

The psychological dynamics of civil-military collaboration

Michael H. Thomson, Barbara D. Adams, Emily-Ana Filardo, Craig R. Flear and
Yvonne C. DeWit

Prepared by:
Humansystems® Incorporated
111 Farquhar St.
Guelph, ON N1H 3N4

Project Manager: Michael H. Thomson, 519-836-5911 ext. 301
PWGSC Contract Number: W7711-098158/001/TOR, Call Up: 8158-04
Contract Scientific Authority: Dr. Angela R. Febbraro, 416-635-3000 Ext. 3120

The scientific or technical validity of this Contract Report is entirely the responsibility of the contractor and the contents do not necessarily have the approval or endorsement of Defence R&D Canada.

Defence Research and Development Canada

Contract Report
DRDC-RDDC-2014-C77
April 2013

© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada (Department of National Defence), 2013

© Sa Majesté la Reine en droit du Canada (Ministère de la Défense nationale), 2013



The psychological dynamics of civil-military collaboration

by:

Michael H. Thomson, Barbara D. Adams, Emily-Ana Filardo, Craig R. Flear and
Yvonne C. DeWit

Humansystems® Incorporated
111 Farquhar St.,
Guelph, ON N1H 3N4

Project Manager:
Michael H. Thomson
519-836-5911 Ext. 301

Standing Offer No: W7711-098158/001/TOR
Call Up: 8158-04

On Behalf of
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

as represented by
Defence Research and Development Canada – Toronto
1133 Sheppard Avenue West
North York, Ontario, Canada
M3M 3B9

DRDC Toronto Scientific Authority:
Dr. Angela R. Febbraro
416-635-3000 Ext. 3120

April 2013



Author

Michael H. Thomson
Humansystems[®] Incorporated

Approved by

Dr. Angela R. Febraro
Socio-Cognitive Systems Section

Approved for release by

K.C. Wulterkens
for Chair, Document Review and Library Committee

The scientific or technical validity of this Contract Report is entirely the responsibility of the contractor and the contents do not necessarily have the approval or endorsement of Defence R&D Canada

© HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF CANADA (2013)
as represented by the Minister of National Defence

© SA MAJESTÉ LA REINE EN DROIT DU CANADA (2013)
Défense Nationale Canada

Abstract

This research was conducted in support of a Defence R&D Canada – Toronto (DRDC Toronto) applied research project (ARP) examining civil-military relations in operations. Military engagements today often require the coordinated efforts of civilian and military assets. Close collaboration with civilian actors may, however, present challenges for militaries, including the Canadian Forces (CF). Previous research suggests a number of potential barriers to effective collaboration among civilian and military actors, including a lack of respect and shared power (Thomson, Adams, Hall, & Flear, 2010; Thomson, Adams, Hall, Brown, & Flear, 2011). Thus, the current research explored psychological dynamics of civil-military collaboration with a focus on the role of respect and power in terms of the process and outcomes of collaboration, through a scenario-based laboratory study. CF personnel and individuals representing non-governmental organizations (NGOs) worked through two operational scenarios using Skype. Scenarios represented CF jurisdiction (project security scenario – PS scenario) and NGO jurisdiction (refugee camp scenario – RC scenario). Results suggested that NGO personnel felt less respected and reported having less power in the RC scenario compared to the PS scenario. Correlational analyses also showed relationships between respect and power and the process of collaboration and outcomes. For example, greater perceptions of being respected and having some power and influence within the negotiation was related to a more integrative negotiation and a more positive perception of one's counterpart and the counterpart's organization, as well as more satisfaction with the negotiation.



Executive Summary

The psychological dynamics of civil-military collaboration

Michael H. Thomson, Barbara D. Adams, Emily-Ana Filardo, Craig R. Flear and Yvonne C. DeWit; Humansystems® Incorporated. Defence Research and Development Canada – Toronto; April 2013.

This research was conducted in support of a Defence R&D Canada – Toronto (DRDC Toronto) applied research project (ARP) examining civil-military relations in operations. Military engagements today often come with a growing imperative to enable post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization, and this requires a different approach from that used in traditional military operations. Known as the comprehensive approach to operations, international intervention combines military and civilian assets to address complex issues in volatile environments to achieve the desired outcomes (e.g., state stability and prosperity). To accomplish mission objectives, militaries, including the Canadian Forces (CF), must work with a number of civilian actors, including other governmental departments (OGDs), international organizations (IOs), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Close collaboration with civilian actors may, however, present challenges, given their diverse cultures, values, and organizational structures and systems.

Indeed, research has identified a number of potential barriers to effective collaboration among civilian and military actors (Thomson, Adams, Hall, & Flear, 2010; Thomson, Adams, Hall, Brown, & Flear, 2011). Two salient issues that have surfaced as challenges in civil-military relations are respect and power, both of which are said to be critical for effective collaboration (San Martin-Rodriguez, Beaulieu, D'Amour, & Ferrada-Videla, 2005). Subject-matter experts (SMEs) from the NGO community felt that their CF counterparts did not always acknowledge their experience and expertise regarding humanitarian and development issues. In civil-military relations, NGO SMEs recalled instances of the CF taking charge of the process, which runs counter to collaboration.

The purpose of the current research was to explore the role of a variety of factors, including respect and power, in understanding the process and outcomes of collaboration. To this end, we asked participants (CF and NGO personnel) to work through two fictional operational scenarios via Skype. Participants had a number of priorities that they needed to resolve during the collaboration, which sometimes conflicted with their counterpart's interests. To address issues of power, each scenario was designed to reflect either a CF jurisdiction (project security scenario – PS scenario) or an NGO jurisdiction (refugee camp scenario – RC scenario), though participants did not always report seeing this distinction in jurisdiction.

Results showed lower NGO ratings of respect and power in the RC scenario compared to the PS scenario. That is, participants representing NGOs reported that their participation, opinions and experience were valued significantly less in the RC scenario than in the PS scenario. They also reported having a significantly harder time in getting their CF counterpart to listen and in getting their own way, even when they tried, within the RC scenario compared to the PS scenario. Compared to CF personnel, NGO personnel were also somewhat more likely to have reported “losing face” during the interaction, and reported feeling significantly less competent as a negotiator after both scenarios.

Correlational analyses showed a relationship between feeling respected and being engaged in the process. Respect was also positively correlated with critical outcomes of collaboration, including perceptions of one's counterpart and their organization, satisfaction with the relationship and future relationships on the basis of the collaboration experience, and satisfaction with the outcome. Respect and personal performance were positively correlated, but only in the RC scenario. Results based on combining CF and NGO responses showed a positive correlation between power and both personal performance and satisfaction with the outcome in the RC scenario, and between power and satisfaction with the outcome, satisfaction with the relationship, and satisfaction with future relationships in the PS scenario. These results suggest that a lack of respect and shared power might negatively impact the process and outcomes of collaboration.

The RC scenario proved to be more challenging than the PS scenario. The apparent authority with respect to jurisdiction within the RC scenario may have been more ambiguous than in the PS scenario, which seemed to open up opportunities for CF personnel to take charge. This might have been a comfortable role for the CF, given that they had more relevant training and were likely more experienced in taking charge than their NGO counterparts. However, the take-charge approach may have had negative consequences. CF personnel believed that they had treated their NGO counterpart respectfully in the RC scenario. However, NGO participants reported feeling less respected during the RC scenario than in the PS scenario, contrary to CF interpretations of their own behaviour.

Implications of these findings and recommendations for future research are discussed.

Table of Contents

ABSTRACT	i
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	iv
LIST OF FIGURES.....	vi
LIST OF TABLES.....	vii
1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. METHOD	7
2.1 PARTICIPANTS.....	7
2.2 SCENARIOS	13
2.3 MEASURES.....	14
2.3.1 <i>Pre-Negotiation Questionnaire</i>	14
2.3.2 <i>Post-Negotiation Questionnaire</i>	14
2.3.3 <i>Measures of Performance</i>	15
2.3.4 <i>Cross-Cultural Competence (IMPPaCTS) Questionnaire</i>	20
2.4 PROCEDURE.....	20
2.4.1 <i>Setup</i>	22
2.4.2 <i>Design</i>	23
3. RESULTS.....	24
3.1 MANIPULATION CHECK	25
3.2 PRE-NEGOTIATION RESULTS	26
3.3 POST-NEGOTIATION RESULTS	29
3.3.1 <i>Conditions of Collaboration</i>	30
3.3.2 <i>Process of Collaboration</i>	39
3.3.3 <i>Outcomes of Collaboration</i>	47
3.4 NEGOTIATION PERFORMANCE	58
3.5 BEHAVIOURAL CODING AND OBSERVER RATINGS.....	59
3.5.1 <i>Respect</i>	60
3.5.2 <i>Influence Strategies</i>	62
3.5.3 <i>Negotiation</i>	65
3.5.4 <i>Communication</i>	69
3.5.5 <i>Observer Ratings and Behavioural Coding Correlation</i>	72
3.5.6 <i>Correlational Analyses for Respect and Power with Collaboration</i>	73
4. DISCUSSION.....	77
4.1.1 <i>Pre-existing Impressions and Anticipated Outcomes</i>	77
4.1.2 <i>Conditions for Collaboration</i>	78
4.1.3 <i>Process of Collaboration</i>	80
4.1.4 <i>Outcomes of Collaboration</i>	80
4.1.5 <i>Future Research</i>	83
4.1.6 <i>Implications for CF Training</i>	84
REFERENCES	85

ANNEX A: VOLUNTARY CONSENT FORM.....	A-1
ANNEX B: INFORMATION BRIEFING.....	B-1
ANNEX C: CF BACKGROUND INFORMATION.....	C-1
ANNEX D: NGO BACKGROUND INFORMATION.....	D-1
ANNEX E: PROJECT SECURITY SCENARIO.....	E-1
ANNEX F: REFUGEE CAMP SCENARIO	F-1
ANNEX G: PRE-NEGOTIATION QUESTIONNAIRE	G-1
ANNEX H: POST-NEGOTIATION QUESTIONNAIRE	H-1
ANNEX I: IMPPACTS QUESTIONNAIRE	I-1

List of Figures

Figure 1: Preliminary framework of CF collaboration in a JIMP operational context (Thomson et al., 2010).....	5
Figure 2: Respect ratings as a function of ambiguity and organization	32
Figure 3: Power and influence as a function of organization and ambiguity	36
Figure 4: Perceptions of counterpart as a function of timing and organization across scenarios.....	48
Figure 5: Perceptions of counterpart's organization as a function of timing and organization across scenarios	50
Figure 6: Self and counterpart respect ratings as a function of organization across scenarios.....	58
Figure 7: Negotiation performance as a function of scenario and organization.....	59
Figure 8: Frequency of respect ratings as a function of scenario and organization.....	60
Figure 9: Observer respect ratings as a function of scenario and organization	62
Figure 10: Frequency of influence ratings as a function of scenario and organization.....	63
Figure 11: Observer influence ratings as a function of scenario and organization.....	65
Figure 12: Frequency of negotiation ratings as a function of scenario and organization.....	66
Figure 13: Observer negotiation ratings as a function of scenario and organization	69
Figure 14: Frequency of communication ratings as a function of scenario and organization	70
Figure 15: Communication ratings as a function of scenario and organization	72

List of Tables

Table 1: General demographic information.....	9
Table 2: Demographics of military personnel	10
Table 3: Demographics of NGO personnel	11
Table 4: Demographics of CF and NGO personnel	12
Table 5: Negotiation performance outcome measures	16
Table 6: Behavioural coding scheme	17
Table 7: Rating scale for observer performance ratings.....	19
Table 8: Session participation	23
Table 9: Perception of jurisdiction in scenarios	25
Table 10: Perception of counterpart	27
Table 11: Perception of counterpart's organization	28
Table 12: Anticipated outcome	29
Table 13: Respect – Descriptives	30
Table 14: Respect – Group comparison	31
Table 15: Power and influence – Analysis.....	33
Table 16: Power and influence – Group comparisons.....	34
Table 17: Trust – Descriptives	37
Table 18: Trust – Group comparison.....	38
Table 19: Communication – Descriptives	39
Table 20: Communication – Group comparison	40
Table 21: Engagement – Descriptives.....	41
Table 22: Engagement – Group comparison	42
Table 23: Negotiation Process – Descriptives.....	43
Table 24: Negotiation process – Group comparison	45
Table 25: Perception of counterpart – Group comparison	47
Table 26: Perceptions of counterpart's organization – Descriptives	49
Table 27: Perceptions of counterpart's organization – Group comparison	49
Table 28: Satisfaction with relationship – Group comparison	51
Table 29: Future relationship – Group comparison.....	51

Table 30: Satisfaction with outcome – Descriptives	52
Table 31: Satisfaction with outcome – Group Comparison	53
Table 32: Personal performance – Descriptives	54
Table 33: Personal performance – Group comparison	55
Table 34: Self-evaluation – Descriptives	56
Table 35: Self-evaluation – Group comparison.....	57
Table 36: Correlations between respect behaviours and own/counterpart ratings	61
Table 37: Correlations between influence behaviours and own/counterpart ratings.....	64
Table 38: Correlations between negotiation behaviours and own/counterpart ratings of integrative negotiation.....	67
Table 39: Correlations between negotiation behaviours and own/counterpart ratings of distributive negotiation.....	68
Table 40: Correlations between communication behaviours and own/counterpart ratings.....	71
Table 41: Correlation between behavioural codes and observer ratings	72
Table 42: Correlations between participant ratings of respect and collaboration process items	73
Table 43: Correlations between participant ratings of respect and collaboration outcomes	74
Table 44: Correlations between participant ratings of power and influence and collaboration items.....	75
Table 45: Correlations between participant ratings of power and influence on collaboration outcomes.....	76

1. Introduction

Today's military engagements often come with a growing imperative to enable post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization, which requires a different approach from that of traditional military operations. Known currently as the comprehensive approach to operations, international intervention combines military and civilian assets to address complex issues in volatile environments to achieve the desired outcomes (e.g., state stability and prosperity). In Afghanistan, for example, combat was only considered part of the equation. The other parts included stabilization, reconstruction and nation-building, and this demanded a configuration of expertise from other governmental departments (OGDs), international organizations (IOs), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Indeed, at the beginning of the Afghan campaign, then Prime Minister Jean Chretien suggested that the principal role for the Canadian Forces (CF) would be "to make sure aid gets to the people who need it" and that Canada's overall engagement would "bring peace and happiness as much as possible" to the Afghan people (quoted in Stein & Lang, 2007). Though the CF would engage in combat when necessary, its strategic outlook would be to provide stabilization in order to open doors for humanitarian assistance (Stein & Lange, 2007). The comprehensive approach became central to CF strategy and planning in Afghanistan, and is likely to continue for future engagements.

However, the phases of intervention (e.g., combat, peace support) are not always linear, as demonstrated by the Afghan example. Despite ousting the Taliban and al-Qaeda elements early on in the military campaign, insurgents continued to persist and terrorize the Afghan populace. As part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the CF was deployed in an unstable, complex environment, where the separation between the war fighting phase and the peace support phase was unclear. "Post"-conflict reconstruction became a misnomer since the development projects that the CF also participated in or enabled were viewed strategically and occurred well before combat operations had ceased. Offering more than just combat elements, the CF initiated quick impact projects (QIPs), which were meant to win support from local nationals in the war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. More than ever before, the CF operated closely with diverse civilian organizations in military operations.

Core to the comprehensive approach then is civil-military relations. And given current global pressures, such as the influence of non-state actors, terrorism and violent conflict, climate change, and strains on energy and natural resources, no one organization has the capacity to operate independently in international interventions (Davidson, 2009). For example, civilian agencies may benefit from military logistical assets (e.g., air lifts, trucks) and security, whereas the military may benefit from civilian expertise. For example, NGOs often reside in countries long before militaries arrive and long after they depart, and as such they can offer important knowledge and understanding of the region and of needs of the local population (Thomson, Adams, Hall, & Flear, 2010). The NGO community also has strong knowledge of humanitarian aid and development projects. Their role is critical in the comprehensive approach given their capacity to facilitate reconstruction and humanitarian efforts. The CF must, therefore, consider appropriate ways to work with this community in order to draw on their expertise and align more effectively their operational goals if these goals include supporting reconstruction and stabilization efforts. These efforts at the same time should safeguard NGO *modus operandi*.

Close working relationships between NGOs and the military, however, may prove to be a challenge. In a recent interview study investigating civil-military collaboration in theatre, for example, subject-matter experts (SMEs) from the NGO community emphasized the adherence to the principles of neutrality and impartiality in order to function effectively and safely in harsh and sometimes hostile environments (Thomson, Adams, Hall, Brown, & Flear, 2011). For some organizations (e.g., Médecins Sans Frontières, International Committee of the Red Cross), any participation with the military in a comprehensive approach impinges on their capacity to function properly and access those most in need (Thomson et al., 2011). Moreover, if NGOs are seen to be taking sides in a conflict and not simply providing aid or support to those in need, they may become targets themselves (Thomson et al., 2011). Relations with the military then can diminish NGO effectiveness and jeopardize their safety. To prevent this, some organizations embrace a clearly demarcated humanitarian space, which must remain “outside” the military battlespace.

On the other hand, there are NGOs who are willing to have some level of involvement with the military. Though they too desire neutrality and impartiality, this does not prevent them from having some level of interaction or relationship with the military. But it does not make the relationship any less challenging. There are plenty of issues that surface based on differences in organizational culture, structures, systems, and values. SMEs, reflecting on their experiences of collaborating with the CF, reported having a level of expertise regarding humanitarian and development issues that was not always consulted or recognized in theatre by the CF (Thomson et al., 2011). They described the CF as taking charge of humanitarian and development issues, rather than seeking counsel from the experts and respecting their (NGOs’) position. The “know it all” attitude and assertive approach, thought to be part of military culture by a few civilian respondents, tended to marginalize the civilian community, thereby discouraging relationship building (Thomson et al., 2011). As one SME stated, “the CF leadership doesn’t necessarily respect the hippy left-wing academic from the NGO world” (as quoted in Thomson et al., 2011, p. 31). Research suggested that power struggles in theatre arose not from an imbalance of power based on resources, the typical construal of power differences (resource dependence perspective – Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Emerson, 1962; both cited in Kim, Pinkley & Fragale, 2005), but from CF attempts to work outside of their jurisdiction in the areas of development and diplomacy (Thomson et al., 2011). While this “take charge” attitude may be the hallmark of good leadership in the CF, it may have unintended negative consequences when exercised in civil-military relations.

To achieve truly collaborative outcomes, which one could argue is the ultimate aim of a comprehensive approach to operations, counterparts are encouraged to listen to the concerns and interests of one another to locate compatible interests and generate mutually satisfactory solutions (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991). At minimum, consultation with key stakeholders (OGDs, NGOs) might make intervention more directed toward the needs of the civilians on the ground, and address reconstruction and stabilization requirements more effectively. Underlying this, however, is the need to respect each other’s expertise and professional contribution. Researchers suggest that mutual respect can facilitate collaboration, but this respect requires knowledge of another organization and its unique contribution to fulfilling collaborative objectives (San Martin-Rodriguez, Beaulieu, D’Amour, & Ferrada-Videla, 2005). Respect, then, is a condition that may explain the difference, at least in part, between ineffective and effective civil-military collaboration.

The concept of respect runs deep in human relations. Some argue that it is a primary good, and that acting justly to one another is a public expression of respect (Rawls, 1971, as cited in Janoff-Bulman & Werther, 2008). The psychological literature divides respect into two types, intergroup (categorical respect) and intragroup (contingency respect), where the former is based on membership in a group and the latter is based on one's standing within the group (Janoff-Bulman & Werther, 2008). According to Janoff-Bulman and Werther, categorical respect is manifest through full participation in a group, being recognized as a group member and having a say on account of that group. That is, "categorical respect grants people a voice" (Janoff-Bulman & Werther, 2008). Indeed, this voice reflects group inclusion (Folger & Cropanzo, 1998; Miller, 2001; Tyler, 1987; all cited in Janoff-Bulman & Werther, 2008) and any kind of participation in group proceedings on issues impacts positively on members' sense of fairness (Tyler, 1987, 1990; Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997; all cited in Janoff-Bulman & Werther, 2008), irrespective of whether or not their voice affected the outcome (Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990, as cited in Janoff-Bulman & Werther, 2008). Categorical respect is a non-hierarchical, unranked form of respect, and as such it is broad in its ascription (Janoff-Bulman & Werther, 2008). On the other hand, contingent respect is earned based on personal performance and competence, and it can move an individual from voice to influence when it is granted (Janoff-Bulman & Werther, 2008). Participating, having a voice, and being heard, as well as having an impact on negotiated outcomes, all point to instances of either categorical respect or contingent respect.

Obtaining respect within one's own group, however, does not necessarily translate into attributions of respect from out-group members. Indeed, highly experienced NGO SMEs shared cases where the military discounted *a priori* their experience and expertise regarding development projects (Thomson et al., 2011). Their experience and past performance did not grant them the respect they expected from out-group members (in this case, CF members). Moreover, age differences between CF and civilian counterparts, in some instances, curtailed the expected amount of desired respect and participation in the operational planning process when it concerned issues of development and diplomacy (Thomson et al., 2010). NGO members mentioned that because they were often younger, they thought that their CF counterparts did not think they could learn anything from them. Discounting the other *is*, according to Janoff-Bulman and Werther (2008), disrespect. They continue that such discounting essentially renders the other "powerless and relatively invisible" in the situation, and when tension or conflict exists (e.g., competing goals), members of out-groups can become "the object of ridicule and humiliation" (p. 154).

From denial of status to de-legitimization, disrespect places the group "outside the sphere of influence and discourse," thereby denying "meaningful participation" (Janoff-Bulman & Werther, 2008, p. 157). Often, non-dominant social groups are seen by dominant groups as lacking knowledge and skills to guide the relevant issues, and as such only minimal contingent respect is granted (Janoff-Bulman & Werther, 2008). As military actors are often large in number compared to their civilian counterparts, the former may be perceived as dominant. But the effects of this perceived dominance will be amplified if all parties accept and maintain the particular social hierarchy.

Perhaps preconceived notions or stereotypes of a group based on prior contact or rumour (e.g., NGOs are "Birkenstock wearing," "tree-huggers," "lazy," and "naïve" – Thomson et al., 2010) de-legitimize the out-group and its members, preventing authentic acts of respect. Considering civil-military relations, Meharg (2007, pp. 124-125) states that "looking in from the outside, each

[CF and NGOs] perceives the other as being homogenous despite detailed sub-group identities that inform their activities in the military and humanitarian space.” And this perception of homogeneity is stronger when in-group and out-group attitudes disagree (Linville, Fischer, & Salovey, 1989, as cited in Janoff-Bulman & Werther, 2008). Perceptions of homogeneity might discourage attributions of uniqueness and value. Indeed, one NGO SME worried that the negative stereotype of her profession exists because sometimes the CF only encounters the needy, “unprofessional,” “ma and pa” NGOs. Within the NGO or CF community itself, there is tremendous diversity. Nevertheless, given that respect derives from having a say, being heard, and having some level of influence, in cases where perceptions of homogeneity are high, respect might very well be withheld.

It is important for all parties to be granted adequate respect if civil-military relations are to work successfully. The most effective way to do this is to promote opportunities to maximize consultation, share experience and expertise, and recognize individual contributions to particular operational challenges. As Janoff-Bulman and Werther (2008, p. 163) state, respect means “listening and acknowledging that the other has a right to shape outcomes as well.” When parties respect one another, this mutual respect might also contribute to a more equal balance of power during working relations and negotiations. In fact, researchers also include shared power as a condition for collaboration (Austin, 2000; Phillips & Graham, 2000; Rapp & Whitfield, 1999; all cited in Foster & Meinhard, 2002). However, in previous research, SMEs thought that CF personnel overstepped their jurisdiction on issues of development and diplomacy, suggesting the CF should stay in their “lane” (Thomson et al., 2011).

The purpose of the present study, therefore, was to investigate respect and power, as well as other conditions for effective collaboration, in civil-military relations, during simulated negotiations involving operational scenarios. Previous research included the development of a preliminary framework for collaborating in a civil-military operational context (Thomson et al., 2010). As shown in Figure 1, a number of variables were identified in the process of collaboration, including communication, negotiation strategies, and engagement, that may be hampered by a lack of respect and shared power. According to this framework, ineffective collaboration processes may lead to suboptimal outcomes.

PRELIMINARY FRAMEWORK OF CF COLLABORATION IN A JIMP OPERATIONAL CONTEXT




Figure 1: Preliminary framework of CF collaboration in a JIMP¹ operational context (Thomson et al., 2010)²

In a laboratory setting, we examined the conditions of collaboration (respect, power, mutual trust), the collaboration process itself (communication, engagement, negotiation), and collaboration outcomes (personal performance, personal relationships, satisfaction with the process). Given SMEs' reported challenges with delineating operational jurisdictions in previous research, we also sought to determine the impact that different operational settings and issues would have on collaboration. In particular, we wondered whether clearly demarcated jurisdictions might promote respect and hence greater collaborative performance, as roles and expectations would be clear in this context. To this end, we conducted a laboratory study in which CF and NGO personnel work through two operational scenarios via Skype (a computer-mediated communication software). One scenario was meant to simulate an NGO jurisdiction and dealt with a refugee camp, whereas the other was meant to simulate a CF jurisdiction and dealt with security for a project in a non-permissive, or hostile, environment. A closer, more controlled analysis of variables impacting collaboration in these particular settings was needed to gain further understanding of civil-military relations, and of the areas that need to be considered for future CF training.

¹ JIMP refers to Joint, Interagency, Multinational, Public.

² Core concepts are highlighted in blue.



This page intentionally left blank.

2. Method

Data collection took place at the Radisson Hotel Kingston Harbourfront, in Kingston, Ontario, and at Humber College, Lakeshore Campus, in Toronto, Ontario, on 27 November 2011. Participants were distributed (i.e., not physically co-located), but linked via Skype during the study, so that CF participants in Kingston negotiated with NGO participants in Toronto. Skype is a computer-mediated communication software that enabled CF-NGO dyads to negotiate “face-to-face” through its video calling feature³. Details of the experimental procedure, including a detailed account of the setup, are provided in the sections that follow.

2.1 Participants

Participants in this study were 21 reserve and regular force military personnel (20 males and 1 female) who had Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) field experience or CIMIC training (except 1 participant who had Information Operations experience) and 22 civilians (4 males and 18 females) enrolled in the International Development Post-Graduate Certificate Program at Humber College in Toronto. Given their training in international development, the civilian group of participants represented two NGOs in this scenario-based negotiation study, and are therefore referred to in this report as the “NGO participants” or “NGO personnel.”

Military participants were recruited with the assistance of the DRDC Toronto military liaison officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Dwayne Hobbs. The liaison ensured that the necessary permissions were in place through the CF chain of command, the Land Strategy Chief of Staff (Land Strat COS), and connected researchers to the appropriate military commanders in charge of tasking CF military personnel.⁴ Military commanders distributed a general invitation via email to participate in the study to those military personnel who had CIMIC field experience or CIMIC training, and who would be eligible to participate.⁵ The timing of recruitment and experimentation coincided with two CF exercises (e.g., Exercise Central Planner) that had been occurring in Kingston at the time in order to maximize study participation. These exercises involved a number of CF personnel who had CIMIC field experience, and provided a critical mass of military personnel from different parts of the Land Force Central Area (LFCA). Participation was elicited via email in advance of the exercises and in person the day before the experiment. The invitation was drafted by the research team to highlight the particular requirements of the study, including approximately 2 hours of participation time, two confidential one-on-one operational negotiations with a member of the NGO community via Skype, and completing questionnaires before and after the negotiation. Potential participants were provided with additional details of the study, including the risks and benefits, and how the results were to be used to inform training in civil-military relations. Those interested in participating contacted the lead researcher to volunteer.

³ Skype® is a software application owned by Microsoft Corporation that allows users to make voice and video calls and chats over the Internet. It is available at www.skype.com.

⁴ As will be discussed, all participants in this study, both military and civilian, were volunteers.

⁵ Given their interactions with NGOs on operations, CIMIC personnel were viewed as appropriate military personnel to participate in this study.



Personnel who voluntarily consented to participate in this research were provided with the necessary study logistics information.

Civilian participants were recruited with the assistance of the International Development Program Coordinator at Humber College. Potential participants were provided with details of the study, including what was expected of them if they participated (e.g., time commitment, study platform, etc.), information about the risks and benefits, and how the results were to be used to inform training around civil-military relations. Potential participants were also briefed by the research team regarding the study. Civilian participants who voluntarily consented to participate in this research were provided with the necessary study logistics information. All participants (both military and civilian) received \$100 in remuneration for their participation. (See Annex A for the Voluntary Consent Form completed by all participants and Annex B for the Information Briefing sheet that was provided to all participants.)

Participants were also asked to complete a Background Information questionnaire (see Annex C for the CF Background Information questionnaire and Annex D for the NGO Background Information questionnaire). Table 1 shows the demographic characteristics of the participants in the study.⁶

⁶ There were 43 participants in total who participated in the negotiation scenarios. Of these, 21 were CF and 22 were NGO participants. Due to scheduling problems, two NGO participants only participated in one session each, whereas all CF participants completed two sessions each. Data for these 2 NGO participants were excluded for all repeated measures analyses. Three of the 21 CF participants and 1 of the 22 NGO participants did not complete the Background Information questionnaire.

Table 1: General demographic information

Variable	Category	CF (N = 18)		Civilian (N = 21)	
		N	%	N	%
First Language	English	18	100	18	85.7
	French	0	0	1	4.8
	Other	0	0	2	9.5
Age	22-26	1	5.6	15	76.2
	27-31	2	11.1	4	19.0
	32-36	1	5.6	1	4.8
	37-41	3	16.7	1	4.8
	42-46	5	27.8	0	0
	47-51	5	27.8	0	0
	52 and over	1	5.6	0	0
Gender	Male	17	94.4	4	19.0
	Female	1	5.6	17	81.0
Education (Highest level obtained)	High school	1	5.6	0	0
	Some university or college	3	16.7	0	0
	University or college degree	8	44.4	18	85.7
	Graduate degree	6	33.3	3	14.3

The demographic distribution varied substantially between CF and civilian participants. The CF participants were predominantly male, while the civilian participants were predominantly female. The range of ages within the CF participants was much greater and was more equally distributed across the age range. The range of ages within the civilian participant sample was much smaller (no one older than 41) and 90% of the civilian participants were between the ages of 22 and 31. Overall, the civilian group tended to be younger than the CF group. Both the CF and civilian participants were predominantly native English speakers. Three-quarters of the CF participants and all of the civilian participants had at least a university/college degree.

Table 2 shows the military experience of the CF personnel, obtained from the CF Background Information questionnaire.

Table 2: Demographics of military personnel

Variable	Category	N	%
Force (n = 18)	Regular force	16	88.8
	Reserve force	2	11.2
Rank (n = 18)	Major	3	16.7
	Lt/Captain	8	44.4
	MWO/CWO	1	5.6
	Sgt/WO	6	33.3
Time serving the CF (n = 18)	Less than a year	0	0
	1-3 years	0	0
	3-5 years	0	0
	5-10 years	1	5.6
	10-15 years	7	38.9
	15-20 years	1	5.6
	20-25 years	5	27.8
	25-30 years	3	16.7
	More than 30 years	1	5.6
Qualified CIMIC Operator	Yes	14	77.8
	No	4	22.2
Qualified CIMIC Staff Officer	Yes	9	50
	No	9	50

As can be seen in Table 2, a majority of the participants were senior or junior officers (majors, captains, and lieutenants). Almost 95% of the participants had a minimum of 10 years of military experience and all but two participants had some prior operational experience (as will be shown in Table 4). Nearly 39% of the participants were senior ranked non-commissioned officers (sergeants, warrant officers, master warrant officers or chief warrant officers). Overall, the military personnel in this study were relatively high ranking, experienced CF members. In addition, many of the CF participants had CIMIC training and experience (e.g., many were qualified CIMIC Operators and/or qualified CIMIC Staff Officers). However, for this study, the CF participants were drawn from an Influence Operations course offered at the Peace Support Training Centre in Kingston, Ontario.

Table 3: Demographics of NGO personnel

Variable	Category	N	%
Current role (n = 22)	Full-time student	21	95.4
	Other	1	4.6

As Table 3 shows, the majority of NGO participants were full-time students.

Table 4: Demographics of CF and NGO personnel

Variable	Category	CF (N = 18)		Civilian (N = 22)	
		N	%	N	%
Operational/Field experiences	0	2	11.1	9	40.9
	1 to 2	13	72.2	9	40.9
	3 to 4	2	11.1	1	4.5
	5 or more	1	5.6	3	13.6
Number of times participants have worked with counterpart's type of organization in the field (i.e., NGO with militaries, and CF with various NGOs)	0	4	22.2	16	72.7
	1 to 2	11	61.1	5 ⁷	22.7
	3 to 4	2	11.1	0	0
	5 or more	0	0	0	0
	Missing	1	5.6	1	4.5
Number of participants indicating past training relevant to working with people or diverse people	Yes	14	77.8	20	90.9
	No	1	5.6	1	4.5
	Missing	3	16.7	1	4.5
Negotiation training experience by area	Interest-based	10	55.6	3	13.6
	BATNA	12	66.7	1	4.5
	Distributive	1	5.6	0	0
	Principled negotiation	1	5.6	1	4.5
	Integrative negotiation	2	11.1	1	4.5
	Mutual gains bargaining	6	33.3	3	13.6
Participants indicating that they have lived in another country (other than for work/on operations)	Yes	9	50	14	63.6
	No	9	50	6	27.3
	Missing	0	0	2	9.1
Participants' ethnicity/heritage	European (including United Kingdom)	11	61.1	5	22.7
	South Asian	1	5.5	4	18.2
	Canadian	4	22.2	3	13.6
	African	0	0	2	9.1
	Iranian	0	0	1	4.5
	Brazilian	0	0	1	4.5
	Jewish	0	0	1	4.5
	Trinidadian	0	0	1	4.5
	Arabic	1	5.5	0	0
	Mixed	0	0	1	4.5
	Missing	1	5.5	3	13.6

⁷ One participant reported that they had worked specifically with the CF a couple of times in the past.

Variable	Category	CF (N = 18)		Civilian (N = 22)	
		N	%	N	%
Second language fluencies indicated by participants. (Note: some participants indicated more than one language; in such cases each language was counted.)	French	3	16.7	1	4.5
	Polish	0	0	1	4.5
	Portuguese	0	0	1	4.5
	Tagalog	0	0	1	4.5
	Konkani	0	0	1	4.5
	Farsi	0	0	1	4.5
	Haitian Creole	0	0	1	4.5
	Tamil	0	0	1	4.5
	German	2	11.1	0	0
	Dutch	1	5.6	0	0
	Spanish	1	5.6	0	0
	Chinese	1	5.6	0	0
	Arabic	1	5.6	0	0
	None	5	27.8	4	18.2
	Missing	7	38.9	9	40.9

Note. BATNA = Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement

Of particular note in Table 4 is the limited negotiation training that NGO personnel had in comparison to the CF personnel. Moreover, about three-quarters of the NGO personnel had no prior experience working with a military in the field, whereas about three-quarters of the CF personnel had some experience working with NGOs. Most NGO personnel had some field experience; in some cases, however, the experience was limited to only a couple of months in duration. In addition, based on the available data regarding ethnicity, the civilian participants were relatively more likely than the CF participants to be members of visible minorities.

2.2 Scenarios

Two scenarios were created by the lead researcher and revised with feedback from SMEs (military personnel and experienced NGO personnel). Given that contested jurisdictions have been noted in previous research to impact negatively on collaboration within a comprehensive operational environment (Thomson et al., 2011), these scenarios were designed to represent either CF jurisdiction (project security or PS scenario) or NGO jurisdiction (refugee camp or RC scenario). The PS scenario focused on the security of a water irrigation and well development project. In the scenario, a fictional Canadian NGO, Water Management for the Future, had been awarded the project through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Because all CIDA funded projects fall under the auspices of the WoG approach to international engagements and the CF was part of this Government of Canada strategy in this particular operational context, the CF was tasked with providing the necessary security to ensure that the project contract is fulfilled. The dispute between the two participants (CF and NGO) lay in how much security was necessary. In contrast, the RC scenario focused on the establishment of a

refugee camp. Outside its current role of providing security and border control in the region, the CF in this scenario, which focused on a humanitarian crisis, had provided some logistical support and security to existing refugees close to its operations. Accordingly, the CF had been asked to work with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) representative⁸ to help resolve the growing refugee crisis. The dispute between the two participants lay primarily in the location of the camp for the recent surge in refugees. The full versions of these scenarios are shown in Annex E and Annex F, respectively.

2.3 Measures

The measures for this study were administered before the scenario (i.e., negotiation) commenced (Pre-Negotiation Questionnaire; see Annex G) and immediately after completion of the scenario (Post-Negotiation Questionnaire; see Annex H). The latter questionnaire included the collaboration framework questionnaire and the negotiation performance outcome measure, as described below.

2.3.1 Pre-Negotiation Questionnaire

This short, 10-item self-report measure was included to capture the participants' perceptions of their counterpart and of their counterpart's organization before meeting. Considerable thought was given to the trade-off of balancing the benefits of capturing pre-existing stereotypes and perceptions of their counterpart and their organization, with the risks of priming thinking patterns that could interfere with the negotiation itself. The measure asked participants to respond to 10 statements using a Likert-type scale. Individual items assessed, for example, dimensions of overall valence of perceptions, trustworthiness, and values congruence. Other items gauged participants' expectations of the probability of experiencing personal success during the scenario and the probability of their counterpart experiencing personal success coming out of the negotiation. A final item was included to ensure that participants understood the scenario itself (i.e., to check whether or not participants viewed the scenario as involving CF jurisdiction or NGO jurisdiction).

2.3.2 Post-Negotiation Questionnaire

This 70-item self-report measure assessed a number of dimensions included in the collaboration framework (see Figure 1) using a Likert-type scale response format. As described below, many of the items were taken from existing measures. Where no existing measures could be identified, researchers developed new items. Constructs that were explored related to respect, power and influence (adapted from the Sense of Power Scale [Anderson, John & Keltner, 2011]), trust (item 5 adapted from the Subjective Value Inventory [Curhan, Elfenbein & Xu, 2006]), goal and value congruency, and perceptions of the counterpart and counterpart's organization. Other constructs were related to perceptions of the negotiation process itself and were captured using items that tapped perceived quality of communication (e.g., sharing interests, asking about priorities, etc.) and negotiating strategies (e.g., making offers, making concessions, etc.). Negotiation items were adapted from Weingart, Olekalns, and Smith (2004) and were categorized according to either

⁸ Originally, a fictional NGO was included in this scenario. However, based on SME feedback on the draft scenario, it was decided to include a real-world NGO in this scenario, rather than a fictional NGO.

integrative or distributed negotiation. Finally, feelings about the self (which measured satisfaction with various aspects of one's own performance), and feelings about the negotiators' interpersonal relationship were also measured by items borrowed from Curhan et al. (2006) and developed by the HSI[®] research team.

2.3.3 Measures of Performance

Three different measures of performance were used. These included (a) objective measures of negotiation performance associated with each specific scenario, (b) the coding of specific collaboration-related behaviours in the video, and (c) observer ratings of overall collaborative performance in the video (at both the individual and dyadic level). These measures are each described in the sections that follow.

2.3.3.1 Negotiation Performance Outcome Measure

During creation of the scenarios used in this study, objective measures of negotiation performance were created based on the stated priorities given to each party and measured at the completion of the negotiation. For example, in the RC scenario, NGO participants received 30 points for obtaining agreement to keep the refugee camp in Feawana, but only 10 points if they agreed to move the camp to Quana (see Annex F). In contrast, CF participants were awarded 30 points for negotiating a move to Quana and only 10 points for keeping the refugees in Feawana. Point allocations were determined prior to the negotiations for four main priorities in the RC scenario and for three main priorities in the PS scenario. Priorities were confirmed using military and NGO SMEs to reflect actual operational realities. Table 5 shows the distribution of points to priorities for each scenario.

Table 5: Negotiation performance outcome measures

REFUGEE CAMP SCENARIO			
Priorities	Options	CF points	NGO points
The location of the camp	Stays in Feawana	10	30
	Moves to Quana	30	10
Security	Providing/Gaining security in Feawana	10	10
	Providing/Gaining security in Quana	20	20
Aid	Providing/Gaining food, water, medical aid in Feawana	10	10
	Providing/Gaining food, water, medical aid in Quana	20	20
If agree to move the refugees, timeframe for moving them	2 weeks	30	10
	4 weeks	20	10
	6 weeks	10	30
	8 weeks	10	30
PROJECT SECURITY SCENARIO			
Priorities	Options	CF points	NGO points
Providing security	Status quo, continuous surveillance, FOB	30	0
	3 weekly patrols from Usam	20	5
	1 weekly patrol from Usam	10	10
On-site visits of CF with CIDA representatives	No visits	0	20
	1 Visit per month	10	10
	2 Visits per month	20	0
Project involvement	No involvement	0	30
	Some involvement (e.g., CF digging wells, delivering materials)	10	0

As indicated in Table 5, the negotiation issue in the RC scenario focused primarily on the location of the refugee camp (Feawana vs. Quana), but also important as a negotiation issue was the timeframe for moving the refugees if such a movement was agreed to be appropriate (e.g., 2 weeks vs. 6-8 weeks). Security and aid were also negotiation priorities in the RC scenario, but for these priorities, the preferred option of providing/gaining security and aid in Quana, rather than Feawana, was the same for both the CF and NGO participants. In the PS scenario, the main negotiation priorities included the provision of security by the CF, the number of on-site visits of CF with CIDA representatives per month, and the degree of project involvement for the CF. For these priorities, the preferred options differed for the CF and NGO participants. For example, regarding security provision, the CF preferred continuous surveillance, whereas the NGO-preferred option was a weekly patrol; regarding project involvement, the CF preferred to have some project involvement, whereas the NGO participants preferred the CF to have no project involvement. In addition, in the PS scenario, the number one priority for the CF was providing security, but the number one priority for the NGO participants pertained to project involvement (see Annex E). (The relative ranking of priorities in the RC scenario did not differ for the CF and NGO participants.)

It is important to note that the participants had knowledge of their priorities during the negotiations, but they were not made aware of the point totals allocated to each outcome option. Their individual score reflects the total point-value of a participant's negotiated outcome divided

by the total available points for that scenario. Because total scores for each scenario were different, this percentage score made it possible to conduct a between-scenario comparison.

2.3.3.2 Behavioural Coding

As previously noted, face-to-face negotiations between the CF and NGO participants was facilitated by Microsoft's Skype video conferencing technology. With the consent of the participants, these interactions were video- and audio-recorded using Ecamm's Skype recording software, thus capturing these data for subsequent behavioural analysis.

A behavioural coding scheme, developed by the HSI[®] research team, drew on the literature regarding the elements necessary for effective collaboration. It was broken down into four broad behavioural categories: respect (Mackenzie, 2011), influence strategies and power (Yukl & Tracey, 1992, as cited in Kim, Pinkley, & Fragale, 2005), negotiation (Weingart et al., 2004), and communication (HSI[®] team). Within these four categories, 36 optimal and suboptimal behaviours were delineated with examples to help guide the coder's inclusion/exclusion decisions, as shown in Table 6.

Table 6: Behavioural coding scheme

OPTIMAL		SUBOPTIMAL	
Respect			
<i>Behaviour</i>	<i>Examples</i>	<i>Behaviour</i>	<i>Examples</i>
Acknowledges counterpart's expertise	"You're the experts in security."	Discredits counterpart's expertise	"We can easily move all of those refugees in 2 weeks."
Acknowledges counterpart's experience	"I can see that your position is based on your experience."	Discounts counterpart's experience	"This situation is different than others."
Listens and reiterates counterpart's interests/priorities	"So you're saying that you'd prefer if we weren't involved in the project at all because you see this as a risk to your staff if they're seen talking to us."	Uses sarcasm/condescending tone	"Without us, you'd be dead."
Shows consideration for counterpart's opinion/position	"I appreciate what you're saying ...that's a valid point..."	Simply keeps restating their point of view without reference to counterpart interests	"As I've said before..."
Influence Strategies (power)			
<i>Behaviour</i>	<i>Examples</i>	<i>Behaviour</i>	<i>Examples</i>
Uses logical argumentation (including expertise/experience) and factual evidence to set priorities (rational persuasion)	"We'd like to leave the camp in Feawana to avoid overcrowding." Or "In my experience...for example"	Praise, flattery and sucking-up (ingratiation)	"We really appreciate the security that you're providing, but..."
Seeks input from counterpart on proposals & priorities	"What do you think we should do to ensure we both	Demands or threatens, (pressure)	"Look, without us, you'll be dead."

OPTIMAL		SUBOPTIMAL	
(consultation)	meet our objectives?"		
Offers resources to support requests (collaboration)	"We can provide the trucks, air support if you choose to move the refugees to Quana."	Refers to having the support of others in order to advance their own priorities (coalition tactics)	"The Garna government has requested that we move the refugees to Quana."
Appeals to counterpart's values and ideals to get them to commit (inspirational appeal)	"Look we both want to ensure the people get what they need."	Questions legitimacy of requests or counterpart's authority (legitimizing tactics)	"Well, y'know, I can't make that decision, but I can take this up to my CO." "Are you in a position to make that decision?"
Negotiation			
<i>Behaviour</i>	<i>Examples</i>	<i>Behaviour</i>	<i>Examples</i>
Asks what issues are important to counterpart	"I'd like to hear what your priorities are."	Constructs arguments around own priorities	"We need to wrap this up in 2 weeks."
Shares which issues are important to himself/herself	"Our priority is to keep the camp in Feawana as well as receive any security and aid from the CF to support our efforts."	Makes arguments against counterpart's priorities	"If we keep the camp in Feawana, the security risk to the population is too great. We should move it to Quana."
Raises more than one issue at a time; asks to explore how to proceed on more than one issue	"Let's discuss how we can keep the worksite safe while trying to appear as though we are not involved with your group."	Suggests addressing one issue at a time	"Let's focus on one thing at a time."
Suggests a concession be made in exchange for an unidentified future concession	"If we agree to patrol the worksite only once weekly, then perhaps we could get involved with the project more directly in the future?"	Suggests a compromise or willingness to concede on an issue for the sake of gaining on another issue.	"I will agree to move the camp, if you agree to provide all of the supplies we will need."
Makes an offer on two or more issues at one time	"I would like to suggest moving the camp to Quana, where CF could provide food supplies and medical aid."	Questions the argument presented by one's counterpart	"I don't believe that patrolling once a week will provide your project with the security needed. Do you have other security arrangements?"
Communication			
<i>Behaviour</i>	<i>Examples</i>	<i>Behaviour</i>	<i>Examples</i>
Gives counterpart an equal amount of time to express his or her views	Does not monopolize the negotiation	Fails to give counterpart time to respond/explain	Interrupts and/or monopolizes conversation
Exchanges ideas freely and honestly	Makes their priorities clear. Does not hold back crucial pieces of information	Withholds relevant information and or objectives	Not forthcoming with information that could be relevant to the negotiation (e.g., waits for counterpart to ask for aid before offering even though has been authorized to provide aid).

OPTIMAL		SUBOPTIMAL	
Friendly communication	Makes eye contact, smiles, warm tone in voice	Unfriendly communication	Avoids eye contact, body language is stand-offish
Articulates points	Speaks clearly without fumbling for words, etc.	Unable to articulate concerns and/or objectives clearly	Stumbles over words, excessive use of filler words (e.g., "um", "you know", etc)
Spells out/explains industry acronyms	"FOB stands for forward operating base."	Over-uses industry acronyms.	"We can meet at the FOB for a sitrep."

There were 42 videos to be analyzed, 21 each for the PS and RC scenarios.⁹ Each video showed the CF participant on one side of the screen and the NGO participant on the other side of the screen.

Within Final Cut Pro, the split-screen video was displayed above the video timeline. The coding was designed to appear over the video of the appropriate participant (i.e., right or left side). This software enabled the HSI[®] researcher to use transparent overlays to input codes on the timeline, attributing them to either the CF or NGO participant. These codes indicated the broad behavioural category (i.e., respect), and whether it was an optimal or sub-optimal example. While coding specific behaviours within each video, examples of specific behaviours were also identified for qualitative reporting.

2.3.3.3 Observer Ratings of Overall Collaborative Performance

Though the behavioural coding of suboptimal and optimal behaviours is a valuable source of data, it does not provide an overall rating of the performance of participants, or of the collaborative performance in the dyads. Therefore, the HSI researcher who performed the behavioural coding also made observer ratings of the individual participant's performance and of the collaborative performance of the dyad at the completion of each video. Performance as related to respect, influence, negotiation and communication was rated separately on each of the four behavioural categories, based on the quality and quantity of the observed behaviours. The rating scale that was used is shown in Table 7.

Table 7: Rating scale for observer performance ratings

	1	2	3	4	5
Evidence	Only sub-optimal behaviours	Majority of behaviours suboptimal	Equal number of suboptimal / optimal OR no evidence of either	Majority of behaviours optimal	Only optimal behaviours
Interpretation	Very weak collaborator / collaboration	Weak collaborator / collaboration	Average/adequate collaborator / collaboration	Strong collaborator / collaboration	Very strong collaborator / collaboration

⁹ The .M4V files produced by Ecamm's Skype recording software were first converted into QuickTime .MOV files so that they could be imported into Final Cut Pro.

For example, if a participant displayed more optimal respect behaviours than suboptimal respect behaviours, then the observer would give a performance rating of 4 on the 5-point rating scale. If the participant and their counterpart combined displayed more suboptimal respect behaviours than optimal respect behaviours, then they would receive an observer dyad performance rating of 2 on the 5-point rating scale.

Once the coding of all the videos was completed, the frequency of the codes for each behavioural category in each video was exported into Microsoft Excel. If the overall observer ratings of the participants' collaborations were accurate, then they should be positively related to the frequency of optimal behaviours and negatively related to the frequency of suboptimal behaviours. In other words, a higher frequency of optimal behaviours should be associated with the observer rating the participant as a strong collaborator overall, and a higher frequency of suboptimal behaviours should be associated with the observer rating the participant as a weak collaborator overall. As such, the frequencies of the behaviours were correlated with the overall observer performance ratings on each of the four behaviour categories (respect, influence, negotiation, communication) in order to validate the observer ratings.

2.3.4 Cross-Cultural Competence (IMPPaCTS) Questionnaire

Because this study provided a rich opportunity to explore collaboration in a realistic scenario, it was conducted in conjunction with another study exploring the impact of cross-cultural competencies when working in complex collaborative environments (Adams, DeWit, Filardo, Brown, & Flear, 2012). The cross-cultural competence component was added to the current study by administering a 31-item questionnaire exploring several sets of competencies assumed to be relevant when working collaboratively in diverse environments. This scale included measures of Influence/Leadership, Motivation, People Skills, Problem-Solving, Cultural Knowledge, Thinking Skills/Adaptability, and Social Monitoring, and thus is referred to as the IMPPaCTS questionnaire (see Annex I).¹⁰

2.4 Procedure

Potential military candidates for this study were recruited and briefed via email. Military commanders distributed a general invitation via email to participate in the study to those military personnel who had CIMIC field experience or CIMIC training, and who would be eligible to participate. The invitation was drafted by the research team to highlight the particular requirements of the study, including approximately 2 hours of participation time, two confidential one-on-one operational negotiations with a member of the NGO community via Skype, and the completion of questionnaires before and after the negotiation. Potential participants were provided with additional details of the study, including the risks and benefits, and how the results were to be used to inform training in civil-military relations. Those interested in participating contacted the lead researcher to volunteer by phone and/or email. In order to meet the required number of participants, some military candidates were briefed in person during Exercise Central Planner in Kingston. Again, requirements for the study were included in the in-person briefing.

¹⁰ The IMPPaCTS measure originally contained 33-items. However, 2 items were removed to improve the psychometric quality of the scale, resulting in a 31-item version. Annex I contains the original 33-item version. Removed items are indicated.

Those who chose to participate added their name to a list and were then contacted by the lead HSI[®] researcher via email.

Civilian participants were recruited with the assistance of the International Development Program Coordinator at Humber College. Potential participants were provided with the same details of the study that the CF candidates received, including what was expected of them if they participated (e.g., time commitment, study platform, etc.), information about the risks and benefits, and how the results were to be used to inform training around civil-military relations. This briefing took place in person at Humber College.

Following the brief about the study and the requirements, candidates who agreed to participate contacted the lead HSI[®] researcher either by phone or email or, in the case of those recruited directly at Exercise Central Planner in Kingston, in person and then followed up by an email. Participants were then sent a link to complete the IMPPaCTS questionnaire using the online FluidSurveys system. They were informed that IMPPaCTS was the first part of the study and that the second part of the study was the scenario-based piece investigating civil-military relations (although a number of CF participants completed the IMPPaCTS questionnaire *after* the scenario piece; see below). Participants were informed that the IMPPaCTS questionnaire had an online Voluntary Consent Form (Annex A) for both components of the study that they needed to read carefully and complete in order to participate in the research. The IMPPaCTS questionnaire also included the Information Briefing sheet describing the study (Annex B), which also needed to be read before completing the Voluntary Consent Form and the survey. At the end of the IMPPaCTS questionnaire, participants completed a Background Information questionnaire (see Annexes C and D), containing questions related to age, gender, education, training and operational or field experience, as previously discussed. Participants were then contacted by a researcher via email and provided with the study logistics.

It should be noted that, to the extent possible, we attempted to minimize potential interference effects (i.e., of completing the IMPPaCTS questionnaire on performance in the scenario-based laboratory study, or vice versa). Two approaches were used to guard against interference. First, we attempted to counterbalance the order in which participants completed the IMPPaCTS questionnaire so that roughly half would complete the questionnaire before the scenario study and about half would complete it afterwards. In actuality, however, given the constantly shifting nature of the participant pool, we determined that it would not be feasible to totally counterbalance the order of completion. Doing so would risk attrition of participants who completed the scenario-based collaboration study first, as we would no longer be in direct contact with them and the requirement to complete the IMPPaCTS questionnaire would no longer be salient. Rather than take this risk, we determined that ensuring that a reasonable amount of time had elapsed between completion of the IMPPaCTS questionnaire and participation in the scenario study would serve to lower the potential for interference. Of the 18 CF personnel who completed the IMPPaCTS questionnaire, 10 (56%) completed it before the scenario study, and 8 (44%) completed it after the scenario study. Those who completed the IMPPaCTS questionnaire after the scenario study had volunteered to participate in the scenario study the day before taking part in the scenario study so did not have time to complete the online version of the IMPPaCTS questionnaire. Instead, they completed it during the week following the scenario study. Those who did not complete the IMPPaCTS questionnaire online before the scenario study were asked to read the Information Briefing sheet and complete the Voluntary Consent Form when they arrived for the experimental session (scenario study). All of the 22 NGO participants completed

the IMPPaCTS questionnaire at least one day in advance of the scenario component. The time lag decreased the risk of interference given that full counterbalancing could not be achieved.

To begin the study session, participants were seated at a workstation. A researcher reviewed the purpose of the study and the role of participants, including the expectations of participants. Participants were then provided with an information package that outlined the background of the fictional scenario, what organization they represented (the CF or the UNHCR/the fictional Water Management for the Future), their role within that organization, and the organization's priorities (see Annexes E and F). Participants were instructed to read the information package carefully and were encouraged to take notes. They were told that they needed to work out or negotiate these priorities with their CF or NGO counterpart. Participants were asked to use their own names (and rank for CF) in the scenarios and to fulfil their role to the best of their ability.

Once participants finished reading the information package, and before meeting their counterpart via Skype, they were asked to complete the Pre-Negotiation Questionnaire (Annex G), also captured using the online FluidSurveys. Once this questionnaire was completed, the researchers initiated the Skype video call and participants began working through their priorities with their counterpart. Participants were required to balance the predefined goals or priorities of their organization with the goals and priorities of their counterpart to achieve a mutually satisfactory conclusion to the negotiation. Each scenario took between 15 and 20 minutes to complete, and this was controlled by the primary HSI[®] researcher. The instructions given to participants emphasized that they would have approximately 15 minutes to complete the scenario-based negotiation and would receive a 5-minute warning that they needed to wrap up the negotiation. When necessary, warnings were given to both members of the dyad to constrain the total length of the negotiation. Following the negotiation, participants completed the Post-Negotiation Questionnaire (Annex H).

Participants conducted two different negotiations with two different counterparts and followed the same procedure each time (i.e., read the instruction package, completed the Pre-Negotiation Questionnaire, negotiated, and completed the Post-Negotiation Questionnaire).¹¹

Following the study, participants received remuneration (\$100) for their participation.

2.4.1 Setup

The scenario-based negotiations were conducted in three adjacent rooms at Humber College in Toronto (NGO test bed) and one divided room at the Radisson Hotel in Kingston Waterfront (CF test bed). This configuration provided enough privacy for negotiations, but also enabled members of the research team the necessary level of oversight given the complex technical requirements. Each location had the necessary equipment to allow up to 10 simultaneous negotiations via Skype. This was necessary because the military personnel were only available for a limited amount of time, and because the exact number of participants was not known until the day of the study. Each room was equipped with multiple MacBook laptop computers, which included a high-quality, built-in video camera. In Kingston, the computers were connected to the Internet via

¹¹ In the original study design, it had been planned that participants would complete three negotiations, as reflected in the Voluntary Consent Form (Annex A) and the Information Briefing sheet (Annex B). However, time constraints on the availability of participants permitted only two negotiations.

a wired connection (with hub to accommodate multiple computers). In Toronto, the computers were connected to a wireless network at Humber College. In addition, to more fully immerse participants in the scenario and to minimize any surrounding noise from adjacent negotiations, noise-cancelling headsets (with earphones and microphones) were provided to participants. Skype software, including Skype recording software, was installed on each MacBook to capture both the video and audio of the scenario-based negotiations. This recording software was a third-party Skype add-on application called Call Recorder¹², which saved the data onto a hard drive in a QuickTime (.mov) format. This format was compatible with the Final Cut Pro¹³ video editing software, which was used to code the negotiations.

Each MacBook was assigned a descriptive Skype username (e.g., PSTCMacBook 1, HumberMacBook 2, etc.) and password. The username was used as a unique identifier and was required in order to connect with other Skype users at the other site. Researchers connected participants by sending a video call request to the Skype account associated with their counterpart's MacBook station. Upon accepting the request, participants were joined in a video conversation and could commence the negotiation task with their counterpart.

2.4.2 Design

This experiment was conducted in three separate sessions running approximately 1.5 hours each over the course of one day (27 Nov 2011). Over the course of each session, each participant took part in two separate, one-on-one negotiations with two different counterparts. Participants were randomly assigned to negotiation counterparts. All CF participants worked through both of the scenarios. As noted earlier, two of the NGO participants worked through only one scenario each (one worked through the RC scenario and the other worked through the PS scenario). The order of scenario presentation was counterbalanced across participants, so that half of the participants ($N = 21$) did the RC scenario first, and half of the participants ($N = 21$) did the PS scenario first. The number of participants in each of the three sessions is shown in Table 8.

Table 8: Session participation

	<i>CF Participants</i>	<i>NGO Participants</i>	<i>Total Number of Participants in Dyads</i>
Session 1	6	6	12
Session 2	10	10	20
Session 3	5	5	10
Total	21	21	42

As outlined in the table, Session 1 and Session 3 saw 6 and 5 simultaneous negotiations, respectively, while Session 2 met the full capacity of our network, hosting 10 simultaneous negotiations.

¹² <http://www.ecamm.com/mac/callrecorder/>

¹³ <http://www.apple.com/finalcutpro/>



This page intentionally left blank.

3. Results

3.1 Manipulation Check

After reading the scenario and prior to negotiating with their counterpart, participants were asked to judge under whose authority or jurisdiction the general issue in the scenario fell. Ideally, all of the participants should have seen the PS scenario as residing under CF jurisdiction and the RC scenario as residing under NGO jurisdiction. However, as can be seen in Table 9, participants perceived no clear delineation of jurisdiction for either scenario.

Table 9: Perception of jurisdiction in scenarios

	Organization	CF jurisdiction	NGO jurisdiction	Not Clear
Project Security	CF	14	1	6
	NGO	7	10	4
	Overall	21	11	10
Refugee Camp	CF	9	2	10
	NGO	5	8	7
	Overall	14	10	17

In project security, one-half (50%) of the participants thought correctly that the situation fell under CF jurisdiction, and many of these participants were CF members, whereas the other 50% thought it was either NGO jurisdiction (mainly civilian participants viewed it this way) or they reported that the jurisdiction was not clear. Perceptions of the jurisdiction for the RC scenario were even less clear than the PS scenario. A greater percentage of participants thought that the jurisdiction was unclear (41%) compared to either under CF (34%) or NGO (24%) jurisdiction (the latter being the correct response). Among those CF members who decided on the jurisdiction for RC, they were relatively more likely to see it as falling under CF authority than under NGO authority. In the RC scenario, the majority of NGO participants who were decided on jurisdiction were relatively more likely to see the scenario as falling under their authority than falling under CF authority.

From this information, it would appear that the jurisdiction manipulation was not successful. The reasons for the failure of this manipulation could lie with a pre-existing bias to favour one's own organization as the authority figure, either in perceptions of the scenarios themselves or simply when responding to the manipulation check question. With regard to a bias in favour of one's own organization, participants may have focused only on the parts of the scenario that were relevant to their own organization, thus assuming authority for that piece. For example, in the PS scenario, NGO participants may have focused more on the water irrigation project aspect of the scenario, rather than on the security aspect. From this perspective, they could reasonably see the situation as falling under NGO jurisdiction. Likewise, in the RC scenario, CF participants may have focused their attention on the security threat and on their potential role in mitigating this threat, rather than on the humanitarian needs of the refugees. From this perspective, it would be reasonable for CF personnel to see the situation as logically falling under CF jurisdiction. In addition, within the RC scenario, one of the priorities was explicitly identified as security. From



that perspective, it would have been reasonable for any of the participants to view the RC scenario as a falling under CF (or military) jurisdiction.

3.2 Pre-Negotiation Results

As noted earlier, prior to the negotiation, participants had completed a questionnaire exploring their perceptions of their counterpart, their counterpart's organization, and the anticipated outcome of the scenario-based negotiation.

Because participants took part in both the PS and RC scenario negotiations, a mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted with one between-groups factor (organization: NGO vs. CF)¹⁴ and one within-groups factor (scenario: PS vs. RC) variable. These analyses were conducted on both the pre- and post-negotiation questionnaires as well as on the negotiation performance outcome measure. Due to the number of analyses that were conducted, the more conservative *p* value of .002 was adopted to reduce Type II error. However, marginally significant results ($p < .05$) are also noted.

It was important to first explore the preconceptions and expectations of the participants in the two groups (CF vs. NGO), as these could impact how the interaction between counterparts and negotiation proceeded. Results for these analyses on the question related to initial perceptions of one's counterpart, as assessed on a 5-point scale, are shown in Table 10.

¹⁴ Because of the skewed distribution of gender across organizations, analyses were also conducted substituting gender for organization. In each case, gender was a less significant predictor than organization, supporting the hypothesis that the results are due to organizational membership rather than gender. However, because gender and organization are largely confounded in this study, this argument cannot be made conclusively. To disentangle the organizational and gender effects, one would require equal numbers of males and females in both organizations.

Table 10: Perception of counterpart

Scale Items	CF (N = 21)				NGO (N = 20) ¹⁵				Overall (N = 41)				<i>p</i>
	Project Security		Refugee Camp		Project Security		Refugee Camp		Project Security		Refugee Camp		
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
What kind of "overall" impression does your counterpart make on you at this point?	2.48	0.68	3.24	0.62	3.15	0.99	3.20	0.52	2.80	0.90	3.22	0.57	S < .05 O < .05 S×O < .002
	Mean = 2.86 SD = 0.48				Mean = 3.17 SD = 0.52				Mean = 3.01 SD = 0.52				
My values are similar to my counterpart's values.	3.29	0.90	3.62	0.86	2.80	0.95	2.85	1.09	3.05	0.95	3.24	1.04	S = <i>n.s.</i> O < .05 S×O = <i>n.s.</i>
	Mean = 3.45 SD = 0.63				Mean = 2.82 SD = 0.80				Mean = 3.15 SD = 0.78				
Index ¹⁶	2.88	0.69	3.43	0.62	2.97	0.83	3.02	0.70	2.93	0.75	3.23	0.68	S = <i>n.s.</i> O = <i>n.s.</i> S×O = <i>n.s.</i>
	Mean = 3.15 SD = 0.47				Mean = 3.00 SD = 0.56				Mean = 3.08 SD = 0.52				

Note: Range of scale = 1 to 5; S = Scenario; O = Organization.

As Table 10 shows, prior to negotiating, across scenarios, CF members had a marginally less positive overall impression of their counterpart ($M = 2.86$, $SD = 0.48$) than did NGO members ($M = 3.17$, $SD = 0.52$; $F_{1,39} = 4.16$, $p = .048$), which indicated a marginally significant main effect for organization. Furthermore, across organizations, participants had a marginally better overall impression of their counterpart in the RC scenario ($M = 3.22$, $SD = 0.57$) than in the PS scenario ($M = 2.80$, $SD = 0.90$; $F_{1,39} = 6.16$, $p = .017$), indicating a marginally significant main effect for scenario. Looking at the marginal scenario × organization interaction effect, while NGO personnel had similar impressions of their CF counterpart in both scenarios ($M_s = 3.15$ & 3.20 , $SD = 0.99$ & 0.52 , for PS and RC, respectively), CF personnel were less positive about their NGO counterparts in the PS scenario (which was viewed by most CF participants as a representing a CF jurisdiction; $M = 2.48$, $SD = 0.68$) than in the RC scenario ($M = 3.24$, $SD = 0.62$; $F_{1,39} = 4.73$, $p = .036$). Across scenarios, CF members also felt that their counterparts' values were more similar to their own ($M = 3.45$, $SD = 0.63$) than did the NGO members ($M = 2.82$, $SD = 0.80$; $F_{1,39} = 7.83$, $p = .008$). There was no main effect of scenario and no scenario × organization interaction effect for perceptions of the similarity of values.

The next set of questions explored perceptions of the counterpart's organization more generally, as shown in Table 11.

¹⁵ Due to unforeseen circumstances, two NGO participants took part in only one scenario each. The data from these participants were excluded from any of the mixed-model analyses that were conducted.

¹⁶ The index was calculated using the average of participants' responses to the items indicated in the table.

Table 11: Perception of counterpart's organization

Scale Items	CF (N = 21)				NGO (N = 20)				Overall (N = 41)				<i>p</i>
	Project Security		Refugee Camp		Project Security		Refugee Camp		Project Security		Refugee Camp		
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
What kind of "overall" impression does your counterpart's organization make on you at this point?	2.67	0.48	3.10	0.30	3.30	0.98	3.20	0.52	2.98	0.82	3.15	0.42	S = <i>n.s.</i> O < .05 S×O = <i>n.s.</i>
	Mean = 2.88 SD = 0.27				Mean = 3.25 SD = 0.53				Mean = 3.06 SD = 0.45				
I believe my counterpart's organization to be trustworthy.	3.67	0.73	3.81	0.60	4.00	1.08	3.80	1.01	3.83	0.92	3.80	0.81	S = <i>n.s.</i> O = <i>n.s.</i> S×O = <i>n.s.</i>
	Mean = 3.74 SD = 0.52				Mean = 3.90 SD = 0.94				Mean = 3.82 SD = 0.75				
The goals of my organization overlap with those of my counterpart's organization.	3.71	1.06	3.48	1.21	2.65	1.09	3.15	1.27	3.20	1.19	3.32	1.23	S = <i>n.s.</i> O < .05 S×O = <i>n.s.</i>
	Mean = 3.60 SD = 0.96				Mean = 2.90 SD = 0.90				Mean = 3.26 SD = 0.98				
Index	3.35	0.52	3.46	0.44	3.32	0.86	3.38	0.70	3.33	0.70	3.42	0.58	S = <i>n.s.</i> O = <i>n.s.</i> S×O = <i>n.s.</i>
	Mean = 3.40 SD = 0.41				Mean = 3.35 SD = 0.66				Mean = 3.38 SD = 0.54				

Note: Range of scale = 1 to 5; S = Scenario; O = Organization.

The only significant results regarding perceptions of one's counterpart's organization were for the questions related to the overall impression of the counterpart's organization and the overlap of the goals of the organizations. In both cases, there was a marginally significant main effect for organization. Specifically, CF personnel reported a marginally significantly less positive "overall" impression of the NGO's organization ($M = 2.88$, $SD = 0.27$) compared to NGO personnel's "overall" impression of the CF ($M = 3.25$, $SD = 0.53$; $F_{1,39} = 8.12$, $p = .007$). As with the previous results regarding perceptions of the counterpart, across scenarios there was a marginally significant difference such that CF members felt that the goals of the organizations overlapped more ($M = 3.60$, $SD = 0.96$) than did the NGO members ($M = 2.90$, $SD = 0.90$; $F_{1,39} = 5.75$, $p = .021$). There were no significant differences in perceptions of organizational trustworthiness, which was relatively high as judged by both CF ($M = 3.74$, $SD = 0.52$) and NGO ($M = 3.90$, $SD = 0.94$) members.

The next set of pre-negotiation questions asked participants to make predictions about the anticipated outcome of the negotiation. These questions explored how successful they expected the negotiation to be for them personally, for their own organization, for their counterpart, and for their counterpart's organization, as shown in Table 12.

Table 12: Anticipated outcome

Scale Items	CF (N = 21)				NGO (N = 20)				Overall (N = 41)				p
	Project Security		Refugee Camp		Project Security		Refugee Camp		Project Security		Refugee Camp		
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
How successful do you expect this negotiation to be for you personally?	3.95	0.67	3.76	0.77	3.60	0.99	3.55	1.00	3.78	0.85	3.66	0.88	S = n.s. O = n.s. S×O = n.s.
	Mean = 3.86 SD = 0.62				Mean = 3.57 SD = 0.65				Mean = 3.72 SD = 0.64				
How successful do you expect this negotiation to be for your counterpart?	3.48	0.93	3.67	0.66	3.30	0.98	3.85	0.67	3.39	0.95	3.76	0.66	S < .05 O = n.s. S×O = n.s.
	Mean = 3.57 SD = 0.64				Mean = 3.57 SD = 0.59				Mean = 3.57 SD = 0.61				
How successful do you expect this negotiation to be for the organization you represent?	4.14	0.57	3.76	0.62	3.65	0.75	3.65	0.99	3.90	0.70	3.71	0.81	S = n.s. O = n.s. S×O = n.s.
	Mean = 3.95 SD = 0.47				Mean = 3.65 SD = 0.61				Mean = 3.80 SD = 0.56				
How successful do you expect this negotiation to be for your counterpart's organization?	3.62	0.86	3.76	0.54	3.30	0.80	3.85	0.67	3.46	0.84	3.80	0.60	S < .05 O = n.s. S×O = n.s.
	Mean = 3.69 SD = 0.58				Mean = 3.57 SD = 0.61				Mean = 3.63 SD = 0.59				
Index	3.80	0.57	3.74	0.50	3.46	0.66	3.72	0.75	3.63	0.63	3.73	0.63	S = n.s. O = n.s. S×O = n.s.
	Mean = 3.77 SD = 0.46				Mean = 3.59 SD = 0.52				Mean = 3.68 SD = 0.49				

Note: Range of scale = 1 to 5; S = Scenario; O = Organization.

These results showed that CF and NGO personnel had quite similar expectations about the anticipated outcomes of the negotiation. Looking first at the means, they all expected the outcome of the negotiation to be at least somewhat successful. The only marginally significant mean differences were observed as a function of the scenario, with both groups being slightly more optimistic when rating the counterpart's success (and the success of their counterpart's organization) in the RC scenario ($M_s = 3.76$ & 3.80 , $SD_s = 0.66$ & 0.60 , for the counterpart and the counterpart's organization, respectively) than when rating the PS scenario ($M_s = 3.39$ & 3.46 , $SD_s = 0.95$ & 0.84 , for the counterpart and the counterpart's organization, respectively; $F_{1,39} = 4.74$, $p = .036$ for the counterpart; $F_{1,39} = 6.97$, $p = .012$ for the counterpart's organization).

3.3 Post-Negotiation Results

Immediately after the negotiation was concluded, participants were asked several questions about their experience. In accordance with the collaboration framework (see Figure 1) that guided the development and design of this study, these questions addressed the conditions of collaboration, including respect, power and influence, trust, and goals and values. Questions were also meant to investigate the elements or process of collaboration itself, including communication and engagement processes as well as the negotiation process. Other questions addressed the outcomes of collaboration, such as perceptions of the counterpart's organization, satisfaction with the process, and perceptions of personal performance, interpersonal relationships, and general negotiation outcomes. The following sections present the findings.

3.3.1 Conditions of Collaboration

3.3.1.1 Respect

Respect is considered a condition for effective collaboration. A feeling of respect can be understood as a feeling of being valued for one's experience, expertise and opinion. People feel respected when their rights are taken into account, their voice is heard, they are treated fairly, and they help shape outcomes. Several questions pertaining to respect were asked immediately following each negotiation. Results are shown in Table 13.

Table 13: Respect – Descriptives

Scale Items	Valid N ¹⁷	Mean	Std. Dev.	Skewness	Kurtosis	Item-Total r	Alpha if deleted
Respect (mean inter-item correlation = .69 ; alpha = .94)							
My rights were respected.	84	4.5	0.7	-1.5	2.8	0.77	0.93
My voice was heard.	84	4.5	0.8	-1.6	2.0	0.76	0.93
I was treated fairly.	84	4.5	0.7	-2.0	6.5	0.74	0.93
My participation was valued.	84	4.4	0.7	-1.5	2.5	0.84	0.92
My opinion was valued.	84	4.4	0.9	-1.5	1.5	0.82	0.92
My expertise was acknowledged.	84	4.2	0.9	-1.1	0.7	0.84	0.92
My experience was valued.	84	4.3	0.9	-1.1	0.5	0.81	0.93
Respect (Index)	84	4.4	0.7	-1.3	2.1		

Note: Range of scale = 1 to 5.

As Table 13 shows, ratings of respect during the negotiations were fairly high, averaging about 4.4 on the 5-point scale. Moreover, the respect scale showed very high reliability in terms of internal consistency (alpha = .94).

Results comparing the respect ratings of CF and NGO personnel are shown in Table 14.

¹⁷ This sample size of 84 in the "Valid N" column includes responses from the 42 participants over the two scenarios.

Table 14: Respect – Group comparison

Scale Items	CF (N = 21)				NGO (N = 20)				Overall (N = 41)				<i>p</i>
	Project Security		Refugee Camp		Project Security		Refugee Camp		Project Security		Refugee Camp		
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
My rights were respected.	4.71	0.46	4.67	0.58	4.65	0.49	4.05	0.94	4.68	0.47	4.37	0.83	S < .05 O < .05 S x O < .05
	Mean = 4.69 SD = 0.46				Mean = 4.35 SD = 0.56				Mean = 4.52 SD = 0.54				
My voice was heard.	4.71	0.56	4.71	0.46	4.60	0.60	3.90	1.07	4.66	0.57	4.32	0.91	S < .05 O < .05 S x O < .05
	Mean = 4.71 SD = 0.41				Mean = 4.25 SD = 0.53				Mean = 4.49 SD = 0.52				
I was treated fairly.	4.71	0.46	4.57	0.68	4.65	0.49	4.20	1.01	4.68	0.47	4.39	0.86	S < .05 O = <i>n.s.</i> S x O = <i>n.s.</i>
	Mean = 4.64 SD = 0.50				Mean = 4.42 SD = 0.59				Mean = 4.54 SD = 0.55				
My participation was valued.	4.48	0.68	4.62	0.50	4.70	0.47	4.10	0.91	4.59	0.59	4.37	0.77	S = <i>n.s.</i> O = <i>n.s.</i> S x O < .05
	Mean = 4.55 SD = 0.47				Mean = 4.40 SD = 0.58				Mean = 4.48 SD = 0.52				
My opinion was valued.	4.52	0.75	4.57	0.60	4.70	0.47	3.80	1.15	4.61	0.63	4.20	0.98	S < .05 O = <i>n.s.</i> S x O < .05
	Mean = 4.55 SD = 0.50				Mean = 4.25 SD = 0.64				Mean = 4.40 SD = 0.58				
My expertise was acknowledged.	4.33	0.97	4.43	0.81	4.55	0.51	3.60	1.10	4.44	0.78	4.02	1.04	S < .05 O = <i>n.s.</i> S x O < .05
	Mean = 4.38 SD = 0.65				Mean = 4.07 SD = 0.57				Mean = 4.23 SD = 0.62				
My experience was valued.	4.24	0.94	4.48	0.75	4.55	0.51	3.80	1.11	4.39	0.77	4.14	0.99	S = <i>n.s.</i> O = <i>n.s.</i> S x O < .05
	Mean = 4.36 SD = 0.67				Mean = 4.17 SD = 0.63				Mean = 4.27 SD = 0.65				
Index	4.53	0.59	4.58	0.49	4.63	0.39	3.92	0.92	4.58	0.50	4.26	0.80	S < .05 O = <i>n.s.</i> S x O < .05
	Mean = 4.55 SD = 0.43				Mean = 4.27 SD = 0.50				Mean = 4.42 SD = 0.48				

Note: S = Scenario; O = Organization.

As Table 14 shows, several items on the respect scale showed marginally significant main effects and interactions. Looking at the overall pattern of results, participants felt marginally more respected in the PS scenario ($M = 4.58$, $SD = 0.50$) than in the RC scenario ($M = 4.26$, $SD = 0.80$), indicating a marginally significant main effect for scenario ($F_{1,39} = 6.35$, $p = .016$). While there was no difference in how respected CF personnel felt across scenarios ($M_s = 4.53$ & 4.58 , $SD_s = 0.59$ & 0.49 for the PS and RC scenarios, respectively), NGO personnel felt marginally significantly less respected in the RC scenario ($M = 3.92$, $SD = 0.92$) than in the PS scenario ($M = 4.63$, $SD = 0.39$; $F_{1,39} = 8.31$, $p = .006$). It is important to point out that the means are quite high for respect across the two scenarios. Thus, although NGO personnel reported feeling marginally less respect in the RC scenario than in the PS scenario, they did not report feeling disrespect. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that in the scenario that was constructed to fall within their jurisdiction, NGO personnel reported feeling relatively less respected. Examining the individual items on the scale, only when asked whether they were treated fairly did the NGO personnel *not* differentially report less respect in the RC and PS scenarios, compared to the CF participants. In this case, both CF and NGO members reported being treated marginally less fairly in the RC

scenario ($M = 4.39$, $SD = 0.86$) than in the PS scenario ($M = 4.68$, $SD = 0.47$; $F_{1,39} = 5.10$, $p = .030$).

One factor that might have influenced NGO personnel's respect ratings within the RC scenario was the ambiguity of the scenario. As was seen in the analysis of the manipulation checks, almost half of the participants felt uncertain about whether the RC scenario fell within their own jurisdiction or within their counterpart's jurisdiction. To explore this finding in more detail, we conducted an analysis that indicated whether or not there was a difference in perceived respect among participants who had clear ideas about the jurisdiction in the RC scenario versus those who did not have such clear ideas (or were uncertain). This analysis used a 2 (organization: CF vs. NGO) \times 2 (ambiguity: certain vs. uncertain) ANOVA assessing participants' respect ratings, and indicated that there was a significant main effect of organization ($F_{1,38} = 11.51$, $p = .002$), which was qualified by a marginally significant organization \times ambiguity interaction ($F_{1,38} = 5.63$, $p = .02$).




Figure 2: Respect ratings as a function of ambiguity and organization

As reflected in Figure 2, NGO personnel in the RC scenario who were uncertain about jurisdiction felt less respected ($M = 3.49$, $SD = 1.04$) than their uncertain CF counterparts ($M = 4.71$, $SD = 0.36$; $t = -3.49$, $p = .003$). On the other hand, there was no difference between NGO ($M = 4.24$, $SD = 0.65$) and CF ($M = 4.45$, $SD = 0.56$) personnel who were certain about the jurisdiction within the RC scenario.

3.3.1.2 Power and Influence

Collaboration also relies on partners finding an acceptable balance between promoting their own interests and needs and working to provide value to their counterparts. Collaboration counterparts are likely to have different forms of potential power, leverage and influence, and how they exercise these forms of power will have implications for how the negotiation proceeds. If one

party thinks that their partner is acting unfairly or is being “heavy-handed,” then this could negatively impact collaboration.

Several questions that were intended to capture power and influence-related perceptions were included in the post-negotiation questionnaire. These questions addressed issues related to the perceived levels of influence of one’s negotiation partner and perceptions of empowerment regarding decision making during the negotiation. Results are shown in Table 15.

Table 15: Power and influence – Analysis

Scale Items	Valid N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Skewness	Kurtosis	Item-Total r	Alpha if deleted
Power & Influence (mean inter-item correlation =.49 ; alpha =.88)							
I could get my counterpart to listen to what I said.	83	4.3	0.9	-1.7	3.2	0.48	0.88
My concerns and interests did not carry much weight (reverse-scored).	82	4.1	1.2	-1.4	0.9	0.56	0.88
I could get my counterpart to do what I wanted.	82	3.5	1.2	-0.5	-0.6	0.64	0.87
Even if I voiced them, my views had little sway (reverse-scored).	83	3.9	1.2	-0.7	-0.9	0.72	0.86
I had a great deal of influence.	83	3.7	1.0	-0.7	-0.1	0.76	0.86
My ideas and opinions were often ignored (reverse-scored).	83	4.2	1.0	-1.0	-0.2	0.60	0.87
Even if I tried, I was not able to get my way (reverse-scored).	83	3.9	1.1	-0.8	-0.2	0.74	0.86
If I wanted to, I got to make the decisions.	83	3.4	1.2	-0.4	-0.8	0.68	0.86
Power & Influence (Index)	83	3.9	0.8	-0.9	0.4		

Note: Range of scale = 1 to 5.

As Table 15 shows, the means for these items were relatively high (with an index mean of 3.9 on a 5-point scale) and the reliability (internal consistency) of the power and influence scale was good (alpha = .88).

Analyses comparing power and influence between CF and NGO groups showed several significant and marginally significant main effects and interactions for both the items and the overall index measuring participants’ perceptions of power and influence in the negotiating process. Results are shown in Table 16.

Table 16: Power and influence – Group comparisons

Scale Items	CF (N = 21)				NGO (N = 20)				Overall (N = 41)				<i>p</i>
	Project Security		Refugee Camp		Project Security		Refugee Camp		Project Security		Refugee Camp		
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
I could get my counterpart to listen to what I said.	4.14	1.15	4.76	0.44	4.53	0.51	3.79	1.08	4.32	0.92	4.30	0.94	S = <i>n.s.</i> O = <i>n.s.</i> S x O < .002
	Mean = 4.45 SD = 0.59				Mean = 4.16 SD = 0.62				Mean = 4.31 SD = 0.62				
My concerns and interests did not carry much weight (rev).	4.38	0.74	4.33	1.06	4.42	1.02	3.37	1.34	4.40	0.87	3.87	1.28	S < .05 O = <i>n.s.</i> S x O < .05
	Mean = 4.36 SD = 0.62				Mean = 3.89 SD = 0.84				Mean = 4.14 SD = 0.76				
I could get my counterpart to do what I wanted.	3.80	1.01	3.95	1.20	3.53	1.12	2.75	1.07	3.67	1.06	3.40	1.28	S = <i>n.s.</i> O < .05 S x O < .05
	Mean = 3.81 SD = 1.01				Mean = 3.16 SD = 0.78				Mean = 3.50 SD = 0.95				
Even if I voiced them, my views had little sway (rev).	4.29	0.85	4.52	0.60	3.89	1.29	2.90	1.29	4.10	1.08	3.77	1.27	S = <i>n.s.</i> O < .002 S x O < .05
	Mean = 4.40 SD = 0.56				Mean = 3.42 SD = 1.04				Mean = 3.94 SD = 0.96				
I had a great deal of influence.	4.05	0.50	4.10	0.83	3.89	0.94	2.85	1.09	3.97	0.73	3.52	1.13	S < .05 O < .002 S x O < .05
	Mean = 4.08 SD = 0.43				Mean = 3.39 SD = 0.77				Mean = 3.75 SD = 0.70				
My ideas and opinions were often ignored (rev).	4.33	0.97	4.29	1.01	4.74	0.56	3.70	0.98	4.52	0.82	4.02	1.02	S < .05 O = <i>n.s.</i> S x O < .05
	Mean = 4.31 SD = 0.78				Mean = 4.24 SD = 0.67				Mean = 4.27 SD = 0.72				
Even if I tried, I was not able to get my way (rev).	4.38	0.67	4.33	0.91	4.21	0.71	2.79	1.13	4.30	0.69	3.60	1.28	S < .002 O < .002 S x O < .002
	Mean = 4.36 SD = 0.57				Mean = 3.50 SD = 0.73				Mean = 3.95 SD = 0.77				
If I wanted to, I got to make the decisions.	3.95	0.97	3.67	1.02	3.68	0.82	2.35	1.39	3.82	0.90	3.07	1.35	S < .002 O < .05 S x O < .05
	Mean = 3.81 SD = 0.78				Mean = 3.05 SD = 0.85				Mean = 3.45 SD = 0.89				
Index	4.17	0.44	4.24	0.59	4.11	0.56	3.09	0.91	4.14	0.49	3.70	0.95	S < .002 O < .002 S x O < .002
	Mean = 4.21 SD = 0.39				Mean = 3.60 SD = 0.57				Mean = 3.92 SD = 0.57				

Note: rev = reverse-scored; S = Scenario; O = Organization.

Overall, participants reported feeling that they had more power and influence in the PS scenario ($M = 4.14$, $SD = 0.49$) than they did in the RC scenario ($M = 3.70$, $SD = 0.95$; $F_{1,38} = 12.75$, $p < .002$), and CF personnel reported more power and influence ($M = 4.21$, $SD = 0.39$) than their NGO counterparts ($M = 3.60$, $SD = 0.57$; $F_{1,38} = 15.35$, $p < .002$). Both of these main effects, however, were qualified by the significant scenario \times organization interaction ($F_{1,38} = 17.17$, $p < .002$). While there was very little difference between CF ($M = 4.17$, $SD = 0.44$) and NGO participants ($M = 4.11$, $SD = 0.56$) regarding power and influence in the PS scenario, there was a significant difference between CF and NGO participants in their reported power and influence in the RC scenario ($M = 4.24$, $SD = 0.59$ and $M = 3.09$, $SD = 0.91$, respectively). While CF participants reported feeling similar degrees of power and influence in the RC scenario ($M = 4.24$, $SD = 0.59$) and in the PS scenario ($M = 4.17$, $SD = 0.44$, $F_{1,20} = 0.26$, $p = .62$), NGO participants reported feeling significantly less power and influence in the RC scenario ($M = 3.09$, $SD = 0.91$) than in the PS scenario ($M = 4.11$, $SD = 0.56$, $F_{1,18} = 20.61$, $p < .001$).

In general, NGO personnel reported feeling that they had significantly less power and influence than CF personnel in the two scenarios, and this appears to be especially the case in the RC scenario. Looking at specific items, NGO personnel reported having a significantly harder time getting their CF counterpart to listen to them in the RC scenario negotiation ($M = 3.79$, $SD = 1.08$) than in the PS scenario negotiation ($M = 4.53$, $SD = 0.51$). CF personnel felt they were listened to more in the RC scenario negotiation ($M = 4.76$, $SD = 0.44$) than in the PS scenario ($M = 4.14$, $SD = 1.15$; $F_{1,38} = 12.30$, $p < .002$). Furthermore, NGO personnel reported more difficulty getting their way in the RC scenario negotiation ($M = 2.79$, $SD = 1.13$) than in the PS scenario negotiation ($M = 4.21$, $SD = 0.71$), whereas there was no difference between the RC and PS scenarios for the CF personnel in this regard ($M = 4.33$, $SD = 0.91$, and $M = 4.38$, $SD = 0.67$, respectively; $F_{1,38} = 13.86$, $p < .002$).

Considering items whose scenario \times organization interactions were marginally significant we found the following. In the RC scenario, NGO personnel reported less influence ($M = 2.85$, $SD = 1.09$) than they reported feeling in the PS scenario ($M = 3.89$, $SD = 0.94$; $t_{37} = 3.20$, $p < .05$). NGO personnel also felt that their concerns and interests did not carry as much weight in the RC scenario ($M = 3.37$, $SD = 1.34$) as they did in the PS scenario ($M = 4.42$, $SD = 1.02$; $t_{36} = 2.72$, $p < .05$). NGO personnel felt their ideas and opinions were ignored more in the RC scenario ($M = 3.70$, $SD = 0.98$) than they were in the PS scenario ($M = 4.74$, $SD = 0.56$; $t_{37} = 4.03$, $p < .05$). In the RC scenario, NGO personnel also felt that they were less able to get their counterparts to do what they wanted ($M = 2.75$, $SD = 1.07$) than they were in the PS scenario ($M = 3.53$, $SD = 1.12$; $t_{37} = 2.21$, $p < .05$). NGO personnel also felt that their voice had less sway in the RC scenario ($M = 2.90$, $SD = 1.29$) than it did in the PS scenario ($M = 3.89$, $SD = 1.29$; $t_{37} = 2.40$, $p < .05$). Finally, NGO personnel felt that they were less able to make the decisions in the RC scenario ($M = 2.35$, $SD = 1.39$) than they were in the PS scenario ($M = 3.68$, $SD = 0.82$; $t_{37} = 3.63$, $p < .05$). NGO personnel appeared to feel less empowered during the RC scenario, which is contrary to expectations, given that the RC scenario was designed to reflect NGO jurisdiction and hence their expertise.

Once again, it is possible that the ambiguity of the jurisdiction within the RC scenario may have played a role in the power and influence ratings. As with the respect ratings, a 2 (organization: CF vs. NGO) \times 2 (ambiguity: certain vs. uncertain) ANOVA was conducted. Once again, there was a main effect of organization ($F_{1,38} = 35.11$, $p < .002$) that was qualified by a marginally significant organization \times ambiguity interaction ($F_{1,38} = 8.44$, $p = .006$), as reflected in Figure 3.




Figure 3: Power and influence as a function of organization and ambiguity

Specifically, uncertain NGO personnel ($M = 2.52$, $SD = 0.70$) felt significantly less power and influence than their CF counterparts ($M = 4.37$, $SD = 0.50$; $t = -6.68$, $p < .002$). Furthermore, uncertain NGO participants felt less power and influence than their certain NGO counterparts ($M = 3.49$, $SD = 0.79$; $t = -2.93$, $p = .009$). On the other hand, there was no difference between uncertain and certain ($M = 4.12$, $SD = 0.67$) CF participants ($t = 0.96$, $p = .35$).

3.3.1.3 Trust

When working together on a complex endeavour, trust also has the potential to be an important facilitator of effective collaboration. As trust is argued to be predicated on expectations of competence, positive (or benevolent) motivation, perceptions of reliability, and integrity, several questions were created to explore these aspects of trust. Results are shown in Table 17.

Table 17: Trust – Descriptives

Scale Items	Valid N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Skewness	Kurtosis	Item-Total r	Alpha if deleted
Trust (mean inter-item correlation =.51 ; alpha =.86)							
My counterpart is competent.	84	4.3	0.9	-1.6	2.9	0.55	0.83
My counterpart is motivated to protect the interests of me and my organization.	84	3.7	1.1	-0.7	-0.4	0.55	0.84
My counterpart is reliable.	84	4.3	0.7	-0.9	0.7	0.68	0.81
My counterpart is honourable.	84	4.4	0.6	-0.7	-0.5	0.74	0.81
Overall, this negotiation increased my trust in my counterpart.	84	4.1	0.9	-0.7	-0.3	0.73	0.80
I have faith in my counterpart's organization.	83	4.0	0.9	-0.7	-0.4	0.61	0.82
Trust (Index)	84	4.1	0.7	-0.4	-0.7		

Note: Range of scale = 1 to 5.

As Table 17 shows, there was a fairly high level of trust among participants, with a mean trust index of 4.1 out of 5 on the post-negotiation items. In addition, the reliability (internal consistency) of the trust scale was good (alpha = .86).

Analyses comparing trust perceptions of CF personnel and NGO personnel are shown in Table 18.

Table 18: Trust – Group comparison

Scale Items	CF (N = 21)				NGO (N = 20)				Overall (N = 41)				p
	Project Security		Refugee Camp		Project Security		Refugee Camp		Project Security		Refugee Camp		
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
My counterpart is competent.	3.90	1.04	4.33	0.91	4.55	0.94	4.30	0.73	4.22	1.03	4.32	0.82	S = n.s.
	Mean = 4.12 SD = 0.82				Mean = 4.42 SD = 0.73				Mean = 4.27 SD = 0.78				O = n.s. S x O < .05
My counterpart is motivated to protect the interests of me and my organization.	3.76	1.04	3.24	1.04	4.15	0.93	3.80	1.15	3.95	1.00	3.51	1.12	S < .05
	Mean = 3.50 SD = 0.84				Mean = 3.97 SD = 0.95				Mean = 3.73 SD = 0.92				O = n.s. S x O = n.s.
My counterpart is reliable.	4.10	0.77	4.24	0.70	4.45	0.76	4.30	0.73	4.27	0.78	4.27	0.71	S = n.s.
	Mean = 4.17 SD = 0.66				Mean = 4.37 SD = 0.56				Mean = 4.27 SD = 0.61				O = n.s. S x O = n.s.
My counterpart is honourable.	4.52	0.60	4.48	0.68	4.50	0.61	4.30	0.73	4.51	0.60	4.39	0.70	S = n.s.
	Mean = 4.50 SD = 0.50				Mean = 4.40 SD = 0.50				Mean = 4.45 SD = 0.50				O = n.s. S x O = n.s.
Overall, this negotiation increased my trust in my counterpart.	4.10	0.89	4.10	0.83	4.35	0.81	3.95	0.89	4.22	0.85	4.02	0.85	S = n.s.
	Mean = 4.10 SD = 0.72				Mean = 4.15 SD = 0.69				Mean = 4.12 SD = 0.70				O = n.s. S x O = n.s.
I have faith in my counterpart's organization.	3.76	0.99	4.00	0.89	4.37	0.76	4.05	0.91	4.05	0.93	4.05	0.89	S = n.s.
	Mean = 3.88 SD = 0.77				Mean = 4.25 SD = 0.70				Mean = 4.06 SD = 0.75				O = n.s. S x O = n.s.
Index	4.02	0.71	4.06	0.61	4.40	0.57	4.12	0.70	4.21	0.66	4.09	0.65	S = n.s.
	Mean = 4.04 SD = 0.58				Mean = 4.26 SD = 0.53				Mean = 4.15 SD = 0.56				O = n.s. S x O = n.s.

Note: S = Scenario; O = Organization.

Although there were few significant effects, the first item (“My counterpart is competent”) showed a marginally significant scenario × organization interaction ($F_{1,39} = 4.99, p = .031$). Specifically, in the RC scenario, NGO and CF participants felt that their counterparts were equally competent ($M = 4.30, SD = 0.73$ and $M = 4.33, SD = 0.91$, respectively). However, in the PS scenario, CF participants felt that their counterparts were less competent ($M = 3.90, SD = 1.04$) than did the NGO participants ($M = 4.55, SD = 0.94$). Confident in their own expertise regarding security and the particular non-permissive or hostile environment in PS, CF personnel may have thought that their NGO counterparts did not fully grasp or appreciate the situation, whereas NGO participants did perceive that their CF counterpart was competent in this area. This may also be connected to CF personnel’s pre-negotiation ratings regarding their overall impression of their counterpart’s organization. Recall that CF personnel’s overall impression of their counterpart’s organization was less positive for PS than for RC, which may have influenced their post-negotiation evaluations of the NGO personnel’s competence. Of course, the connection between preconceptions and trust is speculative here, but may be worth examining in future research.

Participants also reported that their counterpart was marginally more motivated to protect their interests (and those of their organization) in the PS scenario ($M = 3.95, SD = 1.00$) than in the RC scenario ($M = 3.51, SD = 1.12; F_{1,39} = 6.66, p = .014$).

3.3.2 Process of Collaboration

3.3.2.1 Communication

An essential facilitator of productive collaboration is the ability to communicate effectively. Whether to convey one's own interests and concerns or to accurately interpret and repeat back the concerns of one's counterpart, open communication plays a central role during collaboration.

Several questions in the post-negotiation questionnaire captured communication-related perceptions, as shown in Table 19.

Table 19: Communication – Descriptives

Scale Items	Valid N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Skewness	Kurtosis	Item-Total r	Alpha if deleted
Communication (mean inter-item correlation =.27 ; alpha =.78)							
The negotiation had good communication.	84	4.4	0.7	-1.4	3.8	0.53	0.74
We exchanged ideas freely.	84	4.3	0.7	-1.2	2.1	0.59	0.74
I clearly communicated my needs.	84	4.5	0.8	-2.0	4.8	0.66	0.73
My counterpart clearly communicated their needs.	84	4.3	0.9	-1.8	3.9	0.43	0.76
My counterpart used language that I did not understand (reverse-scored).	83	4.7	0.7	-3.1	10.2	0.32	0.77
The communication was to the point.	84	4.4	0.9	-2.0	5.0	0.20	0.79
We developed a good rapport.	84	4.3	0.8	-1.4	2.8	0.43	0.76
My counterpart freely shared information that was necessary for me to make a well-informed decision.	83	4.2	0.8	-1.2	2.5	0.46	0.75
The communication was friendly.	84	4.7	0.5	-1.3	0.8	0.46	0.76
We struggled to communicate (reverse-scored).	84	4.2	1.1	-1.1	0.3	0.44	0.76
Communication (Index)	84	4.4	0.5	-0.5	-0.2		

Note: Range of scale = 1 to 5.

Participants rated their perception of various aspects of communication between participants, with a mean index of 4.4 out of 5 on the post-negotiation items. As indicated in Table 19, the reliability (internal consistency) of the communication scale was acceptable (alpha = .78).

Analyses comparing the communication perceptions of CF personnel and NGO personnel toward each other are shown in Table 20.

Table 20: Communication – Group comparison

Scale Items	CF (N = 21)				NGO (N = 20)				Overall (N = 41)				p
	Project Security		Refugee Camp		Project Security		Refugee Camp		Project Security		Refugee Camp		
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
The negotiation had good communication.	4.38	0.92	4.48	0.60	4.55	0.51	3.95	0.73	4.46	0.74	4.22	0.72	S = n.s. O = n.s. S x O < .05
	Mean = 4.43 SD = 0.51				Mean = 4.25 SD = 0.55				Mean = 4.12 SD = 0.82				
We exchanged ideas freely.	4.48	0.51	4.43	0.75	4.40	0.75	4.05	0.83	4.44	0.63	4.24	0.80	S = n.s. O = n.s. S x O = n.s.
	Mean = 4.45 SD = 0.42				Mean = 4.22 SD = 0.64				Mean = 4.12 SD = 0.82				
I clearly communicated my needs.	4.71	0.46	4.67	0.48	4.50	0.76	3.85	1.14	4.61	0.63	4.27	0.95	S < .05 O < .05 S x O = n.s.
	Mean = 4.69 SD = 0.33				Mean = 4.17 SD = 0.71				Mean = 4.12 SD = 0.82				
My counterpart clearly communicated their needs.	4.33	1.06	4.29	0.72	4.35	0.93	4.30	0.86	4.34	0.94	4.29	0.78	S = n.s. O = n.s. SxO = n.s.
	Mean = 4.31 SD = 0.62				Mean = 4.32 SD = 0.67				Mean = 4.12 SD = 0.82				
My counterpart used language that I did not understand (rev).	4.75	0.91	4.86	0.36	4.60	0.75	4.55	0.89	4.67	0.83	4.71	0.68	S = n.s. O = n.s. SxO = n.s.
	Mean = 4.81 SD = 0.49				Mean = 4.57 SD = 0.73				Mean = 4.12 SD = 0.82				
The communication was to the point.	4.38	0.92	4.38	0.97	4.30	0.98	4.50	0.61	4.34	0.94	4.43	0.81	S = n.s. O = n.s. SxO = n.s.
	Mean = 4.38 SD = 0.84				Mean = 4.40 SD = 0.64				Mean = 4.12 SD = 0.82				
We developed a good rapport.	4.52	0.60	4.29	0.96	4.45	0.69	4.05	0.83	4.49	0.64	4.17	0.89	S < .05 O = n.s. S x O = n.s.
	Mean = 4.40 SD = 0.62				Mean = 4.25 SD = 0.66				Mean = 4.12 SD = 0.82				
My counterpart freely shared information that was necessary for me to make a well-informed decision.	4.33	0.66	4.05	0.97	4.37	0.60	4.05	0.97	4.35	0.62	4.05	0.95	S < .05 O = n.s. S x O = n.s.
	Mean = 4.19 SD = 0.68				Mean = 4.20 SD = 0.68				Mean = 4.12 SD = 0.82				
The communication was friendly.	4.86	0.36	4.67	0.48	4.75	0.44	4.40	0.68	4.80	0.40	4.54	0.60	S < .05 O = n.s. S x O = n.s.
	Mean = 4.76 SD = 0.30				Mean = 4.57 SD = 0.44				Mean = 4.12 SD = 0.82				
We struggled to communicate (rev).	4.38	0.97	4.48	0.87	4.30	1.03	3.65	1.14	4.34	0.99	4.07	1.08	S = n.s. O < .05 S x O = n.s.
	Mean = 4.43 SD = 0.73				Mean = 3.97 SD = 0.64				Mean = 4.12 SD = 0.82				
Index	4.51	0.41	4.46	0.42	4.46	0.41	4.13	0.57	4.49	0.40	4.30	0.52	S < .05 O = n.s. S x O = n.s.
	Mean = 4.49 SD = 0.34				Mean = 4.30 SD = 0.40				Mean = 4.04 SD = 0.58				

Note: rev = reverse-scored; S = Scenario; O = Organization.

As the results show, there was a marginally significant main effect of scenario on the communication index, such that participants reported that their communication was somewhat better in the PS scenario ($M = 4.49$, $SD = 0.40$) than in the RC scenario ($M = 4.30$, $SD = 0.52$; $F_{1,39} = 5.09$, $p = .030$). This finding may have reflected subtle differences in the complexity of the scenarios. The RC scenario may have been perceived as slightly more difficult to comprehend than the PS scenario, and this may have problematized perceived communication effectiveness in

the RC scenario (e.g., in terms of rapport and information sharing). Scenario and organization variables had the greatest impact on the item “I clearly communicated my needs.” Overall, participants reported that they were better at communicating their needs in the PS scenario ($M = 4.61$, $SD = 0.63$) than in the RC scenario ($M = 4.27$, $SD = 0.95$; $F_{1,39} = 4.68$, $p = .037$), a difference that was marginally significant. And, across the two scenarios, CF personnel reported being marginally better at communicating their needs ($M = 4.69$, $SD = 0.33$) compared to NGO personnel ($M = 4.17$, $SD = 0.71$; $F_{1,39} = 8.94$, $p = .005$), which could be a by-product of having had more experience and negotiation training than their NGO counterparts. However, this explanation is speculative. There was no interaction between scenario and organization on this item.

One item, “The negotiation had good communication,” did produce a marginally significant scenario \times organization interaction ($F_{1,39} = 5.27$, $p = .027$). While CF personnel reported that the communication was equally good in the PS ($M = 4.38$, $SD = 0.92$) and RC ($M = 4.48$, $SD = 0.60$) scenarios, NGO personnel reported that the RC scenario ($M = 3.95$, $SD = 0.73$) had worse communication in comparison to the PS scenario ($M = 4.55$, $SD = 0.51$).

3.3.2.2 Engagement

For a collaboration to be successful both parties must be engaged in the process. This means that both must participate actively by contributing to the process, helping to shape a collaborative outcome. Engagement also means participating at the level that one wants.

Three questions were used to capture perceptions of engagement and are shown in Table 21.

Table 21: Engagement – Descriptives

Scale Items	Valid N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Skewness	Kurtosis	Item-Total r	Alpha if deleted
Engagement (mean inter-item correlation =.49 ; alpha =.70)							
I was able to learn from this process.	84	4.3	0.8	-0.9	0.2	0.26	0.87
I contributed something valuable to the negotiation.	84	4.4	0.7	-1.3	1.9	0.76	0.31
I participated at the level that I wanted to.	83	4.3	1.0	-1.4	1.2	0.60	0.49
Engagement (Index)	84	4.3	0.7	-1.0	0.6		

Note: Range of scale = 1 to 5.

There was a very high level of participant engagement, with a mean index of 4.3 out of 5 on the post-negotiation items. At an alpha level of only .70, however, reliability (internal consistency) of the engagement scale was acceptable, but low.

Analyses comparing the engagement perceptions of CF personnel and NGO personnel are shown in Table 22.

Table 22: Engagement – Group comparison

	CF (N = 21)				NGO (N = 20)				Overall (N = 41)				
	Project Security		Refugee Camp		Project Security		Refugee Camp		Project Security		Refugee Camp		
Scale Items	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	p
I was able to learn from this process.	4.14	0.91	4.19	0.75	4.57	0.60	4.33	0.86	4.34	0.79	4.25	0.81	S = n.s.
	Mean = 4.17 SD = 0.76				Mean = 4.45 SD = 0.63				Mean = 4.30 SD = 0.71				O = n.s. S×O = n.s.
I contributed something valuable to the negotiation.	4.57	0.51	4.62	0.50	4.60	0.50	3.75	1.02	4.59	0.50	4.20	0.90	S < .05
	Mean = 4.59 SD = 0.44				Mean = 4.17 SD = 0.59				Mean = 4.39 SD = 0.55				O < .05 S×O < .002
I participated at the level that I wanted to.	4.60	0.50	4.50	0.83	4.55	0.60	3.30	1.30	4.57	0.55	3.93	1.23	S < .002
	Mean = 4.57 SD = 0.51				Mean = 3.92 SD = 0.77				Mean = 4.26 SD = 0.72				O < .05 S x O < .002
Index	4.43	0.51	4.44	0.46	4.57	0.53	3.80	0.89	4.50	0.52	4.12	0.77	S < .002
	Mean = 4.44 SD = 0.42				Mean = 4.17 SD = 0.58				Mean = 4.31 SD = 0.52				O = n.s. S x O < .002

Note: S = Scenario; O = Organization.

Overall, there was a significant main effect of scenario on the engagement index, as participants reported feeling significantly more engaged in the PS scenario ($M = 4.50$, $SD = 0.52$) than in the RC scenario ($M = 4.12$, $SD = 0.77$; $F_{1,39} = 12.35$, $p < .002$). This main effect was qualified by a significant scenario \times organization interaction ($F_{1,39} = 13.39$, $p < .002$). While there was no difference between the PS and RC scenarios in how engaged the CF participants felt ($M = 4.43$, $SD = 0.51$ and $M = 4.44$, $SD = 0.46$, respectively), NGO participants felt significantly less engaged in the RC scenario ($M = 3.80$, $SD = 0.89$) than in the PS scenario ($M = 4.57$, $SD = 0.53$; $F_{1,39} = 15.68$, $p < .002$). NGO personnel reported contributing less value to the negotiation during the RC scenario ($M = 3.75$, $SD = 1.02$) compared to the PS scenario ($M = 4.60$, $SD = 0.50$; $F_{1,19} = 12.18$, $p = .002$). Again, the RC scenario was designed to fall under NGO jurisdiction, and it generally offered more opportunities in line with their expertise. Thus, these results were not anticipated, but once again, may be attributable to the complexity or perceived ambiguity of the scenario from the NGO perspective.

In regard to feelings about participation level, there was a significant main effect of scenario, in that participants felt significantly more comfortable with their level of participation in the PS scenario ($M = 4.57$, $SD = 0.55$) than in the RC scenario ($M = 3.93$, $SD = 1.23$, $F_{1,39} = 11.71$, $p < .002$). This is consistent with the general pattern of findings already discussed regarding the overall less positive collaboration experience in the RC scenario compared to the PS scenario. Further, there was a marginally significant main effect of organization, in that CF participants felt marginally significantly more comfortable with their level of participation across the two scenarios ($M = 4.57$, $SD = 0.51$) than did NGO participants ($M = 3.92$, $SD = 0.77$, $F_{1,39} = 7.24$, $p = .01$). These main effects were qualified by a significant scenario \times organization interaction ($F_{1,39} = 15.82$, $p < .002$). While there was no difference between the satisfaction with the level of participation felt by CF participants across the PS and RC scenarios ($M = 4.60$ & 4.50 , $SD = 0.50$ & 0.83 , respectively; $F_{1,19} = 0.24$, $p = .63$), NGO participants felt significantly less satisfied with their level of participation in the RC scenario ($M = 3.30$, $SD = 1.30$) than in the PS scenario ($M = 4.55$, $SD = 0.60$; $F_{1,39} = 15.68$, $p < .002$).

3.3.2.3 Negotiation process

The strategy or style used in a negotiation can impact not only the quality of the outcome reached, but can also have a substantial impact on the relationship between counterparts. Research suggests that those who use an integrative approach during collaboration tend to reach better agreements (i.e., “win-win”) and leave a more positive impression on their counterparts than those who employ a more distributive or competitive approach (Thompson, Wang, & Gunia, 2010).

Several questions tapping perceptions of the negotiation process (specifically, the negotiation behaviours of counterparts) were part of the post-negotiation questionnaire, and findings are shown in Table 23.

Table 23: Negotiation Process – Descriptives¹⁸

Scale Items	Valid N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Skewness	Kurtosis	Item-Total r	Alpha if deleted
Negotiation Process: Integrative (mean inter-item correlation =.17 ; alpha =.54)							
To what extent did your counterpart share his or her priorities?	84	4.2	0.8	-0.9	1.3	0.30	0.49
To what extent did your counterpart make an offer on two or more priorities at one time?	84	3.0	1.2	0.0	-0.9	0.25	0.51
To what extent did your counterpart state which of his or her priorities were more or less important?	84	2.7	1.2	0.1	-0.9	0.18	0.54
To what extent did your counterpart ask about your priorities?	84	2.6	1.3	0.6	-0.8	0.37	0.44
To what extent did your counterpart note shared interests?	84	3.5	1.1	-0.6	-0.1	0.43	0.42
Negotiation Process: Integrative (Index)	84	3.2	0.6	0.4	-0.1		
Negotiation Process: Distributive (mean inter-item correlation =.17 ; alpha =.55)							
To what extent was your counterpart willing to make concessions?	84	3.4	1.0	-0.2	-0.3	0.19	0.53
To what extent did your counterpart make an offer on only one issue at a time?	84	3.5	1.0	-0.8	0.5	0.09	0.58
To what extent did your counterpart develop an argument for his or her position at the	84	2.7	1.1	0.2	-0.5	0.41	0.42

¹⁸ One of the initial items in the negotiation scale could not be clearly attributed to either an integrative or distributive negotiation strategy upon further reflection, so it was removed from further analyses. This item was “To what extent did your counterpart discuss issues that were off-task?”

Scale Items	Valid N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Skewness	Kurtosis	Item-Total r	Alpha if deleted
expense of yours?							
To what extent did your counterpart refer to the bottom line?	84	2.2	1.2	0.5	-0.8	0.30	0.49
To what extent did your counterpart use threats?	84	1.2	0.6	4.1	16.3	0.33	0.49
To what extent did your counterpart try to weaken your arguments?	84	1.8	0.9	1.0	-0.1	0.42	0.42
To what extent did your counterpart suggest moving on before issues had been resolved?	84	1.5	0.9	2.7	7.5	0.22	0.52
Negotiation Process: Distributive (Index)	84	2.1	0.5	0.4	0.2		

Note: Range of scale = 1 to 5.

On the whole, participants' reports of their counterpart's negotiation behaviours suggested that counterparts were perceived as adopting an integrative approach (the mean index for an integrative negotiation process was 3.2 out of 5). This can be compared to a mean index for a distributive negotiation process of 2.1 out of 5. Unfortunately, the reliability of both constructs, in terms of internal consistency, was quite low (in the .54-.55 range).

Results comparing perceptions of the negotiation process for CF and NGO personnel are shown in Table 24.

Table 24: Negotiation process – Group comparison

Scale Items	CF (N = 21)				NGO (N = 20)				Overall (N = 41)				p
	Project Security		Refugee Camp		Project Security		Refugee Camp		Project Security		Refugee Camp		
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
To what extent did your counterpart share his or her priorities?	3.95	0.67	3.86	0.65	4.35	0.99	4.40	0.88	4.15	0.85	4.12	0.81	S = n.s. O < .05 S×O = n.s.
	Mean = 3.90 SD = 0.49				Mean = 4.37 SD = 0.78				Mean = 4.13 SD = 0.68				
To what extent did your counterpart make an offer on two or more priorities at one time?	2.71	1.01	3.00	1.00	2.80	1.36	3.50	1.32	2.76	1.18	3.24	1.18	S = n.s. O = n.s. S×O = n.s.
	Mean = 2.86 SD = 0.65				Mean = 3.15 SD = 1.08				Mean = 3.00 SD = 0.89				
To what extent did your counterpart state which of his or her priorities were more or less important?	2.57	1.03	2.71	0.96	2.45	1.28	2.95	1.28	2.51	1.14	2.83	1.12	S = n.s. O = n.s. S×O = n.s.
	Mean = 2.64 SD = 0.74				Mean = 2.70 SD = 1.04				Mean = 2.67 SD = 0.89				
To what extent did your counterpart ask about your priorities?	2.00	0.84	2.19	1.12	3.35	1.31	2.95	1.39	2.66	1.28	2.56	1.30	S = n.s. O < .002 S×O = n.s.
	Mean = 2.10 SD = 0.70				Mean = 3.15 SD = 0.99				Mean = 2.61 SD = 1.00				
To what extent did your counterpart note shared interests?	3.33	0.97	3.10	1.00	3.95	1.00	3.50	1.19	3.63	1.02	3.29	1.10	S = n.s. O < .05 S×O = n.s.
	Mean = 3.21 SD = 0.83				Mean = 3.72 SD = 0.72				Mean = 3.46 SD = 0.81				
Index (Integrative)	2.91	0.41	2.97	0.44	3.38	0.79	3.46	0.78	3.14	0.66	3.21	0.67	S = n.s. O < .05 S×O = n.s.
	Mean = 2.94 SD = 0.29				Mean = 3.42 SD = 0.61				Mean = 3.18 SD = 0.53				

Scale Items	CF (N = 21)				NGO (N = 20)				Overall (N = 41)				<i>p</i>
	Project Security		Refugee Camp		Project Security		Refugee Camp		Project Security		Refugee Camp		
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
To what extent did your counterpart develop an argument for his or her position at the expense of yours?	2.52	0.81	2.57	1.08	2.90	1.33	2.70	1.30	2.71	1.10	2.63	1.18	S = <i>n.s.</i> O = <i>n.s.</i> S×O = <i>n.s.</i>
	Mean = 2.55 SD = 0.80				Mean = 2.80 SD = 0.95				Mean = 2.67 SD = 0.88				
To what extent did your counterpart make an offer on only one issue at a time?	3.57	0.93	3.10	1.26	3.80	0.70	3.25	1.12	3.68	0.82	3.17	1.18	S < .05 O = <i>n.s.</i> S×O = <i>n.s.</i>
	Mean = 3.33 SD = 0.84				Mean = 3.52 SD = 0.70				Mean = 3.43 SD = 0.77				
To what extent was your counterpart willing to make concessions?	3.52	0.93	3.57	0.93	3.60	0.75	2.95	0.94	3.56	0.84	3.27	0.98	S = <i>n.s.</i> O = <i>n.s.</i> S×O < .05
	Mean = 3.55 SD = 0.76				Mean = 3.27 SD = 0.68				Mean = 3.41 SD = 0.72				
To what extent did your counterpart refer to the bottom line?	1.95	0.97	2.14	1.20	2.45	1.28	2.45	1.32	2.20	1.14	2.29	1.25	S = <i>n.s.</i> O = <i>n.s.</i> S×O = <i>n.s.</i>
	Mean = 2.05 SD = 0.97				Mean = 2.45 SD = 1.15				Mean = 2.24 SD = 1.07				
To what extent did your counterpart use threats?	1.00	0.00	1.05	0.22	1.35	0.93	1.10	0.45	1.17	0.67	1.07	0.35	S = <i>n.s.</i> O = <i>n.s.</i> S×O = <i>n.s.</i>
	Mean = 1.02 SD = 0.11				Mean = 1.22 SD = 0.64				Mean = 1.12 SD = 0.46				
To what extent did your counterpart try to weaken your arguments?	1.57	0.81	1.90	0.89	1.60	0.82	1.90	1.12	1.59	0.81	1.90	1.00	S = <i>n.s.</i> O = <i>n.s.</i> S×O = <i>n.s.</i>
	Mean = 1.74 SD = 0.64				Mean = 1.75 SD = 0.80				Mean = 1.74 SD = 0.72				
To what extent did your counterpart suggest moving on before issues had been resolved?	1.57	0.98	1.43	0.93	1.30	0.73	1.35	0.59	1.44	0.87	1.39	0.77	S = <i>n.s.</i> O = <i>n.s.</i> S×O = <i>n.s.</i>
	Mean = 1.50 SD = 0.63				Mean = 1.32 SD = 0.59				Mean = 1.41 SD = 0.61				
Index (Distributive)	2.24	0.36	2.25	0.41	2.43	0.50	2.24	0.52	2.33	0.44	2.25	0.46	S = <i>n.s.</i> O = <i>n.s.</i> S×O = <i>n.s.</i>
	Mean = 2.25 SD = 0.32				Mean = 2.34 SD = 0.42				Mean = 2.29 SD = 0.37				

Note: S = Scenario; O = Organization.

There was a marginally significant main effect of organization on the integrative negotiation subscale (based on the integrative index). Compared to the NGO personnel's reports of their CF counterpart ($M = 3.42$, $SD = 0.61$), CF personnel reported that their NGO counterpart's negotiation approach was less integrative ($M = 2.94$, $SD = 0.29$), which was in large part driven by the item, "To what extent did your counterpart ask about your priorities?" NGO personnel reported being asked about their priorities during the negotiations significantly more often ($M = 3.15$, $SD = 0.99$) than CF personnel reported being asked about their priorities ($M = 2.10$, $SD = 0.70$; $F_{1,39} = 15.67$, $p < .002$). This could be due to the more advanced negotiation training that CF personnel receive (e.g., in the CIMIC Operator course). This training emphasizes the importance of asking negotiation parties about their priorities (as well as sharing priorities and interests).

There were no significant main effects or interactions for the distributive negotiation subscale overall (based on the distributive index). However, there was a marginally significant main effect

of scenario for the item “To what extent did your counterpart make an offer on only one issue at a time?” Participants indicated that their counterparts were more willing to make such offers in the PS scenario ($M = 3.68$, $SD = 0.82$) than in the RC scenario ($M = 3.17$, $SD = 1.18$; $F_{1,39} = 5.99$, $p = .019$). Also, there was a marginally significant scenario \times organization interaction effect on the item “To what extent was your counterpart willing to make concessions?” ($F_{1,39} = 4.47$, $p < .05$). NGO personnel reported that their CF counterparts were less willing to make concessions in the RC scenario compared to the PS scenario ($M = 2.95$, $SD = 0.94$ vs. $M = 3.60$, $SD = 0.75$, respectively; $F_{1,19} = 7.81$, $p < .05$). On the other hand, there was no difference between CF personnel’s reports of their NGO counterparts’ willingness to make concessions across scenarios ($M = 3.52$, $SD = 0.93$ in the PS scenario; $M = 3.57$, $SD = 0.93$ in the RC scenario; $F_{1,20} = 0.04$, $p = .84$).

3.3.3 Outcomes of Collaboration

3.3.3.1 Perception of counterpart

As previously mentioned, interpersonal relationships arising from collaboration are partly built upon individuals’ perceptions of counterparts. Two items measured the participant’s overall perception of their counterpart in the post-negotiation questionnaire. Table 25 shows results comparing the ratings made by CF and NGO participants for both scenarios.

Table 25: Perception of counterpart – Group comparison

Scale Items	CF (N = 21)				NGO (N = 20)				Overall (N = 41)				p
	Project Security		Refugee Camp		Project Security		Refugee Camp		Project Security		Refugee Camp		
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
What kind of "overall" impression did your counterpart make on you?	4.33	0.73	4.14	0.73	4.65	0.49	4.15	0.75	4.49	0.64	4.15	0.73	S < .05 O = n.s. S×O = n.s.
	Mean = 4.24 SD = 0.62				Mean = 4.40 SD = 0.48				Mean = 4.32 SD = 0.56				
My values are similar to my counterpart's values.	3.90	0.83	4.14	0.91	3.75	1.02	3.65	0.88	3.83	0.92	3.90	0.92	S = n.s. O = n.s. S×O = n.s.
	Mean = 4.02 SD = 0.64				Mean = 3.70 SD = 0.77				Mean = 3.87 SD = 0.72				
Index	4.12	0.61	4.14	0.65	4.20	0.62	3.90	0.66	4.16	0.61	4.02	0.66	S = n.s. O = n.s. S×O = n.s.
	Mean = 4.13 SD = 0.50				Mean = 4.05 SD = 0.50				Mean = 4.09 SD = 0.50				

Note: Range of scale = 1 to 5; S = Scenario; O = Organization.

There was a marginally significant main effect of scenario on overall impression of one’s counterpart ($F_{1,39} = 7.86$, $p = .008$). Specifically, results indicated that participants had a more positive impression of their counterpart in the PS scenario ($M = 4.49$, $SD = 0.64$) than in the RC scenario ($M = 4.15$, $SD = 0.73$). It is important to note that ratings were relatively high, with all means for this item exceeding 4 on a 5-point scale.

Recall that prior to the negotiations, there was a significant scenario \times organization interaction for the item assessing participants’ “overall” impression of their counterpart. To examine whether this evaluation changed as a result of interactions with counterparts, a 2 (timing: pre-negotiation vs. post-negotiation) \times 2 (scenario: PS vs. RC) \times 2 (organization: NGO vs. CF) mixed-model

ANOVA was conducted with the first two variables being within-groups and the third variable being between-groups.




Figure 4: Perceptions of counterpart as a function of timing and organization across scenarios

As can be seen in Figure 4, overall there was a significant main effect for timing ($F_{1,39} = 145.16$, $p < .002$) such that participants across organizations had a significantly more positive perception of their counterpart after having completed the negotiation ($M = 4.32$, $SD = 0.74$) than before ($M = 2.83$, $SD = 0.91$). However, there were no main effects for scenario ($F_{1,39} = 0.09$, $p = .77$) or organization ($F_{1,39} = 3.69$, $p = .062$). There was, however, a marginally significant scenario \times organization interaction ($F_{1,39} = 6.12$, $p = .018$). Within the PS scenario, CF members had a more negative perception of their counterpart ($M = 3.40$, $SD = 0.56$) than did NGO members ($M = 3.90$, $SD = 0.50$; $t = -2.97$, $p = 0.005$). There was no difference between CF and NGO members' ratings of their counterparts in the RC scenario ($M = 3.69$, $SD = 0.49$ and $M = 3.67$, $SD = 0.52$, respectively; $t = 0.10$, $p = 0.92$). Finally, there was a significant time \times scenario interaction ($F_{1,39} = 13.68$, $p < .002$). There was a greater increase in overall perceptions of one's counterpart (in a positive direction) from pre- to post-negotiation in the PS scenario ($M = 2.80$, $SD = 0.90$ and $M = 4.49$, $SD = 0.64$, respectively) than there was in the RC scenario ($M = 3.22$, $SD = 0.57$ and $M = 4.15$, $SD = 0.73$, respectively). In other words, participants' perceptions of their counterparts increased (became more positive) after having interacted with them, and this was particularly true within the PS scenario.

3.3.3.2 Perceptions of counterpart's organization

One's perception of one's counterpart's organization following a collaboration experience will undoubtedly affect the tone of future interactions. A positive perception may increase one's

willingness to share information and work together in future, while more negative perceptions can lead individuals to withhold information and avoid collaboration in the future. Of interest was to determine how or whether or not the interactions during the negotiations would alter perceptions of the counterpart's organization. The measure used to assess such perceptions was the same as the pre-negotiation measure. Results are shown in Table 26.

Table 26: Perceptions of counterpart's organization - Descriptives

Scale Items ¹⁹	Valid N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Skewness	Kurtosis	Item-Total r	Alpha if deleted
Perception of Counterpart's Organization (mean inter-item correlation = .49)							
I believe my counterpart's organization to be trustworthy.	84	4.0	0.8	-0.7	0.2	.49	--
The goals of my organization overlap with those of my counterpart's organization.	84	3.7	1.1	-0.9	0.2	.49	--
Perception of Counterpart's Organization (Index)	84	3.9	0.8	-1.0	1.4		

Note: Range of scale = 1 to 5.

Overall, participants held a positive view of their counterpart's organization, with an index mean of 3.9 on a 5-point scale.

Comparison ratings of their counterpart's organization for both CF and NGO personnel are shown in Table 27.

Table 27: Perceptions of counterpart's organization – Group comparison

	CF (N = 21)				NGO (N = 20)				Overall (N = 41)				
	Project Security		Refugee Camp		Project Security		Refugee Camp		Project Security		Refugee Camp		
Scale Items	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	p
I believe my counterpart's organization to be trustworthy.	3.62	1.16	4.14	0.73	3.60	1.19	3.50	0.89	3.61	1.16	3.83	0.86	S = n.s. O = n.s. S×O = n.s.
	Mean = 3.88 SD = 0.69				Mean = 3.55 SD = 0.69				Mean = 3.72 SD = 0.70				
The goals of my organization overlap with those of my counterpart's organization.	3.86	0.96	4.05	0.50	4.20	0.89	4.20	0.70	4.02	0.94	4.12	0.60	S = n.s. O = n.s. S×O = n.s.
	Mean = 3.95 SD = 0.54				Mean = 4.20 SD = 0.70				Mean = 4.07 SD = 0.63				
Index	3.74	0.92	4.10	0.46	3.90	0.87	3.85	0.67	3.82	0.89	3.98	0.58	S = n.s. O = n.s. S×O = n.s.
	Mean = 3.92 SD = 0.51				Mean = 3.87 SD = 0.59				Mean = 3.90 SD = 0.54				

Note: S = Scenario; O = Organization.

¹⁹ With only two items, this is not a conventional scale, but was included here for the sake of completeness.

There were no main effects or interactions for participants' perceptions of their counterparts' organization after completion of the negotiation. This was true for both the index and the individual items on the scale. On the whole, it seemed that both groups somewhat agreed that their counterpart's values were similar to their own, that their counterpart's organization was trustworthy, and that both organizations' goals overlapped.

Next we assessed whether the ratings of one's counterpart's organization changed upon completion of the negotiation. Once again, a 2 (timing: pre-negotiation vs. post-negotiation) \times 2 (scenario: PS vs. RC) \times 2 (organization: NGO vs. CF) mixed-model ANOVA was conducted.




Figure 5: Perceptions of counterpart's organization as a function of timing and organization across scenarios

As reflected in Figure 5, overall there were no main effects for either scenario ($F_{1,39} = 1.20, p = .28$) or organization ($F_{1,39} = 0.11, p = .75$), but there was a main effect for timing ($F_{1,39} = 35.13, p < .002$). Participants had a significantly more positive perception of their counterparts' organization after having completed the negotiation ($M = 3.90, SD = 0.54$) than prior to the negotiation ($M = 3.38, SD = 0.54$). There were no significant two- or three-way interactions. In other words, this timing effect was found across scenarios and organizations.

3.3.3.3 Satisfaction with relationship

The quality of interpersonal relationships among individuals can impact collaboration and the outcome of negotiations. A single item was included in the post-negotiation questionnaire to measure participants' satisfaction with their relationship with their counterpart on a 5-point scale.

Table 28: Satisfaction with relationship – Group comparison

Scale Items	CF (N = 21)				NGO (N = 20)				Overall (N = 41)				<i>p</i>
	Project Security		Refugee Camp		Project Security		Refugee Camp		Project Security		Refugee Camp		
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
How satisfied are you with your relationship with your counterpart as a result of this negotiation?	4.05	0.74	3.90	0.83	4.60	0.50	4.00	0.92	4.32	0.69	3.95	0.86	S < .05 O = <i>n.s.</i> S×O = <i>n.s.</i>
	Mean = 3.98 SD = 0.61				Mean = 4.30 SD = 0.50				Mean = 4.13 SD = 0.57				

Note: Range of scale = 1 to 5; S = Scenario; O = Organization.

Table 28 demonstrates a marginally significant main effect for scenario type ($F_{1,39} = 5.08, p < .05$). Participants were more satisfied with the relationship that they developed with their counterpart in the PS scenario ($M = 4.32, SD = 0.69$) than they were satisfied with the relationship that they developed in the RC scenario ($M = 3.95, SD = 0.86$). However, after negotiation, participants were still quite satisfied with their relationships with their counterparts overall, with means around or above 4 on the 5-point satisfaction scale.

3.3.3.4 Future relationship

Collaboration between individuals works ideally in situations where there are good working relationships between parties. As such, it was important to measure the degree to which participants believed that the negotiation built a good foundation for future relations with their counterpart. Results comparing the CF and NGO groups of participants on a single item measuring this construct (on a 5-point scale) are shown in Table 29.

Table 29: Future relationship – Group comparison

Scale Items	CF (N = 21)				NGO (N = 20)				Overall (N = 41)				<i>p</i>
	Project Security		Refugee Camp		Project Security		Refugee Camp		Project Security		Refugee Camp		
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
This negotiation built a good foundation for a future relationship with my counterpart.	4.43	0.75	4.24	0.62	4.65	0.49	4.10	0.64	4.54	0.64	4.17	0.63	S < .05 O = <i>n.s.</i> S×O = <i>n.s.</i>
	Mean = 4.33 SD = 0.60				Mean = 4.37 SD = 0.43				Mean = 4.35 SD = 0.52				

Note: Range of scale = 1 to 5; S = Scenario; O = Organization.

Participants reported that the negotiation in the PS scenario provided a good foundation for a future relationship with their counterpart to a significantly greater extent than it did in the RC scenario ($M = 4.54, SD = 0.64$ and $M = 4.17, SD = 0.63$, respectively; $F_{1,39} = 10.85, p = .002$).

3.3.3.5 Satisfaction with outcome

For a collaboration to be successful, all parties must be satisfied with its outcome. Much as perceptions of the counterpart's organization following collaboration can affect the tone of future interactions, one's satisfaction with the collaborative outcome will affect the tone of future

interactions. Three questions were created to measure level of satisfaction with various outcomes, as shown in Table 30.

Table 30: Satisfaction with outcome – Descriptives

Scale Items	Valid N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Skewness	Kurtosis	Item-Total r	Alpha if deleted
Satisfaction with Outcome (mean inter-item correlation =.40 ; alpha =.62)							
How satisfied are you with your own outcome (i.e., the extent to which the negotiated agreement benefits you)?	83	4.1	1.0	-1.1	0.7	0.56	0.33
How satisfied do you think your counterpart is with their own outcome (i.e., extent to which the negotiated agreement benefits them)?	83	4.1	0.8	-1.1	1.4	0.15	0.86
How satisfied are you with the balance between your own outcome and your counterpart's outcome?	83	4.0	0.9	-0.9	0.4	0.68	0.17
Satisfaction with Outcome (Index)	83	4.1	0.7	-0.9	1.0		

Note: Range of scale = 1 to 5.

In all, participants were satisfied with the outcomes of the collaboration with a mean of 4.1 on a 5-point scale. However, the internal consistency of the satisfaction scale was low (alpha = .62). Results comparing satisfaction with outcomes for CF and NGO personnel are shown in Table 31.

Table 31: Satisfaction with outcome – Group Comparison

Scale Items	CF (N = 21)				NGO (N = 20)				Overall (N = 41)				p
	Project Security		Refugee Camp		Project Security		Refugee Camp		Project Security		Refugee Camp		
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
How satisfied are you with your own outcome (i.e., the extent to which the negotiated agreement benefits you)?	4.55	0.51	4.15	0.88	4.25	0.85	3.40	1.23	4.40	0.71	3.77	1.12	S < .05 O < .05 S×O = n.s.
	Mean = 4.35 SD = 0.46				Mean = 3.82 SD = 0.80				Mean = 4.09 SD = 0.70				
How satisfied do you think your counterpart is with their own outcome (i.e., extent to which the negotiated agreement benefits them)?	4.20	0.52	3.80	0.95	4.35	0.59	4.40	0.75	4.27	0.55	4.10	0.90	S = n.s. O < .05 S×O = n.s.
	Mean = 4.00 SD = 0.54				Mean = 4.37 SD = 0.48				Mean = 4.19 SD = 0.54				
How satisfied are you with the balance between your own outcome and your counterpart's outcome?	4.35	0.49	4.30	0.86	4.20	0.77	3.25	0.97	4.27	0.64	3.77	1.05	S < .05 O < .002 S×O < .05
	Mean = 4.32 SD = 0.47				Mean = 3.72 SD = 0.66				Mean = 4.02 SD = 0.64				
Index	4.37	0.37	4.08	0.77	4.27	0.56	3.68	0.77	4.32	0.47	3.88	0.79	S < .05 O = n.s. S×O = n.s.
	Mean = 4.22 SD = 0.39				Mean = 3.97 SD = 0.49				Mean = 4.10 SD = 0.45				

Note: S = Scenario; O = Organization.

Results show a marginally significant main effect for scenario on the satisfaction with outcome index ($F_{1,39} = 8.79, p = .005$) such that participants reported greater satisfaction with the outcomes in the PS scenario ($M = 4.32, SD = 0.47$) than in the RC scenario ($M = 3.88, SD = 0.79$).

The individual item “How satisfied are you with the balance between your own outcome and your counterpart’s outcome?” showed the strongest effects. There was a significant main effect of organization ($F_{1,38} = 11.05, p < .002$), revealing that CF personnel were more satisfied with the balance of outcomes than NGO personnel ($M = 4.32, SD = 0.47$ and $M = 3.72, SD = 0.66$, respectively). And there was a marginally significant main effect of scenario ($F_{1,38} = 8.28, p = .007$) that followed the pattern of the overall index [i.e., more satisfaction with the balance of the outcomes for the PS scenario ($M = 4.27, SD = 0.64$) than the RC scenario ($M = 3.77, SD = 1.05$)]. These main effects were qualified by a marginally significant scenario × organization interaction ($F_{1,38} = 6.71, p = .014$). While CF personnel were equally satisfied with the balance between their outcome and their counterpart’s outcome in both scenarios ($M = 4.30, SD = 0.86$ and $M = 4.35, SD = 0.49$ for the RC and PS scenarios, respectively; $F_{1,19} = 0.04, p = .83$), NGO personnel were significantly less satisfied with the balance of outcomes in the RC scenario ($M = 3.25, SD = 0.97$) than in the PS scenario ($M = 4.20, SD = 0.77$; $F_{1,19} = 13.74, p = .001$).

3.3.3.6 Personal performance

Participants' evaluations of their own performance during the negotiations were also assessed. Four questions were created to measure perceptions of personal performance during the negotiation, as shown in Table 32.

Table 32: Personal performance – Descriptives

Scale Items	Valid N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Skewness	Kurtosis	Item-Total r	Alpha if deleted
Personal Performance (mean inter-item correlation =.47 ; alpha =.78)							
To what extent did you "lose face" (i.e., damage your sense of pride) in the negotiation? (reverse-scored)	83	4.8	0.6	-2.7	7.2	0.50	0.76
To what extent did this negotiation make you feel competent as a negotiator?	84	3.6	1.1	-0.6	-0.3	0.72	0.62
To what extent did you behave according to your own principles and values during the negotiation?	84	4.3	0.9	-1.1	0.7	0.55	0.72
To what extent did this negotiation positively impact your impression of yourself?	84	3.6	1.1	-0.6	-0.1	0.58	0.71
Personal Performance (Index)	83	4.1	0.7	-0.8	0.7		

Note: Range of scale = 1 to 5.

Overall, participants seemed to be very satisfied with their own performance during the negotiation, giving a mean index rating of 4.1 on a 5-point scale. The reliability (internal consistency) of the scale was also acceptable (alpha = .78).

Results comparing perceptions of personal performance for CF and NGO personnel are shown in Table 33.

Table 33: Personal performance – Group comparison

Scale Items	CF (N = 21)				NGO (N = 20)				Overall (N = 41)				p
	Project Security		Refugee Camp		Project Security		Refugee Camp		Project Security		Refugee Camp		
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
To what extent did you "lose face" (i.e., damage your sense of pride) in the negotiation? (rev)	5.00	0.00	4.90	0.44	4.70	0.57	4.45	0.94	4.85	0.42	4.65	0.74	S = n.s. O < .05 S×O = n.s.
	Mean = 4.93 SD = 0.18				Mean = 4.57 SD = 0.63				Mean = 4.76 SD = 0.49				
To what extent did this negotiation make you feel competent as a negotiator?	4.14	0.79	4.05	0.92	3.45	1.00	2.80	1.24	3.80	0.95	3.44	1.25	S = n.s. O < .002 S×O = n.s.
	Mean = 4.10 SD = 0.66				Mean = 3.12 SD = 0.93				Mean = 3.62 SD = 0.93				
To what extent did you behave according to your own principles and values during the negotiation?	4.67	0.48	4.43	0.81	4.15	0.93	3.80	1.01	4.41	0.77	4.12	0.95	S < .05 O < .05 S×O = n.s.
	Mean = 4.55 SD = 0.55				Mean = 3.97 SD = 0.82				Mean = 4.27 SD = 0.74				
To what extent did this negotiation positively impact your impression of yourself?	3.62	1.12	3.90	1.09	3.70	0.98	3.05	1.05	3.66	1.04	3.49	1.14	S = n.s. O = n.s. S×O < .05
	Mean = 3.76 SD = 1.02				Mean = 3.37 SD = 0.81				Mean = 3.57 SD = 0.93				
Index	4.41	0.42	4.35	0.59	4.00	0.63	3.52	0.86	4.18	0.58	3.91	0.84	S < .05 O < .002 S×O = n.s.
	Mean = 4.32 SD = 0.50				Mean = 3.76 SD = 0.57				Mean = 4.05 SD = 0.60				

Note: rev = reverse-scored; S = Scenario; O = Organization.

As shown in Table 33, and based on the mean index, there was a marginally significant main effect of scenario on participants' perceptions of their own performance ($F_{1,38} = 4.63, p < .05$), in that participants were somewhat more positive about their performance in the PS scenario ($M = 4.18, SD = 0.58$) than in the RC scenario ($M = 3.91, SD = 0.84$). This finding follows the general trend of participants responding more positively to the PS scenario than to the RC scenario. In addition, participants reported behaving in accordance with their own principles and values to a greater extent in the PS scenario ($M = 4.41, SD = 0.77$) than in the RC scenario ($M = 4.12, SD = 0.95; F_{1,39} = 4.27, p = .045$).

Based on the mean index, there was also a significant main effect of the organization ($F_{1,38} = 14.86, p < .002$). CF personnel were significantly more positive about their own performance ($M = 4.32, SD = 0.50$) compared to NGO personnel ($M = 3.76, SD = 0.57$). In particular, NGO personnel were significantly less likely than CF personnel to report that the negotiations made them feel like a competent negotiator ($M = 3.12, SD = 0.93$ and $M = 4.10, SD = 0.66$, respectively). Further, CF participants were marginally less likely to feel they had lost face during the negotiation ($M = 4.93, SD = 0.18$) as compared to NGO participants ($M = 4.57, SD = 0.63; F_{1,38} = 5.62, p = .023$). CF participants were also marginally more likely to feel that they had behaved in accordance with their own principles and values ($M = 4.55, SD = 0.55$) than their

NGO counterparts ($M = 3.97$, $SD = 0.82$; $F_{1,39} = 7.01$, $p = .012$). With regard to the positive impact of the negotiation on their perceptions of themselves, there was a marginally significant scenario \times organization interaction ($F_{1,38} = 8.02$, $p = .007$). CF personnel reported a greater positive impact on their self-impression in the RC scenario ($M = 3.90$, $SD = 1.09$) compared to the PS scenario ($M = 3.62$, $SD = 1.12$), whereas in contrast NGO participants reported a greater positive impact on their self-impression in the PS scenario ($M = 3.70$, $SD = 0.98$) compared to the RC scenario ($M = 3.05$, $SD = 1.05$).

3.3.3.7 Self-evaluation

In collaboration, it is important to have good interpersonal relationships between parties. However, discrepancies can exist between one's own self-perceptions and how behaviours are interpreted by others. As such, it was important to measure participants' self-evaluation of how they were perceived by their counterpart on the respect items. Specifically, these questions addressed how the participant believed that their counterpart perceived their (participants') behaviour during the negotiation. Results are shown in Table 34.

Table 34: Self-evaluation – Descriptives

Scale Items	Valid N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Skewness	Kurtosis	Item-Total r	Alpha if deleted
Counterpart's perception (mean inter-item correlation = .56 ; alpha = .88)							
Respected his or her rights.	84	4.6	0.6	-1.0	0.1	0.78	0.84
Gave them an opportunity to voice their issues and concerns.	84	4.6	0.6	-1.4	2.5	0.61	0.86
Treated him or her fairly.	84	4.6	0.6	-1.0	-0.1	0.67	0.85
Valued his or her participation.	84	4.5	0.7	-1.1	1.0	0.70	0.85
Acknowledged their expertise.	84	4.3	0.8	-0.9	0.4	0.64	0.86
Valued his or her experience.	83	4.3	0.8	-1.0	0.3	0.71	0.85
Counterpart's perception (Index)	84	4.5	0.5	-0.7	-0.2		

Note: Range of scale = 1 to 5.

Participants generally believed that their counterparts would see them as in a very positive light during the scenarios, with means averaging 4.5 on a 5-point scale. Furthermore, the individual items and overall subscale demonstrated good reliability ($\alpha = .88$).

Comparisons of the self-evaluation ratings of CF and NGO participants are displayed in Table 35.

Table 35: Self-evaluation – Group comparison

“My Counterpart would say that I...”	CF (N = 21)				NGO (N = 20)				Overall (N = 41)				<i>p</i>
	Project Security		Refugee Camp		Project Security		Refugee Camp		Project Security		Refugee Camp		
Scale Items	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
Respected his or her rights.	4.57	0.51	4.52	0.68	4.55	0.60	4.65	0.59	4.56	0.55	4.59	0.63	S = <i>n.s.</i>
	Mean = 4.55 SD = 0.50				Mean = 4.60 SD = 0.55				Mean = 4.57 SD = 0.52				O = <i>n.s.</i> S×O = <i>n.s.</i>
Gave them an opportunity to voice their issues and concerns.	4.48	0.75	4.71	0.46	4.50	0.61	4.60	0.60	4.49	0.68	4.66	0.53	S = <i>n.s.</i>
	Mean = 4.60 SD = 0.49				Mean = 4.55 SD = 0.54				Mean = 4.57 SD = 0.51				O = <i>n.s.</i> S×O = <i>n.s.</i>
Treated him or her fairly.	4.67	0.48	4.67	0.58	4.40	0.60	4.60	0.60	4.54	0.55	4.63	0.58	S = <i>n.s.</i>
	Mean = 4.67 SD = 0.46				Mean = 4.50 SD = 0.51				Mean = 4.59 SD = 0.49				O = <i>n.s.</i> S×O = <i>n.s.</i>
Valued his or her participation.	4.48	0.60	4.52	0.60	4.50	0.61	4.50	0.76	4.49	0.60	4.51	0.68	S = <i>n.s.</i>
	Mean = 4.50 SD = 0.50				Mean = 4.50 SD = 0.61				Mean = 4.50 SD = 0.55				O = <i>n.s.</i> S×O = <i>n.s.</i>
Acknowledged their expertise.	4.10	1.00	4.24	0.89	4.40	0.60	4.35	0.75	4.24	0.83	4.29	0.81	S = <i>n.s.</i>
	Mean = 4.17 SD = 0.78				Mean = 4.37 SD = 0.56				Mean = 4.27 SD = 0.68				O = <i>n.s.</i> S×O = <i>n.s.</i>
Valued his or her experience.	4.19	0.98	4.29	0.78	4.42	0.61	4.42	0.77	4.30	0.82	4.37	0.77	S = <i>n.s.</i>
	Mean = 4.24 SD = 0.75				Mean = 4.45 SD = 0.63				Mean = 4.34 SD = 0.69				O = <i>n.s.</i> S×O = <i>n.s.</i>
Index	4.41	0.54	4.49	0.49	4.47	0.55	4.52	0.60	4.44	0.54	4.51	0.54	S = <i>n.s.</i>
	Mean = 4.45 SD = 0.43				Mean = 4.50 SD = 0.53				Mean = 4.47 SD = 0.47				O = <i>n.s.</i> S×O = <i>n.s.</i>

Note: rev = reverse-scored; S = Scenario; O = Organization.

There were no main effects or interactions regarding participants’ beliefs about how their counterparts perceived them, suggesting that CF and NGO personnel had similar (and highly positive) beliefs about how they were perceived by their counterpart. However, it was important to determine whether or not this perception concurred with their counterpart’s perception on the same items. Indeed, participants’ self-evaluations regarding how they felt that their counterpart would perceive them was significantly correlated with their counterpart’s self-reported respect rating ($r = .35, p = .001$). To examine this relationship more closely, a 2 (evaluation source: self vs. counterpart) × 2 (scenario: PS vs. RC) × 2 (organization: CF vs. NGO) mixed-model ANOVA was conducted.




Figure 6: Self and counterpart respect ratings as a function of organization across scenarios

As reflected in Figure 6, there was no main effect for evaluation source ($F_{1, 38} = 0.90, p = .35$), scenario, ($F_{1, 38} = 2.07, p = .16$) or organization ($F_{1, 38} = 1.62, p = .21$) and no source \times organization interaction ($F_{1, 38} = 3.04, p = .09$). However, there were marginally significant two-way scenario \times organization ($F_{1, 38} = 5.11, p = .030$) and scenario \times evaluation source ($F_{1, 38} = 6.22, p = .017$) interactions. These were, however, qualified by a marginally significant three-way scenario \times evaluation source \times organization interaction ($F_{1, 38} = 7.00, p = .012$). Breaking down this three-way interaction, we see that within the PS scenario, there were no differences between participants' self-evaluations and their counterparts' evaluations for both NGO and CF members (self-evaluation: $M = 4.47, SD = 0.55$ and $M = 4.41, SD = 0.54$ for NGO and CF, respectively; counterpart's evaluation: $M = 4.52, SD = 0.60$ and $M = 4.56, SD = 0.50$ for NGO and CF, respectively). Within the RC scenario, CF personnel believed that they would be evaluated by their counterpart ($M = 4.48, SD = 0.50$) much more favourably than they actually were ($M = 3.92, SD = 0.92$). On the other hand, NGO personnel were comparatively much more accurate about how they would be evaluated by their counterpart ($M = 4.52, SD = 0.60$ and $M = 4.60, SD = 0.49$ for self-evaluation and counterpart's rating, respectively).

3.4 Negotiation Performance

As noted earlier, objective measures of negotiation performance were also created in accordance with the priorities identified for each group (CF and NGO) in the scenarios (see Annexes G and H). In order to make comparisons across scenarios, the proportion of points that a participant received out of the total possible points that they could achieve in the scenario was calculated

(i.e., PS score/60; RC score/100). This resulted in a final score for each scenario that ranged from 0 to 1.

Because each participant (with the exception of the two NGO participants noted earlier) worked through both the RC and PS scenarios, a mixed-model ANOVA was conducted with one within-subject variable (scenario: RS vs. PS) and one between-subject variable (organization: CF vs. NGO)²⁰.

As reflected in Figure 7, results showed two main effects.




Figure 7: Negotiation performance as a function of scenario and organization

There was a main effect of the type of scenario ($F_{1,39} = 9.53, p = .004$) and a main effect for organization ($F_{1,39} = 8.82, p = .005$). Overall, and somewhat surprising given some of the results presented earlier, participants had higher negotiation scores for the RC scenario ($M = 0.68, SD = 0.29$) than the PS scenario ($M = 0.52, SD = 0.22$). Furthermore, regardless of scenario, CF participants ($M = 0.68, SD = 0.20$) showed better negotiation performance than NGO participants ($M = 0.51, SD = 0.15$). The scenario \times organization interaction was not significant ($F_{1,33} = 0.196, p = .67$).

3.5 Behavioural Coding and Observer Ratings

As noted in Section 2.2.3.2, the videos of the negotiation were saved after each negotiation, and subsequently coded by a HSI[®] researcher in terms of both optimal and suboptimal behaviours relevant to respect, influence, negotiation and communication. Each section that follows explores behaviours within each of these four categories. An observer rating for performance is also

²⁰ The two NGO participants who took part in only one negotiation each were excluded from any mixed-model analyses that were conducted.

provided, followed by analyses showing the frequency of specific coded behaviours. Correlations between the overall observer ratings and the frequency of specific coded behaviours are provided.

3.5.1 Respect

3.5.1.1 Frequency of Behaviour Codes – Group Comparisons

The mean frequencies of observer codings of optimal and suboptimal respect within the videos were assessed using a mixed-model ANOVA with scenario (RC and PS) as the within-groups factor and the participant's organization (CF vs. NGO) as the between-groups factor.

Results for these analyses are shown in Figure 8.




Figure 8: Frequency of respect ratings as a function of scenario and organization

With respect to optimal respect behaviours, there was a marginally significant main effect of the type of scenario ($F_{1,39} = 4.24, p = .046$) as well as a significant main effect of organization ($F_{1,39} = 19.72, p < .002$), but no scenario \times organization interaction ($F_{1,39} = 0.05, p = .83$). Overall, the frequency of optimal respect behaviour was greater during the PS scenario ($M = 2.34, SD = 1.39$) than in the RC scenario ($M = 1.76, SD = 1.65$). Furthermore, across scenarios, CF personnel displayed a greater frequency of optimal respect behaviours ($M = 2.74, SD = 1.29$) than did NGO personnel ($M = 1.33, SD = 0.61$).

Considering suboptimal respect behaviours, there were no significant main effects for the type of scenario ($F_{1,39} = 2.67, p = .11$) or organization ($F_{1,39} = 0.15, p = .70$), and no scenario \times organization interaction ($F_{1,39} = 0.34, p = .57$). Overall, the frequency of suboptimal respect behaviour was somewhat greater during the PS scenario ($M = 0.32, SD = 0.93$) than in the RC scenario ($M = 0.17, SD = 0.54$). Furthermore, across scenarios, CF personnel had a somewhat greater frequency of suboptimal respect behaviours ($M = 0.28, SD = 0.88$) than did NGO personnel ($M = 0.20, SD = 0.47$). In neither of these cases were these differences significant.

However, it is important to note that the frequencies of suboptimal behaviour were very low for both groups, limiting the conclusions that can be drawn from this analysis.

3.5.1.2 *Correlations between Behaviour Frequency, Observer Ratings and Own/Counterpart Ratings*

As previously mentioned, based on the behavioural coding of the videos of the negotiations, the frequency of optimal and suboptimal respect behaviours were determined. The researcher who completed the behavioural coding also gave an overall performance rating for level of respect displayed by the individual participant, and the level of overall collaborative respect in the dyad. Table 36 shows the correlations between the frequency of observed optimal and suboptimal respect behaviours and the observer's overall performance ratings for the individual participant and the collaboration dyad, on the one hand (see rows of table), and participants' own ratings of feeling respected as well as their counterparts' ratings of feeling respected, across each scenario, on the other hand (see columns of table).

Table 36: Correlations between respect behaviours and own/counterpart ratings

	Project Security		Refugee Camp	
	Own Ratings of Feeling Respected	Counterpart's Ratings of Feeling Respected	Own Ratings of Feeling Respected	Counterpart's Ratings of Feeling Respected
Frequency of Observed Optimal Respect Behaviours	0.16	-0.03	0.08	-0.14
Frequency of Observed Suboptimal Respect Behaviours	-0.41**	0.07	-0.01	-0.19
Observer Rated Respect - Individual Performance	0.26	0.09	0.17	0.01
Observer Rated Respect – Dyad Performance ²¹	0.22		0.23	

Note: * $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .01$.²²

As shown in Table 36, one significant correlation was found. The observed frequency of suboptimal respect behaviours was significantly negatively related to participants' own ratings of feeling respected by their counterpart in the PS scenario. This finding suggests that, within the PS scenario, the more that participants' felt respected by their counterpart, the fewer the observed suboptimal respect behaviours displayed by the participants.

²¹ Since each person acted as both the target and the counterpart in a dyad, their rating would have gone into both the "own ratings" column and "counterpart's ratings" column. Since both partners in a dyad received the same "observer rated – dyad" score, the correlation between own rating and the dyad rating would be exactly the same as the counterpart's rating and the dyad rating. Therefore, the correlation between the counterpart's rating and the observer's rating of the dyad was redundant and was excluded from all such tables.

²² Due to the reduced number of analyses conducted, and the separation of the PS and RC scenarios as two sets of data, the less stringent p-values of .05 and .01 were used in the correlation tables.

3.5.1.3 Observer Ratings – Group Comparisons

Observer ratings of respect behaviours were explored using a mixed-model ANOVA with scenario (RC and PS) as the within-groups factor and the participant's organization (CF vs. NGO) as the between-group factor. Results are shown in Figure 9.




Figure 9: Observer respect ratings as a function of scenario and organization

In reference to Figure 9, there was a marginally significant main effect for the type of scenario ($F_{1,39} = 8.76, p = .005$) as well as a marginally significant main effect for organization ($F_{1,39} = 5.27, p = .027$), but no scenario \times organization interaction ($F_{1,39} = 0.12, p = .73$). Overall, the observer-rated respect was higher during the PS scenario ($M = 4.17, SD = 0.80$) than during the RC scenario ($M = 3.83, SD = 0.80$). Furthermore, across scenarios, CF personnel were rated as more respectful ($M = 4.24, SD = 0.83$) than were NGO personnel ($M = 3.75, SD = 0.47$). This finding appears to contradict the findings of felt respect seen earlier. While the CF members appeared to be behaving respectfully to the observer, this did not appear to translate into the respect that NGO participants felt (as indicated by their lower ratings of felt respect).

3.5.2 Influence Strategies

3.5.2.1 Frequency of Behaviour Codes – Group Comparisons

The mean frequencies of observer codings of optimal and suboptimal influence strategies within the videos were assessed using a mixed-model ANOVA with scenario (RC and PS) as the within-groups factor and the participant's organization (CF vs. NGO) as the between-groups factor. Results are shown in Figure 10.




Figure 10: Frequency of influence ratings as a function of scenario and organization

As reflected in Figure 10, with regard to the frequency of optimal influence behaviours, there was a significant main effect of organization ($F_{1,39} = 63.6, p < .002$) but no significant main effect of scenario type ($F_{1,39} = 0.09, p = .76$) and no scenario \times organization interaction ($F_{1,33} = 0.53, p = .47$). Overall, the frequency of optimal influence behaviours was equal within the PS scenario ($M = 4.54, SD = 2.58$) and the RC scenario ($M = 4.63, SD = 2.44$). Furthermore, across scenarios, CF participants had greater frequencies of optimal influence behaviours ($M = 6.31, SD = 1.74$) than did NGO participants ($M = 2.78, SD = 0.97$).

With regard to the frequency of suboptimal influence behaviours, there was no significant main effect of scenario type ($F_{1,39} = 0.04, p = .85$). There was, however, a marginally significant main effect of organization ($F_{1,39} = 4.20, p = .047$), which was qualified by a marginally significant scenario \times organization interaction ($F_{1,39} = 4.64, p = .037$). Within the PS scenario, CF and NGO participants displayed the same number of suboptimal influence behaviours ($M = 1.00, SD = 0.89$ and $M = 0.90, SD = 0.91$, respectively; $t = 0.35, p = .72$). Within the RC scenario, however, CF members displayed more suboptimal influence behaviours ($M = 1.48, SD = 1.57$) than did NGO participants ($M = 0.50, SD = 0.61$; $t = 2.60, p = .013$).

3.5.2.2 Correlations between Behaviour Frequency, Observer Ratings and Own/Counterpart Ratings

Table 37 shows the correlations between the participants' own ratings of feeling powerful and influential during the interaction as well as their counterparts' ratings of feeling powerful and influential (see table columns) and the frequency of optimal and suboptimal influence strategy behaviours observed (see table rows). It also displays the correlations between participants' and counterparts' ratings of feeling powerful and influential and the HSI[®] researcher's overall observer ratings of the influence strategies used in the negotiation for both the individual participant and the dyad as a whole. These correlations are shown for both scenarios.

Table 37: Correlations between influence behaviours and own/counterpart ratings

	Project Security		Refugee Camp	
	Own Ratings of Power & Influence	Counterpart's Ratings of Power & Influence	Own Ratings of Power & Influence	Counterpart's Ratings of Power & Influence
Frequency of Observed Optimal Influence Behaviours	0.10	-0.21	0.37*	-0.57**
Frequency of Observed Suboptimal Influence Behaviours	-0.09	-0.51**	0.21	-0.19
Observer Rated Influence - Individual	0.14	0.16	0.16	-0.15
Observer Rated Influence – Dyad	0.43**		<-0.01	

Note: * $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .01$.

As shown in Table 37, observer ratings of the overall use of influence strategies within the dyad was positively related to participant's own ratings of their power and influence in the PS scenario. This finding indicated that the participants' ratings of their power and influence matched the overall use of influence strategies within the dyad as rated by the observer for the PS scenario. In addition, the frequency of observed suboptimal influence behaviours was significantly negatively related to the counterpart's ratings of power and influence. In other words, within the PS scenario, as counterparts' ratings of their power and influence increased, the observed frequency of participants' suboptimal influence behaviours decreased.

In the RC scenario, counterparts' ratings of their power and influence were negatively related to the observed frequency of participants' optimal influence behaviours. This finding suggests that the increased use of optimal influence behaviours during a negotiation is associated with counterparts' feeling less power and influence. Likewise, participants' own ratings of influence were positively related to the observed frequency of participants' optimal influence behaviours within the RC scenario.

3.5.2.5 Observer Ratings - Group Comparisons

Observer ratings of influence strategies were explored using a mixed-model ANOVA with scenario (RC and PS) as the within-groups factor and the participant's organization (CF vs. NGO) as the between-groups factor, as shown in Figure 11.




Figure 11: Observer influence ratings as a function of scenario and organization

As reflected in Figure 11, there was a marginally significant main effect of scenario ($F_{1,39} = 7.39$, $p = .010$) as well as a marginally significant main effect of organization ($F_{1,39} = 4.38$, $p < .043$). However, the scenario \times organization interaction was not significant ($F_{1,33} = 3.41$, $p = .072$). Overall, more optimal influence strategies were observed during the PS scenario ($M = 4.02$, $SD = 0.76$) compared to the RC scenario ($M = 3.71$, $SD = 0.78$). Furthermore, across scenarios, CF participants displayed more optimal influence behaviours ($M = 4.07$, $SD = 0.71$) than did NGO participants ($M = 3.65$, $SD = 0.56$). This difference across organizations was somewhat (although not significantly) greater within the PS scenario than within the RC scenario. That is, the CF showed comparatively more optimal influence strategies in the scenario designed to reflect their jurisdiction.

3.5.3 Negotiation

3.5.3.1 Frequency of Behaviour Codes – Group Comparisons

The frequency of observer codings of optimal and suboptimal negotiation behaviours within the videos were explored using a mixed-model ANOVA with scenario (RC vs. PS) as the within-groups factor and the participant's organization (CF vs. NGO) as the between-groups factor. Results are shown in Figure 12.




Figure 12: Frequency of negotiation ratings as a function of scenario and organization

As demonstrated in Figure 12, with respect to the frequency of optimal negotiation behaviours, there were no significant main effects for scenario ($F_{1,39} = 0.06, p = .81$) or organization ($F_{1,39} = 2.21, p = .15$). In addition, there was no significant scenario \times organization interaction ($F_{1,39} = 0.15, p = .70$). Overall, the frequencies of optimal negotiation behaviour were equal across the PS scenario ($M = 3.20, SD = 0.97$) and the RC scenario ($M = 2.93, SD = 1.43$). Across scenarios, the frequency of optimal negotiation behaviours was somewhat greater among NGO participants ($M = 3.20, SD = .97$) than among CF participants ($M = 2.74, SD = 1.02$), though this difference did not reach significance.

With respect to the frequency of suboptimal negotiation behaviours, there were no significant main effects for scenario ($F_{1,39} = 0.03, p = .86$) or organization ($F_{1,39} = 0.87, p = .36$). In addition, there was no significant scenario \times organization interaction ($F_{1,39} = 0.27, p = .61$). Overall, the frequency of suboptimal negotiation behaviours was equal across the PS scenario ($M = 1.66, SD = 1.33$) and the RC scenario ($M = 1.71, SD = 1.54$). Across scenarios, the frequency of suboptimal negotiation behaviours was somewhat greater among NGO participants ($M = 1.85, SD = 1.03$) than among CF participants ($M = 1.52, SD = 1.18$), but this difference did not reach significance.

3.5.3.2 Correlations between Behaviour Frequency, Observer Ratings and Own/Counterpart Ratings

Tables 38 and 39 show the correlations between the coding frequency of optimal and suboptimal negotiation behaviours and participants' own ratings of their counterpart's negotiation strategies for each scenario, for integrative and distributive negotiations, respectively. The tables also show the correlations between the coding frequency of optimal and suboptimal negotiation behaviours and the counterpart's ratings of the participant's negotiation strategies for each scenario. Furthermore, the tables show the correlations between observer ratings of the negotiation behaviours of the individual participant as well as of the dyad's interaction as a whole, and

participants' own ratings of their counterpart's negotiation strategies for each scenario. Finally, the tables display the correlations between observer ratings of the negotiation behaviours of the individual participant as well as the dyad, and counterparts' ratings of participant's negotiation strategies for each scenario. Two scales to measure negotiation styles were used in the study: one measure evaluated the use of an integrative negotiation style (a collaborative negotiation style) and one measure evaluated the use of a distributive negotiation style (a competitive negotiation style). As such, Table 38 reports the correlations specific to the ratings of integrative negotiation and Table 39 reports the correlations specific to ratings of distributive negotiation.

Table 38: Correlations between negotiation behaviours and own/counterpart ratings of integrative negotiation

	Project Security		Refugee Camp	
	Own Ratings of Counterpart's Integrative Negotiation	Counterpart's Ratings of Participant's Integrative Negotiation	Own Ratings of Counterpart's Integrative Negotiation	Counterpart's Ratings of Participant's Integrative Negotiation
Frequency of Observed Optimal Negotiation Behaviours	< 0.01	< 0.01	0.05	0.16
Frequency of Observed Suboptimal Negotiation Behaviours	-0.07	-0.20	-0.06	-0.14
Observer Rated Negotiation - Individual	0.23	0.17	0.30	0.30
Observer Rated Negotiation - Dyad	0.31*		0.40**	

Note: * $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .01$.

As seen in Table 38, participants' views that their counterpart engaged in an integrative negotiation style were positively associated with the observer rating of the overall negotiation in the dyad in both the PS and RC scenarios. This is demonstrated by the significant correlations between the participants' rating of their counterparts' integrative negotiation and the observer's overall rating of the negotiation within the dyad, for both scenarios. This suggests that the perception that one's counterpart is engaging in an integrative negotiation is associated with a more positive negotiation within the dyad as a whole as rated by an observer.

Table 39: Correlations between negotiation behaviours and own/counterpart ratings of distributive negotiation

	Project Security		Refugee Camp	
	Own Ratings of Counterpart's Distributive Negotiation	Counterpart's Ratings of Participant's Distributive Negotiation	Own Ratings of Counterpart's Distributive Negotiation	Counterpart's Ratings of Participant's Distributive Negotiation
Frequency of Observed Optimal Negotiation Behaviours	0.02	-0.15	0.15	-0.03
Frequency of Observed Suboptimal Negotiation Behaviours	-0.04	-0.06	0.21	0.29
Observer Rated Negotiation - Individual	-0.03	-0.07	-0.33*	-0.01
Observer Rated Negotiation - Dyad	-0.15		-0.08	

Note: * $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .01$.

As shown in Table 39, in the RC scenario, higher observer ratings of the participants' negotiation behaviours were negatively related to the participants' perception of their counterparts' negotiation style as distributive. This finding is demonstrated by the significant negative correlation between participants' report of their counterpart's distributive negotiation and the observer's overall rating of participants' negotiation. A possible interpretation of this finding is that participants use less optimal negotiation behaviours themselves when they see their counterpart's negotiation style as competitive.

3.5.3.3 Observer Ratings - Group Comparisons

Observer ratings of negotiation behaviours were explored using a mixed-model ANOVA with scenario (RC vs. PS) as the within-groups factor and the participant's organization (CF vs. NGO) as the between-groups factor, as shown in Figure 13.




Figure 13: Observer negotiation ratings as a function of scenario and organization

There were no main effects for the type of scenario ($F_{1,39} = 2.76, p = .10$) or organization ($F_{1,39} = 0.37, p = .55$), and no scenario \times organization interaction ($F_{1,33} = 0.49, p = .49$).

3.5.4 Communication

3.5.4.1 Behaviour Codes – Group Comparisons

The frequencies of coded communication behaviours were lower than for other coded behaviours because exchanges between counterparts were more often coded as examples of respecting behaviours, influence strategies, or negotiation behaviours. In accordance with the coding scheme (see Table 6), communication examples were quite specific in nature (e.g., spelling out/explaining industry acronyms).

The frequencies of observer-rated optimal and suboptimal influence behaviours were explored using a mixed-model ANOVA with scenario (RC vs. PS) as the within-groups factor and the participant's organization (CF vs. NGO) as the between-groups factor. Results are shown in Figures 14 and 15.




Figure 14: Frequency of communication ratings as a function of scenario and organization

As reflected in Figure 14, for observer-rated optimal communication behaviours, there was a significant main effect for the type of organization ($F_{1,39} = 10.91, p = .002$) as well as a significant scenario \times organization interaction ($F_{1,33} = 5.11, p = .029$), but no main effect for scenario ($F_{1,39} = 0.50, p = .49$). Overall, the frequency of optimal communication behaviour was relatively equal during the PS scenario ($M = 0.34, SD = 0.66$) and the RC scenario ($M = 0.27, SD = 0.50$). Across scenarios, the frequency of optimal communication behaviours was greater among CF participants ($M = 0.52, SD = 0.58$) than among NGO participants ($M = 0.08, SD = 0.18$). However, while the frequency of optimal communication decreased from the PS to the RC scenario for CF members ($M = 0.67, SD = 0.80$ and $M = 0.38, SD = 0.59$, respectively), it increased from the PS to the RC scenario for NGO members ($M = 0.00, SD = 0.00$ and $M = 0.15, SD = 0.37$, respectively). However, as demonstrated, the frequencies of optimal communication behaviours were relatively low, limiting the conclusions that can be drawn from these findings.

Regarding suboptimal communication behaviours, there were no significant main effects for the type of scenario ($F_{1,39} = 2.27, p = .14$) or organization ($F_{1,39} = 0.67, p = .42$). In addition, there was no significant scenario \times organization interaction ($F_{1,33} = 0.001, p = .97$). Overall, the frequency of suboptimal communication behaviour was relatively equal during the PS scenario ($M = 0.34, SD = 0.66$) and the RC scenario ($M = 0.27, SD = 0.50$). Across scenarios, the frequency of suboptimal communication behaviours was somewhat greater among CF participants ($M = 0.21, SD = 0.41$) than among NGO participants ($M = 0.13, SD = 0.28$), though this difference was not statistically significant. Overall, the frequencies of communication behaviours were very low, limiting the conclusions that can be drawn from these findings.

3.5.4.2 Correlations between Behaviour Frequency, Observer Ratings and Own/Counterpart Ratings

Table 40 shows the correlations between the observed frequency of optimal and suboptimal communication behaviours and participants' own ratings of the quality of communication as well

as their counterpart's ratings of the quality of communication in the two scenarios. Table 40 also shows the correlations between observer ratings of communication behaviours for the individual participant as well as for the dyad's interaction as a whole and participants' own ratings of the quality of communication. Finally, Table 40 also shows the correlations between observer ratings of communication behaviours for the individual participant as well as for the dyad's interaction as a whole and the counterpart's rating of the quality of the communication in the two scenarios.

Table 40: Correlations between communication behaviours and own/counterpart ratings

	Project Security		Refugee Camp	
	Own Ratings of Communication Quality	Counterpart's Ratings of Communication Quality	Own Ratings of Communication Quality	Counterpart's Ratings of Communication Quality
Frequency of Observed Optimal Communication Behaviours	0.30	-0.07	0.24	0.01
Frequency of Observed Suboptimal Communication Behaviour	-0.04	-0.14	-0.34*	-0.19
Observer Rated Communication - Individual	0.24	0.20	0.49**	0.19
Observer Rated Communication - Dyad	0.23		0.38*	

Note: * $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .01$.

In the RC scenario, observer ratings of the participants' communication behaviours were positively related to participants' ratings of the quality of communication ($r = .49$). Similarly, observer ratings of dyad communication behaviours during the RC scenario were also significantly positively related to the participants' own ratings of the quality of communication ($r = .38$). Furthermore, there was a significant negative correlation between participants' ratings of the quality of the communication and the frequency of observed suboptimal communication behaviours ($r = -.34$). Together these findings demonstrated that participants' ratings of the quality of communication were related to observed communication behaviours during the RC negotiation.

3.5.4.3 Observer Ratings - Group Comparisons

Observer ratings of communication behaviours were explored using a mixed-model ANOVA with scenario (RC vs. PS) as the within-groups factor and the participant's organization (CF vs. NGO) as the between-groups factor, as shown in Figure 15.




Figure 15: Communication ratings as a function of scenario and organization

There was a marginally significant main effect for the type of scenario ($F_{1,39} = 8.29, p = .006$) as well as a marginally significant main effect for organization ($F_{1,39} = 4.47, p < .041$), but no scenario \times organization interaction ($F_{1,33} = 0.50, p = .48$). Overall, more optimal communication strategies were observed during the PS scenario ($M = 3.88, SD = 0.93$) than during the RC scenario ($M = 3.44, SD = 0.81$). Furthermore, across scenarios, CF participants were rated as displaying more optimal communication behaviours ($M = 3.88, SD = 0.65$) than NGO participants displayed ($M = 3.42, SD = 0.73$).

3.5.5 Observer Ratings and Behavioural Coding Correlation

The results of correlational analyses between the specific behavioural codes associated with the video and the observer ratings emerging from watching the video in its entirety are shown in Table 41.

Table 41: Correlation between behavioural codes and observer ratings

N = 43	Optimal	Suboptimal
Respect	0.67**	-0.69**
Influence	0.53**	-0.49**
Negotiation	0.39*	-0.64**
Communication	0.20	-0.54**

Note: * $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .01$.

As previously mentioned, the observer ratings are of the overall performance of the participant in the domains of respect, influence, negotiation, and communication. These ratings were based on

balancing the frequency of optimal and suboptimal behaviours.²³ As such, if the observer ratings of performance were valid, then they should be significantly positively related to the frequency of the participants' optimal behaviours, and significantly negatively related to the frequency of the participants' suboptimal behaviours. As this analysis shows, there were strong and significant relationships in the predicted directions between the behaviour codes and the observer overall ratings of negotiation performance. The only non-significant correlation was related to communication, in regard to optimal behaviours, though this non-significant correlation was in the predicted direction. This suggests that, overall, a consistent approach was used for coding specific behaviours and for rating observed performance, which provides some evidence for the validity of the observer ratings of performance.

3.5.6 Correlational Analyses for Respect and Power with Collaboration

Respect and power were hypothesized to influence the collaboration process and outcomes. These relationships were investigated through correlational analyses. Table 42 examines the correlations between participant ratings of respect and collaboration process items, including engagement in the process, power and influence, negotiation, and communication, for each of the two scenarios.

Table 42: Correlations between participant ratings of respect and collaboration process items

		Project Security: Respect Self-Report	Refugee Camp: Respect Self-Report
Engagement	Self-Report	0.53**	0.71**
Power & Influence	Self-Report	0.44**	0.74**
	Observer Ratings - Individual	0.14	0.26
	Observer Ratings - Dyad	0.10	0.17
	Frequency of Optimal Behaviours	0.09	0.23
	Frequency of Suboptimal Behaviours	-0.14	0.12
Negotiation	Self-Report - Integrative	0.45**	0.25
	Self-Report - Distributive	-0.27	-0.42**
	Observer Ratings - Individual	0.36*	0.35*
	Observer Ratings - Dyad	0.17	0.26
	Frequency of Optimal Behaviours	-0.02	0.14
	Frequency of Suboptimal Behaviours	-0.25	-0.25
Communication	Self-Report	0.62**	0.55**
	Observer Ratings - Individual	0.11	0.37*
	Observer Ratings - Dyad	0.15	0.16

²³ See Section 2.3.3.3 for additional information about the observer ratings.

		Project Security: Respect Self-Report	Refugee Camp: Respect Self-Report
	Frequency of Optimal Behaviours	0.19	0.34*
	Frequency of Suboptimal Behaviours	-0.13	-0.02

Note: * $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .01$.

Results showed that feeling respected was significantly and positively related to feelings of engagement and to perceiving oneself to have more power and influence in the two scenarios. Feeling respected was also significantly and positively related to participants' ratings of the quality of communication in the two scenarios. Although the same general patterns were found for both scenarios, there were some differences. For instance, within the RC scenario only, better communication behaviours, as evidenced by observer ratings of the individual participant ($r = .37$) and optimal coded behaviours ($r = .34$), were positively associated with participants' feelings of respect. Respect was also significantly associated with some aspects of negotiation behaviour. For instance, participants felt more respected when they saw their counterpart's negotiation to be integrative, though this relationship was only significant in the PS scenario ($r = .45$). Further, participants reported less respect when they saw their counterpart's negotiation to be distributive, although this negative relationship was significant only in the RC scenario ($r = -.42$).

Correlations were also conducted on participant ratings of respect and collaboration outcomes. These are listed in Table 43.

Table 43: Correlations between participant ratings of respect and collaboration outcomes

	Project Security: Respect Self-Report	Refugee Camp: Respect Self-Report
Perceptions of Counterpart	0.61**	0.34*
Perceptions of Counterpart's organization	0.41**	0.39*
Satisfaction with relationship	0.59**	0.39*
Future Relationship	0.64**	0.46**
Satisfaction with Outcome	0.36*	0.46**
Personal Performance	0.33*	0.58**
Self-Evaluation of Counterpart's Perceptions	0.44**	0.40**

Note: * $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .01$.

Feeling respected was significantly related to more positive ratings of the outcomes of the collaboration. In both scenarios, higher ratings of respect were significantly related to more positive ratings on all of the outcome variables, including participants' perceptions of their counterpart and of their counterpart's organization, satisfaction with the relationship and a potential future relationship, satisfaction with the negotiation outcome, positive perceptions of their own performance, and positive evaluations of their counterpart's perceptions of them.

The same correlational analyses were conducted for power and influence and are listed in Tables 44 and 45.

Table 44: Correlations between participant ratings of power and influence and collaboration items

		Project Security: Power and Influence Self-Report	Refugee Camp: Power and Influence Self-Report
Engagement	Self-Report	0.52**	0.67**
Respect	Self-Report	0.44**	0.74**
	Observer Ratings - Individual	0.03	0.07
	Observer Ratings - Dyad	0.03	0.06
	Frequency of Optimal Behaviours	-0.06	0.14
	Frequency of Suboptimal Behaviours	-0.23	0.27
Negotiation	Self-Report - Integrative	0.37*	0.22
	Self-Report - Distributive	-0.27	-0.44**
	Observer Ratings - Individual	0.35*	0.29
	Observer Ratings - Dyad	0.19	0.17
	Frequency of Optimal Behaviours	-0.20	-0.09
	Frequency of Suboptimal Behaviours	-0.15	-0.18
Communication	Self-Report	0.38**	0.57**
	Observer Ratings - Individual	0.30	0.45**
	Observer Ratings - Dyad	0.27	0.20
	Frequency of Optimal Behaviours	0.07	0.34*
	Frequency of Suboptimal Behaviours	-0.13	-0.13

Note: * $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .01$.

Correlational analyses showed that, in both scenarios, perceptions of power and influence were significantly and positively related to participants' ratings of their engagement with the collaboration process, their perceptions of being respected, and their ratings of the quality of communication. Once again, although similar patterns were seen for both scenarios, there were a few differences. For instance, within the RC scenario, observer ratings of the participants' communication ($r = .45$) and the frequency of optimal communication behaviours ($r = .34$) were significantly correlated with participants' self-reported power and influence during the negotiation. These findings suggest that better communication behaviours during the negotiation (as evidenced by optimal coded behaviours and observer ratings) were associated with increased participant perceptions of their own power and influence.

Perceived power and influence was also significantly associated with some aspects of negotiation behaviour. For instance, within the PS scenario, participants felt more powerful and influential when they perceived their counterpart's negotiation to be integrative ($r = .37$). Likewise, within the RC scenario, participants felt less powerful when they perceived their counterpart's negotiation style as distributive ($r = -.44$). Observer ratings of the participants' negotiation were also related to perceptions of power and influence in both scenarios, though this relationship was only significant in the PS scenario ($r = .35$).

Table 45: Correlations between participant ratings of power and influence on collaboration outcomes

	Project Security: Power and Influence Self-Report	Refugee Camp: Power and Influence Self-Report
Perceptions of Counterpart	0.09	0.05
Perceptions of Counterpart's organization	0.45**	0.42**
Satisfaction with relationship	0.17	0.16
Future Relationship	0.41**	0.28
Satisfaction with Outcome	0.57**	0.50**
Personal Performance	0.46**	0.56**
Self-Evaluation of Counterpart's Perceptions	0.26	0.08

Note: * $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .01$.

In both scenarios, having a greater perception of one's power and influence was positively related to increased satisfaction with the outcome of the negotiation, more positive perceptions of the counterpart's organization, and greater satisfaction with one's personal performance during the negotiation. In the PS scenario only, feeling more power and influence was also related to a more positive assessment of the potential for a future relationship with the counterpart.

4. Discussion

This study investigated relationships among conditions for collaboration and aspects of the process of civil-military collaboration and its outcomes. Of particular interest were the constructs of respect and power, as these had been identified in previous research as particular challenges to manage in theatre (Thomson et al., 2010; Thomson et al., 2011). To replicate, as best possible, an operational setting, we asked NGO personnel and CF personnel to work through two simulated scenarios via Skype. Each scenario, developed in consultation with SMEs, had particular NGO and CF priorities for participants to address, which often conflicted but did not foreclose a “win-win” outcome. We wondered if clearly demarcated jurisdictions, or clear roles and responsibilities based on type of organization (CF vs. NGO), would be associated, for instance, with greater respect and better performance. The scenarios were thus designed to reflect either CF or NGO jurisdiction.

However, despite our efforts to develop scenarios with clear jurisdictions, the jurisdiction manipulation check showed that participants did not perceive the issue of jurisdiction as a simple one. Because the scenarios were constructed to represent complex, realistic, and somewhat ambiguous operational scenarios, it could be that both scenarios provided some justification for either CF or NGO jurisdiction. From the perspective of the CF, there are security issues in both scenarios, and from the perspective of NGOs, there is a development component in one (PS) and a humanitarian crisis in the other (RC) – both of which are NGO concerns. Of particular note is the lack of clarity regarding jurisdiction for the RC scenario. Over 40% of the participants in this study said that the jurisdiction was unclear, 30% said that it was the CF’s jurisdiction, and only 25% said that it was NGO jurisdiction, when in fact it was designed to be NGO jurisdiction. With respect to the PS scenario, over half of the participants saw this (correctly) as the CF’s jurisdiction, whereas about one-quarter said that it was unclear. Without asking participants why they were unclear about jurisdiction, it is difficult to explain these results regarding jurisdiction perceptions. In using a similar approach in future research, perhaps eliciting a broader range of SME input on scenario development, and/or possibly developing less complex scenarios, could address this question. Nevertheless, ambiguity of jurisdiction may account for some of the observed results in this study.²⁴

4.1.1 Pre-existing Impressions and Anticipated Outcomes

Participants were asked to rate their overall impression of their counterparts and their expectations regarding the outcomes of their negotiations, once they had read the information package. These ratings were meant to provide a way of determining whether or not perceptions would change following the civil-military interaction. Previous research has shown that contact with a stereotyped out-group diminishes pre-existing stereotypes, through processes such as learning about one another, changing one’s behaviour toward stereotyped groups, generating positive feelings about one another, and reappraising (Pettigrew, 1998).

²⁴ We also considered analyzing the data based on whether participants judged the scenario jurisdiction correctly or incorrectly, but too few participants made a correct judgment to make this analysis worthwhile.

The pre-negotiation measures showed little evidence of strong pre-conceptions about counterparts. However, in the PS scenario, CF personnel had slightly less positive perceptions of their counterpart as an individual and of the counterpart's organization as a whole, compared to in the RC scenario. Despite a slightly negative "overall" impression of the NGO in the PS scenario, CF participants still perceived the NGO as both trustworthy and as having overlapping goals with their own organization. Perhaps their judgement of the NGO was based more on their relatively low regard for its ability within the PS scenario context as it was a familiar (to the CF), non-permissive environment, which many CF regarded as their own jurisdiction. This speculation is somewhat supported by the finding that CF personnel rated their counterpart's competence marginally lower in the PS scenario than in RC scenario, following collaboration. CF personnel's own confidence in this scenario may have, in part, driven their relatively low regard for the NGO in the PS scenario. Understanding the impact that particular environments have on perceptions of one's counterpart and how these shape collaboration should be investigated further.

Overall, on a more positive note, results showed an increased positive perception of one's counterpart following the interaction in both the PS and RC scenarios. In the PS scenario, this was more the case for the CF than for the NGO. Consistent with contact theory, perhaps having the opportunity to work with an out-group member on a particular problem, where sharing resources is demanded, improves general perceptions of the out-group, at least in some cases.

4.1.2 Conditions for Collaboration

Our previous research identified conditions for effective collaboration, such as mutual respect and shared power (Thomson et al., 2010). Other research has suggested that the failure to meet these conditions may frustrate civil-military collaboration (Thomson et al., 2011). In the current project, our findings suggest that NGO personnel generally perceived themselves to be disadvantaged in relation to their CF counterparts, most often in the RC scenario, which, again, was meant to reflect an NGO jurisdiction. Whereas CF personnel reported consistent feelings of respect across scenarios, NGO personnel felt less respected in the RC scenario than in the PS scenario. Specifically, NGOs reported that their participation, opinions and experience were valued less in the RC scenario compared to the PS scenario. Conditions of shared power also varied across scenario and organization. NGO participants reported having less power and influence in the RC scenario than in the PS scenario. In particular, they had a harder time in getting their counterpart to listen to them and in getting their own way, even when they tried, in the RC scenario compared to in the PS scenario. Compared to activity in the PS scenario, NGOs said that they did not think that their voice held much sway, and that they did not believe that they made the decisions in the RC scenario. In both scenarios, NGOs reported having less overall influence compared to CF personnel.

Given these results, under particular circumstances, collaboration with CF personnel was associated with NGO participants feeling less respected and less powerful and influential. The key challenge then is to understand why NGO personnel reported feeling less respected and less powerful and influential in the RC scenario compared to the PS scenario. One explanation could be related to gender roles. Because a majority of the CF members were male and a majority of the NGO members were female, one explanation could be that the male CF members may have felt uncomfortable with the female NGO members taking on a leadership role (as seen, e.g., in the gender literature; see Boyce & Herd, 2003; Eagly, Makhijani, & Klonsky, 1992; Korabik & Ayman, 1989). To examine this possibility, analyses were conducted to assess the role of gender

in lieu of organization. However, the findings were less significant and less consistent when considering gender rather than organization, indicating that the results had less to do with the gender distribution than with the organizational distribution. However, due to the skewed gender distribution in our sample (gender was nearly confounded with organization), it is difficult to conclusively rule out a gender explanation.

Likewise, other possible explanations for the relative lack of respect, power, and influence felt by NGO participants in the RC scenario may be related to their age and ethnic/visible minority status. The NGO participants in this study tended to be younger than the CF participants and a greater proportion of NGO participants were members of a visible minority. These demographic differences may have played a role in the negotiation dynamics, particularly in a context such as the RC scenario (NGO jurisdiction), where leadership roles were opposite to what they typically are in many other social and organizational contexts, ranging from theatres of operations (such as non-permissive environments) to other societal contexts. Thus, in addition to gender, future research should also examine the possible role of age and ethnicity in the dynamics of civil-military collaboration.

Another possible explanation for the findings could be the relatively high level of ambiguity surrounding jurisdiction, roles and expectations in the RC scenario. The data provide some support for this account. In the RC scenario, NGO personnel who were uncertain about jurisdiction reported feeling significantly less respected than their CF counterparts who also were uncertain about jurisdiction in that context. Unlike NGO personnel who were uncertain, uncertain CF personnel reported a comparable level of respect to NGO personnel and to CF personnel who thought that they understood the jurisdiction (irrespective of accuracy). An even stronger effect showing the same pattern emerged for perceptions of power and influence. In short, uncertain NGO personnel in the RC scenario reported feeling less respected, less powerful and less influential relative to personnel in the other three groups (NGO certain, CF uncertain, and CF certain).

The present analysis shows that NGO personnel reported feeling less respected and that their opinions were less valued in the RC scenario than in the PS scenario. It is unclear exactly why, but perhaps ambiguity in a situation provided an opportunity for the CF participants to “step up to the plate,” so to speak, and to take on a leadership role in the RC scenario. This might have been facilitated, for instance, by the CF participants’ greater level of prior negotiation training and experience compared to the NGO participants, as well as, perhaps, by the CF participants’ greater level of operational experience interacting with NGO members than the NGO participants had interacting with military members prior to the study. Without fully appreciating their unique and distinct role in the RC scenario, the NGO personnel may have presented this opportunity to their well trained and more experienced CF counterparts, which may have unwittingly led to feelings of lack of respect and diminished power and influence on the part of the NGO personnel. These findings are worth understanding in more detail, as they suggest that uncertainty about jurisdiction may be related to the conditions for collaboration and to the quality of the collaboration process itself.

We wondered just how collaboration would unfold if conditions of mutual respect and shared power were not fully realized. And, in fact, there was some evidence that a lack of mutual respect or lack of shared power may have had a negative impact on the process of collaboration.

4.1.3 Process of Collaboration

Correlational analyses showed that when participants reported feeling respected, they also thought that they had more power and influence, they were more engaged in the process, and they thought communication was positive. The opposite can be said of those who reported feeling less respected, (i.e., they were less engaged, they thought they had less power and influence, and communication was not judged as positive). Correlational analyses also showed that those who reported a higher degree of power and influence during the negotiation also thought that they were more respected, were more engaged, and thought that the communication was positive. Not surprisingly, these relationships were stronger for the RC scenario than the PS scenario. Together, these results suggest that having respect and power will increase engagement in the collaboration process and support positive communication, which are critical for effective collaboration.

Considering their experience of collaborating, again results showed that the scenario played a significant role. Overall, participants reported significantly less positive engagement with the RC scenario compared to the PS scenario. However, NGOs reported significantly less engagement in the RC scenario specifically on the item “I contributed something valuable to the negotiation” and marginally significantly less engagement on the item “I participated at the level that I wanted to.” These results are consistent with the finding that NGO personnel reported having a hard time getting their CF counterparts to listen to them, and a hard time getting their way, even if they tried. With respect to communication, results showed that items such as “The communication was friendly” and “We developed a good rapport” were rated marginally higher in the PS scenario than in the RC scenario.

The key issue concerning the process of collaboration is why NGO personnel felt that they did not make the contribution that they would have liked and did not participate to the level that they wanted. Did their CF counterparts close opportunities for engagement? Were CF personnel more apt at addressing complex situations as a consequence of training and experience, such that they comfortably took the lead in resolving the particular issues they faced? In fact, considering negotiation items from the point of view of one’s counterpart, the CF appeared to get a better grade overall. That is, CF personnel rated the overall integrative negotiation items of their counterparts marginally lower than did NGO personnel. As mentioned earlier, perhaps previous negotiation training and operational experience favoured CF personnel when confronting ambiguity, and this did not go unnoticed by their NGO counterparts.

4.1.4 Outcomes of Collaboration

With respect to the outcomes of the collaboration, we measured it in two ways. First, we asked participants to rate both their satisfaction with the outcome and their satisfaction with the relationship that they developed as a result of the negotiation. Importantly, we also asked whether or not interactions in the negotiation built a strong foundation for a future relationship, as experiences may positively or negatively influence future collaboration efforts. We asked participants to rate their personal performance as well. Second, we included an objective indicator to assess how a negotiation proceeded and ended.

In terms of satisfaction with the relationship and the possibility of a future relationship with their counterpart after the negotiation, although CF and NGO personnel showed no differences in satisfaction, they both reported marginally less satisfaction with their counterpart after the RC scenario than after the PS scenario. And this was true for future relationships as well (i.e.,

participants were significantly more likely to report that their experience in the PS scenario built a good foundation for a future relationship compared to in the RC scenario). Exploring satisfaction with the outcome, CF personnel were marginally more satisfied than NGO personnel, but both groups reported being marginally more satisfied with the outcome of the PS scenario than the outcome of the RC scenario. CF personnel were significantly more satisfied with the balance of outcomes than NGO personnel. To note, results suggest that CF personnel thought that their counterparts would be marginally less satisfied with their own (NGO) outcomes, suggesting a level of awareness on their (CF) part regarding the overall negotiation.

Similarly, on a measure of personal performance, NGO personnel showed the lowest means in both scenarios, which were significantly lower than the self-rated personal performance of CF personnel. Most troubling, perhaps, is the result showing NGO personnel marginally “losing face” during the interaction, and feeling significantly less competent than the CF personnel as a negotiator after both scenarios. In all cases, they rated their performance in the RC scenario to be lower than that in the PS scenario.

Further, in terms of personal performance, it is perhaps not surprising that NGO personnel negotiating with more experienced CF counterparts would feel less competent in their own performance compared to CF personnel, especially in situations that are ambiguous and complex. As reported earlier, NGO personnel in this study had little negotiation training and less operational experience compared to their CF counterparts. The implications of this differential experience are important as differences in negotiation skills and operational experience could actually lead to feelings of ill will, especially out in the field.

It is challenging to assess one’s own performance and how it is being interpreted by one’s counterpart. To examine this, we asked participants to self-evaluate their collaborative performance (e.g., “My counterpart would say that I respected his or her rights,” “...valued his or her participation,” etc.) in order to allow us to assess how their ratings would correspond to their counterpart’s ratings. As we were primarily interested in the issue of respect for effective collaboration, this scale effectively duplicated the respect scale. Results showed a disconnect in perceptions, such that CF personnel thought that they had treated their counterpart in the RC scenario respectfully, but this perception was inconsistent with their counterpart’s perspective. In light of how NGO personnel reported feeling less respected and as having received less consideration from their counterpart during the RC scenario specifically, these results seem to signal a potential critical “blind spot” for CF personnel when working collaboratively with civilian counterparts.

Further, correlational analyses showed a relationship between respect and collaboration outcomes. For example, higher ratings of respect were positively correlated with more positive perceptions of one’s counterpart and their organization, satisfaction with the relationship and future relationships on the basis of the collaboration experience, and satisfaction with the outcome. Respect and personal performance were positively correlated, but only in the RC scenario. Correlation results from the observer’s behavioural coding also suggested that when participants felt respected, they also exhibited less suboptimal respecting behaviours, suggesting that respect begets respect. In addition, a sense of power and influence was also correlated with outcomes. In the RC scenario, a sense of having power and influence was positively related to personal performance and satisfaction with the outcome, and a more positive perception of one’s counterpart’s organization. In the PS scenario, having a sense of power and influence was

positively correlated with more positive perceptions of one's counterpart and their organization, satisfaction with the relationship and future relationships, and satisfaction with the outcome. Correlations involving the observer's behavioural coding suggest that when a counterpart employs influential strategies, one's own sense of influence diminishes. It seems then that a lack of respect and power will impact negatively on both collaboration processes and outcomes.

The objective performance indicators of collaboration suggest that CF personnel overall had a clear advantage during the negotiation; that is, they "won" more of their priorities (were awarded more points) compared to their NGO counterparts ($M = 0.68$ & 0.51 , respectively), though interestingly, scores for both counterparts were higher in the RC scenario ($M = 0.59$ & 0.77 for NGO and CF, respectively) than in the PS scenario ($M = 0.45$ & 0.59 for NGO and CF, respectively). Behavioural coding data from the observer also revealed consistently better ratios of optimal to suboptimal behaviours for the CF personnel compared to the NGO personnel for influence strategies, negotiation, and communication behaviour, which might ultimately be an illustration of CF negotiation training. However, despite showing optimal behaviours during the negotiations and gaining more of their priorities, the CF interactions with the NGOs were less than ideal from the perspective of the NGO personnel, as was most pronounced during the RC scenario.

Perhaps inadvertently, CF training and experience influenced the collaboration in unintended ways. In following their negotiation training closely and in focusing on promoting their priorities in the negotiations, CF personnel may have been less focused on attending to the needs and interests of their counterparts, especially in an ambiguous and complex setting such as that reflected in the scenarios. Such a complex setting presented an opportunity for the CF personnel to "take charge," but perhaps required greater sensitivity to their counterpart's contribution than was displayed. In short, CF participants may well have heard (in accordance with their training), but failed to really listen to, their counterparts. Recall that NGO participants reported having a hard time getting their counterpart to listen and in getting their way, even when they tried. Acting in accordance with their training may have prevented the CF participants from providing an "equal opportunity" to their NGO counterparts to voice their opinions, interests, and ideas, and may have prevented CF participants from devoting the energy necessary to help the NGO personnel better achieve their own goals.

In addition, ambiguous situations like the RC scenario may require us to draw more on our own resources (e.g., knowledge and experience). CF personnel may have been inclined to maximize their operational experience to address the issues in the RC scenario. They may have deviated from the information package in the sense of using their own personal knowledge and experience about peace support operations and CF logistics to support their own priorities during the refugee scenario. Although NGO personnel came into the negotiations with a wide range of prior experience, most were at a relatively early stage in their career and may have had somewhat less exposure to negotiations in complex environments. Reliance on CF resources and expertise may have signalled a shift in power disproportionately to the CF negotiators, which, in turn, may have led to less satisfaction on the part of NGO personnel regarding collaboration.

It should be noted that real-life operations often require CF personnel to work with others, including civilians, who have varying levels of experience and skill. In these situations, the present findings suggest that CF personnel should recognize the skills that their counterparts bring to the table and use their own experience in such a way as to avoid being perceived as

controlling the process. The key to working collaboratively in a complex operational environment is finding the best possible balance between protecting one's own interests and preserving a good relationship with one's counterpart. Having a voice and influence on the outcomes will be important for both parties in any civil-military collaboration. Dominating or prevailing over one's counterpart within the context of a negotiation may help garner short-term gains, but if such gains are won at the expense of mutual respect and shared power, then any benefits could be short-lived. The process of collaboration includes important outcomes, like relationship building, and sacrificing such outcomes in order to further one's interests may have long-term negative effects. The key issue then is not whether or not one "wins" a negotiation, as such performance measures favoured CF personnel in the current study, but rather how one interacts during civil-military collaboration.

4.1.5 Future Research

Given the limitations of the jurisdiction manipulation (i.e., the fact that many participants did not appear to perceive the jurisdiction as it was intended), the results presented in this report are difficult to interpret. A number of the significant findings appear to hinge on the difference between the PS scenario and the RC scenario, yet the nature of this difference is unclear, given the results of the manipulation check. The current research only had two different contexts of operation, which were meant to reflect CF and NGO jurisdiction. As the results showed, many participants were unclear about the jurisdiction of the RC scenario, in particular. Thus, future work could examine collaboration in a greater number of contexts with clearly and unclearly demarcated jurisdictions to determine the effects on civil-military relations. Ambiguity in jurisdictions could result in interactions that are very different from interactions that arise from clear jurisdictions. In addition, future research could explore the impact of external factors on collaboration, as different operational contexts and circumstances might signify different approaches to collaboration.

Although we did find a moderate degree of consistency between, for instance, observer ratings and behavioural codings of optimal and suboptimal negotiation behaviours, the internal reliability of these particular behavioural scales (for both integrative and distributive negotiation processes) was low, which may at least partly explain why findings were not entirely consistent. In addition, only one observer was used to code the scenario video data, and therefore inter-rater reliability could not be assessed. Thus, future research should seek to develop more reliable measures of negotiation behaviours and other collaboration-related constructs, and should include multiple observers when possible.

A more detailed comparison of the video- and audio-recorded interactions that took place during the scenario-based negotiations may also clarify why NGO participants reported less respect and power in the RC scenario compared to the PS scenario. Indeed, a deeper analysis of the rich set of qualitative data captured for this study could be the focus of further research. Such an analysis might illuminate key factors in explaining NGO assessments of respect and power.

Future research could also consider how variances in respect and power might impact collaboration and negotiated outcomes. We found positive correlations between respect and engagement in the process of collaboration as well as between respect and collaboration outcomes (such as satisfaction with the relationship, perception of counterpart, and satisfaction with the outcome). Similarly, a sense of having power and influence was positively correlated



with a sense of engagement in the collaborative process as well as with collaboration outcomes, but these relationships often depended on the scenario. Having a sense of power and influence was also positively correlated with perceptions of one's counterpart's organization, suggesting that a failure to have a sense of power in collaboration may invoke a negative perception of one's counterpart. Disentangling these relationships would be a logical next step in future research.

Understanding the relationship between respect and power is also important to consider. Having respect (feeling respected) seems to entail having a sense of power. Recall that categorical respect guarantees a voice, whereas contingent respect means influencing the outcome. Granting contingent respect, therefore, entails power and influence by definition. Looking at the dynamic between these two conditions would further shed light on their impact on collaboration.

4.1.6 Implications for CF Training

The ultimate goal of this research was to inform and support CF training regarding civil-military relations. A disconnect in perceptions between CF and NGO counterparts as identified in this research (e.g., regarding respect) demands re-evaluation of current CF training. Given that the CF will continue to be involved in comprehensive operations for the foreseeable future, it will be critical to ensure that relevant training supports the ability of the CF to develop effective collaborative behaviour (including respect) across a variety of civil-military circumstances. Research therefore should continue to investigate effective strategies of civil-military collaboration that may be used to enhance CF training initiatives for culturally complex, comprehensive environments.

References

- Adams, B.D., Filardo, E-A., Dewit, Y.C., Brown, A.L., & Flear, C.R. (in press). *IMPACTS: A military measure of cross-cultural competence*. (DRDC Toronto CR 2012-116). Toronto, ON: Defence Research and Development Canada.
- Anderson, C., John, O.P., & Keltner, D. (2011). The personal sense of power. *Journal of Personality*, "Accepted Article"; doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6494.2011.00734.x
- Boyce, L. A., & Herd, A. M. (2003). The relationship between gender role stereotypes and requisite military leadership characteristics. *Sex Roles*, 49(7/8), 365-378.
- Curhan, J.R., Elfenbein, H.A., & Xu, H. (2006). What do people value when they negotiate? Mapping the domain of subjective value in negotiation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 91, 493-512.
- Davidson, J. (2009). Making government work: Pragmatic priorities for interagency coordination. *Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs*, 53, 419-438.
- Eagly, A. H., Makhijani, M. G., & Klonsky, B. G. (1992). Gender and the evaluation of leaders: A meta-analysis. *Psychological Bulletin*, 111, 3-22.
- Fisher, R., Ury, W., & Patton, B. (1991). *Getting to Yes* (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Penguin Books.
- Foster, M.K., & Meinhard, A.G. (2002). A regression model explaining predisposition to collaborate. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, 31(4), 549-564.
- Janoff-Bulman, R. & Werther, A. (2008). The social psychology of respect: Implications for delegitimization and reconciliation. In A. Nadler, T. Malloy & J. Fisher (Eds.), *The social psychology of intergroup reconciliation* (pp. 145-167). Oxford Scholarship Online: Oxford University Press.
- Korabik, K., & Ayman, R. (1989). Do women managers have to act like men? *Journal of Management Development*, 8(6), 23-32.
- Kim, P.H., Pinkley, R.L., & Fragale, A.R. (2005). Power dynamics in negotiation. *Academy of Management Review*, 30(4), 799-822.
- Mackenzie, L. (2011, October). *The communication of respect: Incorporating research findings into the on-line classroom*. Presented at the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Chicago, IL.
- Meharg, S.J. (2007). Clash of the titans: Navigating new identities in conflict geographies. In S.J. Meharg (Ed.), *Helping hands & loaded arms: Navigating the military and humanitarian space* (pp. 115-140). Clementsport, Nova Scotia: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press.
- Pettigrew, T.F. (1998). Intergroup contact theory. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 49, 65-85.
- San Martin-Rodriguez, L., Beaulieu, M.D., D'Amour, D. & Ferrada-Videla, M. (2005). The determinants of successful collaboration: A review of theoretical and empirical studies. *Journal of Interprofessional Care*, 1, 132-147.



- Stein, J., & Lang, E. (2007). *Unexpected war: Canada in Kandahar*. Toronto, ON: Viking Canada.
- Thomson, M.H., Adams, B.D., Hall, C.D. & Flear, C.R. (2010). *Collaboration within the JIMP (Joint, Interagency, Multinational, Public) environment* (DRDC Toronto CR 2010-136). Toronto, ON: Defence Research and Development Canada.
- Thomson, M.H., Adams, B.D., Hall, C.D., Brown, A.B., Flear, C.R. (2011). *Collaboration between the Canadian Forces and the public in operations* (DRDC Toronto CR 2011-073). Toronto, ON: Defence Research and Development Canada.
- Thompson, L.L., Wang, J., & Gunia, B.C. (2010). Negotiation. *The Annual Review of Psychology*, 61, 491-515.
- Weingart, L.R., Olekalns, M., & Smith, P.L. (2004). Quantitative coding of negotiation behavior. *International Negotiation*, 9, 441-455.

Annex A: Voluntary Consent Form

Voluntary Consent Form

Title: Exploring Civil-Military Collaboration in an Operational Context

Principal DRDC Investigator: Dr. Angela Febbraro, Defence R&D Canada – Toronto (DRDC Toronto)

Principal Investigator: Dr. Barbara Adams (Humansystems)

Co-Investigators: Dr. Tara Holton, Defence R&D Canada – Toronto (DRDC Toronto) and Michael Thomson (Humansystems)

Thrust: 12og, JIMP Essentials in the Public Domain (PG2: Land Command)

I hereby volunteer to participate in the study entitled, "Exploring Civil-Military Collaboration in an Operational Context" (Revised Protocol #L-808, Amendment #1). I have read the information letter and have had the opportunity to ask questions of the Investigators. All of my questions concerning this study have been fully answered to my satisfaction. However, I may obtain additional information about the research study and have any questions about this study answered by contacting Dr. Angela R. Febbraro at 416-635-2000 x3120 or Dr. Tara Holton at 416-635-2101.

I have been told that I will participate in two separate realistic operational scenarios with individuals representing a different organization from my own (e.g., the Canadian Forces or a fictional non-governmental or international organization). I have also been told that I will have to assume the role of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Operator or of program manager representing the fictional non-governmental or international organization throughout the scenarios, and that I will be presented with a number of organizational goals that need to be fulfilled. I have been told that a number of issues will need to be considered as I collaborate with my counterpart in order to maximize my organization's goals for a given scenario. I understand that I will have to complete a number of questionnaires throughout the study and that each of the three collaboration sessions will be recorded (audio and video) in Skype Software Services for future content analysis. It is expected that the time commitment for this study is approximately 2 hours.

I have been told that the principal risks associated with my participation in this study are minimal and are anticipated to be no greater than what I would encounter in my daily life or occupation. If, however, a topic makes me feel uncomfortable, I should feel free to decline to answer. My participation in the study is completely voluntary and I may withdraw from the study at any time, without penalty.

Also, I acknowledge that my participation in this study, or indeed any research, may involve risks that are currently unforeseen by DRDC and Humansystems.

I understand that my experimental data will be protected under the Government Security Policy (GSP) at the appropriate designation and not revealed to anyone other than the DRDC-affiliated Investigator(s) or external investigators from the sponsoring agency without my consent except as data unidentified as to source.

I understand that my name will not be identified or attached in any manner to any publication arising from this study. Moreover, I understand that the experimental data may be reviewed by an internal or external audit committee with the understanding that any summary information resulting from such a review will not identify me personally.

I understand that, as a Government Institution, DRDC is committed to protecting my personal information. However, under the Access to Information Act, copies of research reports and research data (including the database pertaining to this project) held in Federal government files, may be disclosed. I understand that prior to releasing the requested information, the Directorate of Access to Information and Privacy (DAIP) screens the data in accordance with the Privacy Act in order to ensure that individual identities (including indirect identification due to the collection of unique identifiers such as rank, occupation, and deployment information of military personnel) are not disclosed.

I understand that I am free to refuse to participate and may withdraw my consent without prejudice or hard feelings at any time. Should I withdraw my consent, my participation in this research project will cease immediately, unless the Investigator(s) determine that such action would be dangerous or impossible (in which case my participation will cease as soon as it is safe to do so). I also understand that the Investigator(s), their designate, or the physician(s) responsible for the research project may terminate my participation at any time, regardless of my wishes.

I understand that as a participant in this research, I am entitled to a remuneration in the form of a stress allowance for a total amount of \$100 if I complete the entire research project as set out in the protocol. I also understand that I am entitled to partial remuneration if I do not complete all of the sessions. Stress remuneration is income and is subject to income tax.

I understand that by consenting I have not waived any legal rights I may have as a result of any harm to me occasioned by my participation in this research project beyond the risks I have assumed. Also, I understand that I will be given a copy of this consent form so that I may contact any of the individuals mentioned below at some time in the future should that be required.



FOR PARTICIPANT ENQUIRY IF REQUIRED:

Should I have any questions or concerns regarding this project before, during or after participation, I understand that I am encouraged to contact Defence Research and Development Canada – Toronto (DRDC Toronto), P.O. Box 2000, 1133 Sheppard Avenue West, Toronto, Ontario, M3M 3B9. This contact can be made by surface mail at this address or in person, by phone or e-mail to any of the DRDC Toronto members and addresses listed below:

- DRDC Toronto Investigators: Dr. Angela Febbraro, phone at (416) 635-2000 x3120, or email at Angela.Febbraro@drdc-rddc.gc.ca, and Dr. Tara Holton, phone at (416) 635-2101, or email at tara.holton@drdc-rddc.gc.ca.
- Humansystems Investigators: Dr. Barb Adams, phone at (519) 836-5911 ext. 249, or email at badams@humansys.com, and Michael Thomson, phone at (519) 836-5911 ext. 301, or email at mthomson@humansys.com.
- For research ethics issues, contact the Chair, DRDC Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC): Jack Landolt, PhD, (DRDC Toronto), phone at (416) 635-2120, or email at jack.landolt@drdc-rddc.gc.ca.

If you wish to give your consent to participate in this study, you need only indicate this by selecting the checkbox label "I consent" at the bottom of this page. If you do not wish to give your consent to participate, simply close your browser now.

☐ I consent and agree to participate in this study.

Annex B: Information Briefing

Information Briefing

The changing nature of international conflict has resulted in militaries (e.g., Canadian Forces) increasingly taking on atypical roles in support of humanitarian relief and reconstruction. Defence R&D Canada - Toronto (DRDC Toronto) is conducting research examining collaboration between the Canadian Forces (CF) and its civilian counterparts, most notably those working in non-governmental organizations (e.g., World Vision) or international organizations (e.g., International Committee of the Red Cross). This study, entitled, "Exploring Civil-Military Collaboration in an Operational Context," will explore the factors that influence collaboration between individuals representing different organizations and identify strategies that improve collaboration in a comprehensive operational setting that combines military, diplomatic, development and humanitarian relief efforts (e.g., Afghanistan, Haiti).

To assist with Part 1 of this study, you are being asked for approximately 30 minutes of your time to fill out an online questionnaire exploring your attitudes and experience working with and interacting with other people. Later, in Part 2 of the study, you will be asked to work through three realistic operational scenarios via Skype Software Services with an individual representing the CF or representing a fictional NGO/IO. You will be asked to assume the role of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Operator or of program manager representing the fictional NGO/IO and will be presented with a number of organizational goals that need to be fulfilled. The scenarios will also have a number of issues that you will need to consider when collaborating with your counterpart in order to maximize your goals. For each scenario, you will be paired with a different participant, but will follow a similar procedure. Additionally, for the second part of the study you will be asked to complete two 5-minute questionnaires exploring your opinions about the negotiation. We anticipate that the total time of the study is about 2 hours, and we can provide you with a small remuneration of \$100.00.

The information that you provide in the questionnaire is strictly confidential. Please note that your participation is covered by the Privacy Act, and that any information that may identify you personally cannot be released without your consent. Also, to ensure the anonymity of yourself and others, we ask that you do not mention specific individuals or groups by name, or provide enough details to identify individuals or groups, in the course of this study. This acts as protection to you in the unlikely event of an Access to Information request. Finally, any material used in the write-up of the final report or subsequent publications or presentations will have any and all identifying characteristics removed. Only the research team will have access to the online questionnaire to ensure confidentiality and anonymity. We will use a code number rather than names to further ensure anonymity. With your consent, we would also like to record the session (audio and video) through Skype Software Services in order to conduct a content analysis of the interaction between you and your negotiation partner. All of the information gathered on the questionnaire and captured via Skype Software Services is kept confidential to the research team except as data unidentified as to source.

The risks associated with your participation in this study are minimal (e.g., minor eye strain) and are anticipated to be no greater than what you would encounter in your daily life or occupation. If, however, a topic makes you feel uncomfortable, you should feel free to decline to answer. Your participation in the study is completely voluntary and you may withdraw from the study at any time, without penalty. Participating or declining to participate will not impact your career in any way.

This is Part 1 of the study. Part 2, the scenario based part of the study, will be conducted on Sunday 27 November 2011.

This study has been approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) of Defence R&D Canada (DRDC) and has been coordinated through the DGMPPRA Social Science Research Review Board, in accordance with CANFORGEN 198/08 (Coordination # 1012/11-N).

If you have any questions please feel free to contact the DRDC investigators, Dr. Tara Holton or Dr. Angela Febbraro at tara.holton@drdc-rddc.gc.ca or angela.febbraro@drdc-rddc.gc.ca.

For research ethics issues, you may also contact the chair of the HREC at DRDC Toronto, Dr. Jack Landolt, at Jack.Landolt@drdc-rddc.gc.ca or by phone at (416) 635-2120.

By clicking next, you are indicating that you have read and understood this information briefing.



This page intentionally left blank.

Annex C: CF Background Information

Background Information

Please provide the requested background information.

What is your official first language?

- ☐ English
☐ French
☐ Other, please specify:

What is your age?

Select

Sex

- ☐ Male
☐ Female

Marital Status

- ☐ Single (including divorced, widowed, separated)
☐ Married (including commonlaw)

What is your highest level of education?

- ☐ Some high school
☐ High school diploma
☐ Some university or college
☐ University or college degree
☐ Graduate degree

What is your current rank?

- ☐ Pte
☐ Cpl/MCpl
☐ Sgt/WO
☐ MWO/CWO
☐ Lt/Captain
☐ Major
☐ LtCol/Col

What is your element?

- ☐ Army
☐ Navy
☐ Air Force

Length of CF Service

Years

Months



Your Role

- ☐ Regular force
☐ Reserve force

What is your CF job title?

How many operational tours have you completed?

- ☐ 0 ☐ 1 to 2 ☐ 3 to 4 ☐ 5 or more

How many operational tours have required you to work directly with NGOs?

- ☐ 0 ☐ 1 to 2 ☐ 3 to 4 ☐ 5 or more

Can you provide more details about experience working with NGOs on operations?

1.

Date(s)

Location(s)

NGOs involved

Your role with NGOs

2.

Date(s)

Location(s)

NGOs involved

Your role with NGOs

3.

Date(s)

Location(s)

NGOs involved

Your role with NGOs

4.

Date(s)

Location(s)

NGOs involved

Your role with NGOs

Do you have another non-military occupation?

- ☐ Yes
☐ No

If you have another job, how often does it require you to you interact with other people (other than your regular coworkers)?

- ☐ More than 20 people in a typical day
☐ More than 10 people in a typical day
☐ More than 5 people in a typical day
☐ Fewer than 5 people in a typical day
☐ Fewer than 5 people in a typical week

Please indicate if you have received training dealing with the negotiation concepts listed below.

- | | | |
|---|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Interest-based negotiation | <input type="checkbox"/> Distributive Negotiation | <input type="checkbox"/> Integrative negotiation |
| <input type="checkbox"/> BATNA | <input type="checkbox"/> Principled Negotiation | <input type="checkbox"/> Mutual gains bargaining |

Have you received training either through your job or education related to your ability to work with other people or with diverse people?

- ☐ Yes
☐ No

Are you a qualified CIMIC Operator?

- ☐ Yes
☐ No

Are you a qualified CIMIC Staff Officer?

- ☐ Yes
☐ No

Excluding your official first language, what other languages are you fluent in?

Other than on operations, have you lived in another country (outside of North America) for a period of more than 6 months?

- ☐ Yes
☐ No

Ethnicity/Heritage:

Email

Your email address:

PLEASE CLICK SAVE before you click next to ensure that no data is lost.



This page intentionally left blank.

Annex D: NGO Background Information

Background Information

Please provide the requested background information.

What is your official first language?

☐ English

☐ French

☐ Other, please specify:

What is your age?

Select

Sex

☐ Male

☐ Female

Marital Status

☐ Single (including divorced, widowed, separated)

☐ Married (including commonlaw)

What is your highest level of education?

☐ Some high school

☐ High school diploma

☐ Some university or college

☐ University or college degree

☐ Graduate degree

What is your current role?

☐ Part-time student

☐ Full time student

☐ Other

of NGO field experiences you have been a part of

☐ 0 ☐ 1 to 2 ☐ 3 to 4 ☐ 5 to 10 ☐ 10 to 20 ☐ 20 or more

Can you provide more details about your NGO field experiences?

1.

Date(s)

Location(s)

Organization

Your role(s)

2.

Date(s)

Location(s)

Organization

Your role(s)

3.

Date(s)

Location(s)

Organization

Your role(s)

4.

Date(s)

Location(s)

Organization

Your role(s)

How many times have you worked with Militaries in the past?

- ☐ 0
- ☐ 1 to 2
- ☐ 3 to 4
- ☐ 5 to 10
- ☐ 10 or more

How many times have you worked specifically with the Canadian Forces (CF) in the past?

- ☐ 0
- ☐ 1 to 2
- ☐ 3 to 4
- ☐ 5 to 10
- ☐ 10 or more

Please indicate if you have received training dealing with the negotiation concepts listed below.

- | | | |
|---|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Interest-based negotiation | <input type="checkbox"/> Distributive Negotiation | <input type="checkbox"/> Integrative negotiation |
| <input type="checkbox"/> BATNA | <input type="checkbox"/> Principled Negotiation | <input type="checkbox"/> Mutual gains bargaining |

Have you received training either through your job or education related to your ability to work with other people or with diverse people?

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

Excluding your official first language, what other languages are you fluent in?



Other than for your work, have you lived in another country (outside of North America) for a period of more than 6 months?

- ☐ Yes
☐ No

Ethnicity/Heritage:

Email

Your email address:

PLEASE CLICK SAVE before you click next to ensure that no data is lost.



This page intentionally left blank.

Annex E: Project Security Scenario

Background Information

For the past 10 years, Canada has been conducting counterinsurgency operations in Coddlestan as part of a multinational NATO force. Though the insurgent network Zarki has been largely ousted from the country, there are still radical elements inside Coddlestan that continue to disrupt NATO operations. Moreover, the Hishite regime that was overthrown at the beginning of the war continues to be a major threat to the Coddlestan government's efforts. Prior to the war, the Hishite regime hosted the Zarki terrorist network.

The Canadian government has embraced a Whole of Government (WoG) approach to its operations in Coddlestan, utilizing all branches of government including the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Corrections Services Canada (CSC), and the Canadian Forces (CF). To date, the CF is the largest component of the Canadian mission, though there are increasing numbers of civilians from other government departments (OGDs) being added to the mission as the hostilities decrease or become contained.

For the past couple of years, CIDA has been awarding development projects in Coddlestan to a number of different Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). One particular project includes the development of a well and water irrigation system in a small town, Singon, just outside the capital, Usam. The Canadian NGO responsible for this contract is Water Management for the Future (WMF), which currently has four international personnel onsite, employing and managing approximately 20 Coddlestan labourers and farmers. They have been working on this project for approximately 4 months.

Before the war, Singon and the surrounding area were Hishite strongholds, and had a number of Zarki terrorist training camps located nearby. As a result, there are a number of radical elements still in the area. Combining their efforts, the Zarki and Hishite insurgents have been known to conduct hit and run assaults on NATO forces or lay improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Though primarily focused on targeting NATO personnel, the disruption of development and diplomatic efforts is also viewed as a victory for the insurgents. Anyone seen associating or "corroborating" with NATO (combatants or non-combatants), therefore, are considered legitimate targets by these radical elements. For example, in recent weeks, two local Coddlestans from Singon, working with NATO forces as translators, were abducted and killed. Other civilians have been killed by sporadic small arms fire and mortar activity in and around Singon. These actions are meant to terrorize the local population.

Because CIDA projects fall under the auspices of the WoG approach, the CF have been tasked with providing the necessary security to ensure that the project contract is fulfilled. The main CF base in Coddlestan is approximately 20 km south of Singon, on the outskirts of Usam. Rather than sending regular patrols, which is also plausible, the CF has deployed a platoon to a Forward Operating Base (FOB) to provide continuous surveillance for the project (i.e., providing continuous, all-encompassing surveillance to the Singon area). The FOB is on the outskirts of Singon. According to the CF, any involvement with the project such as helping to dig wells, build walls, provide materials, also helps promote a positive image to the locals. A core principle of



counterinsurgency operations is winning the “hearts and minds” of the local population. At the same time, the CF uses this opportunity for regular patrolling to collect whatever intelligence they can from the local population regarding the Zarki and Hishite activities.

Confidential Instructions to CF CIMIC Operator:

The CF have been in Coddlestan for 10 years supporting NATO operations against the Hishite regime and Zarki terrorist network, and have been based in Usam throughout most of the conflict. Though most of the radical elements have been eliminated from Usam, the surrounding area contains the strongest resistance to NATO operations, as local populations in this region were traditionally supporters of the Hishite regime. Although there continues to be regular insurgent activity, at this point in the conflict, the removal of radical elements from the area would be considered a major victory, and this it is believed will partially depend on winning the hearts and minds of the local population.

You are a CIMIC Operator. You have had experience working with CIDA representatives in the past, helping them coordinate some of their development programs. Your CO informs you that the support from the local population for the Hishite and Zarki elements has diminished, but the locals will comply with them more out of fear than loyalty. He also informs you that there seems to be an increase in local support toward the new government of Coddlestan, as a direct consequence of the development and diplomatic efforts they have been involved in. Despite the recent abduction and killing of two Coddlestans, your CO argues that keeping a CF platoon in Singon is a good way to gather intelligence, provide security and gain local support. He also believes that Coddlestan support would increase if the CF were seen participating in the well and water irrigation development project (such as helping dig wells, etc). He also would like to see regular site visits to the water irrigation project to strengthen public relations and ensure security to the completion of the project.

Your CO asks you to go and speak with the project manager from Water Management for the Future (WMF). He informs you that the WMF is advocating for less CF presence in the area and no CF involvement in the well and water irrigation project at all. As the removal of radical elements in this region is seen as decisive for the conflict, and the Singons continue to provide useful intelligence, it is important that the CF maintains regular contact with the local population. From a military perspective, the region is still hostile and the project is viewed as a means to help win the hearts and minds of the Coddlestans.

You have three main priorities. First, your CO explains that you need to maintain some level of presence in order to safeguard the project and prevent radical elements from gaining support from the local population. Upholding the status quo, i.e., maintaining continuous surveillance by operating out of the FOB, allows the CF to stay close to the project and interact with the local population. You do not want to let the radical elements think that you have moved back from your current position, so that they can re-establish themselves. Also, according to your CO, this is a WoG endeavour and your unit must ensure that its objectives are achieved. Second, he would like to see regular site visits as this is a way of convincing the local population that the CF supports development projects that promote their infrastructure and prosperity for the future. A couple of visits per month would be ideal. Third, your CO would like to see some of the guys help with the project. He thinks that this will promote a positive image of the CF both in Coddlestan and at home.



CF Measures:

Priority 1: Providing security

Score
Status quo, continuous surveillance, FOB = 30 points
3 weekly patrols from Usam = 20 points
1 weekly patrol from Usam = 10 points

Priority 2: On-site visits of CF with CIDA representatives

Score
No visits = 0 points
1 Visit/month = 10 points
2 Visits/month = 20 points

Priority 3: Project involvement

Score
No involvement = 0 points
Some involvement (e.g., CF digging wells, delivering materials) = 10 points



Confidential Instructions to Project Manager, Water Management for the Future:

You are the Water Management for the Future (WMF) Project Manager of the well and water irrigation project in Singon. At present, you and your staff have regular contact with the CF personnel stationed in Singon. You get along well enough with the soldiers and highly appreciate the security that they provide in the region as a whole. You have met with them at a neutral site to avoid putting your beneficiaries at risk. These meetings have been friendly enough, and they keep you informed about security (i.e., radical elements in the region). But your ultimate concern is for the safety of you and your project team.

You know that radical elements target non-combatants if they think they are associated or corroborating with NATO forces as recent events show. To minimize the risk of being targeted, the WMF want to maintain a professional distance from the CF. You believe that this distance will help to maintain your organization's neutrality and impartiality in the eyes of the local community and, more importantly, the Hishite and Zarki insurgents. As an NGO, it is important that WMF is seen as providing service to those in need and adhering to its mandate, without being seen as overtly siding with or supporting NATO forces. In the past, the CF had provided support to the project (e.g., digging, moving materials, etc.). This was useful and welcomed before you employed local Singons. But currently, CF support is no longer required nor desired. It is vital for your project to reduce the potential harm to your staff from the sporadic small arms and mortar activity, and potential abductions. You believe that this risk is increased because of the continued CF presence. Your Executive Director has asked that you speak to a CIMIC Operator to determine a suitable degree of civil-military interaction.

You have three priorities. First, to mitigate the risk to you and your staff, you would like absolutely no involvement of CF personnel in the project. You have qualified Coddlestan staff as well as your own WMF staff's expertise to rely upon for meeting the goals of the project. In this particular project, CF involvement has been minimal and you do not want to foster a false impression that you are associating too closely with or corroborating with NATO, as this may provoke a negative retaliation by the Zarki and Hishite radical elements around Singon. Second, you and your Executive Director think that site visits from CF personnel would be okay, provided that CF personnel do not come unannounced, that the site visits are scheduled by WMF, the visits are accompanied by CIDA representatives, and these visits are few in number. Third, you would like to see the continuous CF presence replaced with patrols. You believe that as long as the CF remains in the area on an on-going basis, the project and its personnel may be considered a target, increasing their risk. It is clear that the Zarki and Hishite element's feud is with NATO forces and not the development projects, though they seem willing to extend this to include development projects. In your view, the CF FOB (forward operating base) in Singon is way too close to the project, which, at times, draws sporadic gun fire and mortar activity, not to mention the possibility of IEDs (improvised explosive devices). Though security is important, you believe that one patrol per week would suffice.



NGO Measures:

Priority 1: Project involvement

Score
No involvement = 30 points
Some involvement (e.g., CF digging wells, delivering materials) = 0 points

Priority 2: On-site visits of CF with CIDA representatives

Score
No visits = 20 points
1 Visit/month = 10 points
2 Visits/month = 0 points

Priority 3: Providing security

Score
Status quo, continuous surveillance, FOB = 0 points
3 weekly patrols from Usam = 5 points
1 weekly patrol from Usam = 10 points

Annex F: Refugee Camp Scenario

Background Information

About 6 months ago, Garna was divided by a 5-year conflict between the Garna government and its Armed Forces (GAF) and the Garna rebels. The Garna government implemented new political and social policies that the rebels opposed. The GAF have largely defeated the rebels and the government is beginning to stabilize the country and gain international support. The core leaders of the Garna rebels have signed a tentative peace accord with the Garna government, though there are still small pockets of resistance from more radical members of the rebels in and around the southern capital, Feawana. The Garna government fears that if these pockets of resistance gain in momentum, it could undermine the tenuous peace agreement, sending the country back into civil war.

Exacerbating the tension is the conflict next door in neighbouring Kartoofoo. The Kartoofian Government Army (KGA) and the Kartoofian Resistance Party (KRP) are engaged in a similar civil conflict. Like Garna, the Kartoofian government has introduced political and social reforms which the KRP oppose and seek to overturn. In recent months, the KRP has made significant strategic gains in the south-western part of Kartoofoo. These advances in Kartoofoo are problematic for Garna. Intelligence reports indicate that the remaining Garna resistance in and around Feawana is supported by the KRP. Any gains by the rebels in Kartoofoo are viewed as a gain for the rebels in Garna by the Garna government.

As a result of the ongoing conflict in Kartoofoo, thousands of Kartoofian refugees have entered Garna for safety. In fact, there are an estimated 20,000 refugees just outside Feawana. Another 10,000 Kartoofians are already housed in a refugee camp just outside the south-eastern city of Quana in Garna. The Quana refugee camp has been operating for just under 2 months, though not under ideal conditions. The international community is requesting a refugee camp be set up outside of Feawana before the situation further escalates into a humanitarian crisis. However, because Feawana is within 20 km of the border between Garna and Kartoofoo, and is directly adjacent to a region of Kartoofoo that is currently occupied by the KRP, there is growing concern in the Garna government that KRP elements will pose as refugees and move arms and money to the Garna rebels through the Feawana refugee camp. The Garna government would like to move the refugees north to the Quana refugee camp in order to prevent the Garna rebels from gaining a greater foothold in Feawana through KRP support. This proposal has been met with resistance from the international community based on the assessment of a number of international organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that currently operate in Garna.



Confidential Instructions to CF CIMIC Operator:

The Canadian Forces (CF) have been deployed to Garna by the request of the Garna government to help stabilize the country following the conflict. You and your unit are part of this larger CF contingency, which has been in the country for 3 months. The CF base is on the outskirts of Quana. The CF's primary role is to provide security and border control in the south-eastern regions of Garna (approximately 100 km north-east of Feawana), in the Quana region, an area used frequently during the conflict to smuggle arms from Kartoofoo into Garna. As a Garna rebels stronghold during the civil war, this region was decisive during the war and saw some of the most intense fighting. Much of the city's infrastructure has been damaged and it is very hard on the population at the present time. Aid has been slow to move into this region.

At present, the greatest threat in the Quana region is providing a safe haven for KRP elements fleeing Kartoofoo as the KGA advances along its western border to the south. However, most intelligence reports suggest that if KRP elements are to cross into Garna, this will occur with the recent surge of refugees into Feawana. And since the Garna resistance elements are largely in and around Feawana, the CF has not seen any substantial combat or troop movement (neither Garna rebels nor KRP) in the Quana region. CF command believes that its assets could be utilized by the Garna government to destroy the remaining Garna elements in Feawana. However, there seems to be no political will to move CF assets to the Feawana area, except in a humanitarian capacity (i.e., provide limited aid and security to the refugees if necessary).

Given the intense hostilities in the region of Quana during the conflict, many aid agencies are not well established there. Instead, the IOs and NGOs in Garna have the greatest presence in and around the capital of Feawana. Currently, they are only able to deliver aid using military assets. In response, the CF has participated in a number of humanitarian activities while stationed in Quana. They provide the much needed food, water and medical aid to refugees in the Quana camp as well as provide security within the camp. The humanitarian aid delivered by the CF, therefore, has been a valued asset.

The CF wants to eventually transfer most of its humanitarian efforts (except some medical provisions and transporting food) to the IO and NGO community as soon as possible, so that the CF can carry out its primary role of providing security and border control. The CF suspects that if the refugees remain in the Feawana area, then the CF will be asked by the Garna government to provide humanitarian aid and some security, dividing their force. This would diminish its capacity to provide security and border control in the Quana region. Instead, the CF would prefer that the 20,000 refugees in the south (Feawana) join those in the Quana refugee camp because they believe this will speed the transfer of humanitarian aid and contain the refugees in one camp. The CF has plenty of aid resources at its current base to support the additional refugees (including food, water, and medical supplies) temporarily. More importantly, it can provide some security within the camp. The CF also can provide logistical support to other aid agencies that operate out of Quana, though currently these are few in number. Given logistics, the support to refugees in Feawana would be less.

You are a CIMIC Operator. You have been involved in coordinating CF humanitarian efforts within the Quana refugee camp. You speak directly with Rita Moorria, a Garna government representative, about CF humanitarian activities. On behalf of the Garna government, she tells you that CF presence within the refugee camps deter KRP elements from using it as a safe haven.

She further tells you that her government wants to move the refugees from Feawana to the current camp and wants the CF to use its assets (e.g., vehicles) to help move them and then provide further humanitarian support to the expanded refugee camp in Quana. The Garna government believes that this proximity will prevent the KRP from providing arms and money to further the rebels' destabilization campaign in and around Feawana. At the same time, Rita informs you that international aid donors are pressuring the Garna government to keep the refugees in the current location. The Garna government recognizes that this is a difficult balancing act and it is looking for the CF to negotiate the refugee issue with a representative from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). Rita informs you that the UNHCR representative supports the assessment for keeping the Kartoofian refugees in Feawana and is looking forward to an opportunity to speak with you.

You have spoken with your CO about the issue. You have shared some of your observations about the Quana camp with your CO, such as potential overcrowding in the camp, inadequate drainage when it rains (leaving pools of stagnant water), and Garna security elements being a bit "rough" with the refugees. Both you and your CO agree that the movement of 20,000 more refugees might not be sustainable. However, the CF position is to support the Garna government. He offers CF assets to deliver aid on a temporary basis in the hope that the 20,000 refugees move to Quana. Your CO believes that if co-located, the CF can provide aid to 30,000 people more efficiently than if they were distributed (10,000 in Quana and 20,000 in Feawana). Your CO explains that CF military assets close by will provide increased security to the refugees and ought to minimize KRP elements holding up or operating (smuggling weapons and money) in the camps. An increased CF presence in and around the camp might also deter the Garna security elements that are "rough" with the refugees. The current location also ensures that refugees do not mix with the local population in Feawana. The Garna government wants as many Kartoofians as possible to return home to Kartoofoo as quickly as possible. The CF is committed to the mission for another 3 months, with the option of another 6-month rotation. Your CO wants to move the refugees ASAP. If possible, he would like this to occur in the next 2 weeks.

You have four main priorities that you would like to get agreement on. First, you care most overall about supporting the Garna government and bringing the refugees north to the Quana refugee camp. Second, the CF is willing to provide security within the camp, but this is only feasible if the location is Quana. The CF can only provide minimal assets to Feawana to provide the proper security while still providing a robust force in the Quana region. Third, you can provide the necessary aid (food, water, and medical) more efficiently if all of the refugees are in Quana. Finally, you would like to move the refugees to Quana within 2 weeks using your military assets.



CF Measures:

Priority 1: The location of the camp

Score
Stays in Feawana = 10 points
Moves to Quana = 30 points

Priority 2: Security

Score
Providing security in Feawana = 10 points
Providing security in Quana = 20 points

Priority 3: Aid

Score
Providing food, water, medical aid in Feawana = 10 points
Providing food, water, medical aid in Quana = 20 points

Priority 4: If agree to move the refugees, timeframe for moving them

Score
2 weeks = 30 points
4 weeks = 20 points
6 weeks = 10 points
8 weeks = 10 points

Confidential Instructions for the Camp Administrator, United Nations High Commission for Refugees:

You work for the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. You have been the representative in Garna ever since the Kartoofian refugees have come to Garna. Your head office is in Feawana. You have a few staff distributed throughout the country. You have a few providing support to the refugees primarily in Quana. Though originally few in number, the UN has sent a number of personnel to assist with the arrival of the Kartoofian refugees and you have been asked to assist in the management of the refugee camp.

The assessment that you have been provided regarding the Quana refugee camp and the proposed Feawana camp is as follows. The proposed camp in Feawana is a desirable location because it is on a sloping terrain, thereby providing natural drainage from rain (unlike the Quana refugee camp) and little potential for pooled stagnant water. Stagnant water can produce diseases such as malaria and dengue fever, since it can become a breeding ground for the mosquitoes that transmit the diseases. The Quana refugee camp already holds 10,000 people. The addition of 20,000 more people would make it 30,000. The smaller the camp, the easier it is to manage when it comes to fire risks, security problems, and spreading other disease. Moreover, the shelters for the proposed Feawana camp will adhere to conventional standards (e.g., ensure that the minimum distance between two shelters is 2 metres), which is unlikely with a population of 30,000. It is believed that there is a higher probability of advancing a range of services (e.g., psycho-social supports, family reunification and education) within the proposed Feawana location than the alternative location in Quana. Given the fighting in Quana during the war, medical services and facilities in general (e.g., hospital for delivering babies) are much better in Feawana than in Quana. However, aid has been slow to arrive in Garna, and there is a shortage of food and water in the country as a whole. Aid from any source would be most welcomed. As well, given that the GAF is primarily concerned with destroying the current Garna rebel resistance in and around Feawana, there is little security available for the refugee camp in Feawana. You have heard from your staff in the Quana camp that the Garna security elements there have been seen to be “rough” with the Kartoofian refugees.

You understand that the CF has been in the country for about 3 months and they are based outside of Quana. They have been assisting with humanitarian aid at the Quana refugee camp, but their primary role is to provide security along the Garna and Kartoofoo border. You understand that the CF is willing to provide assistance temporarily, but they want to decrease their current humanitarian role so that they can focus their efforts on providing security and border control in the Quana region. Security provided to the refugee camp would be a great asset to your efforts as well as aid. Knowing military rotations are typically 6 months, however, you wonder how long the CF will be staying and what impact this will have for your needs. The Garna government has asked you to speak with the CF CIMIC Operator to work out the location and logistics for the Kartoofian refugees in the south currently in Feawana.

You have four main priorities that you would like to get agreement on. First, you want to keep the Kartoofian refugees in Feawana because the conditions are more favourable for ensuring that refugee camp standards are upheld. You are willing to send any new refugees to Quana, but you know that it could be expensive and psychologically disruptive to move those who have already started to settle. Also, to move the refugees to Quana would likely take 60 days to coordinate, and you are uncertain about CF assets and time. Again, military rotations are usually 6 months and



you do not know the CF commitment beyond that. Second, you want the CF to provide security within the refugee camp. This is vital to successfully managing the refugee situation. Third, you want to ensure that there is humanitarian aid (food, water, and medical) coming from the CF as this is in short supply. Finally, if the refugees must move to Quana, then, realistically, you'll need 6-8 weeks to coordinate this. Uprooting that many people is a major operation, and this will take time.

NGO Measures:

Priority 1: The location of the camp

Score
Stays in Feawana = 30 points
Moves to Quana = 10 points

Priority 2: Security

Score
Gaining security in Feawana = 10 points
Gaining security in Quana = 20 points

Priority 3: Aid

Score
Gaining food, water, medical aid in Feawana = 10 points
Gaining food, water, medical aid in Quana = 20 points

Priority 4: If agree to move the refugees, timeframe for moving them

Score
2 weeks = 10 points
4 weeks = 10 points
6 weeks = 30 points
8 weeks = 30 points



This page intentionally left blank.

Annex G: Pre-Negotiation Questionnaire

JIMP_PRE

0%

JIMP Framework

Before you meet your counterpart, we would like you to complete a short questionnaire. Please keep in mind the information that you just read about the upcoming scenario that you will work through.

Please enter your confidential 6 digit participant ID in the box below.

Instructions for creating your PIN:

Characters 1 & 2: First two letters of your mother's maiden name

Characters 3 & 4: The numbers corresponding to the month your mother was born

Characters 5 & 6: The first two letters of your father's first name



Please click next to continue.

Next

JIMP_PRE

50%

Manipulation Check

The scenario that you just read through describes a situation which is primarily under whose authority?

- ☐ Canadian Forces
☐ NGO
☐ It is not clear from the description

Perception of counterpart

Using the 5-point scale below, please answer the following questions.

	Extremely negative	Somewhat negative	Neither positive nor negative	Somewhat positive	Extremely positive
What kind of "overall" impression does your <u>counterpart</u> make on you at this point?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
What kind of "overall" impression does your <u>counterpart's organization</u> make on you at this point?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Perception of counterpart's organization

Using the 5-point scale below, please indicate your level of agreement with each of the following.

	Strongly disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat agree	Strongly agree
I believe my counterpart's organization to be trustworthy.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My values are similar to my counterpart's values.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The goals of my organization overlap with those of my counterpart's organization.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Anticipated outcome

Indicate the level of success you expect during the negotiation for the following items:

	Very unsuccessful	Somewhat unsuccessful	Neither successful nor unsuccessful	Somewhat successful	Very successful
How successful do you expect this negotiation to be <u>for you personally</u> ?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
How successful do you expect this negotiation to be <u>for the organization you represent</u> ?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
How successful do you expect this negotiation to be <u>for your counterpart's organization</u> ?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
How successful do you expect this negotiation to be <u>for your counterpart</u> ?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Your email address:

JIMP_PRE

100%

Thank you. Please inform the researcher that you have completed the questionnaire, and you are ready to begin the scenario.



This page intentionally left blank.

Annex H: Post-Negotiation Questionnaire

JIMP_POST

0%

JIMP Framework

Thank-you for completing the scenario. We would now like you to answer a few questions about it.

Please enter your confidential 6 digit participant ID in the box below.

Instructions for creating your PIN:

Characters 1 & 2: First two letters of your mother's maiden name

Characters 3 & 4: The numbers corresponding to the month your mother was born

Characters 5 & 6: The first two letters of your father's first name



Please click next to continue.

Next



JIMP_POST

33%

In the space below, please indicate what you and your counterpart agreed to at the end of the scenario **WITH RESPECT TO YOUR PRIORITIES.**

Respect

During the negotiation, I felt as though....

	Strongly disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat agree	Strongly agree
My participation was valued.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My expertise was acknowledged.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My experience was valued.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My opinion was valued.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I was treated fairly.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My voice was heard.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My rights were respected.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Power and influence

During the negotiation, I felt as though....

	Strongly disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat agree	Strongly agree
My concerns and interests did not carry much weight.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Even if I voiced them, my views had little sway.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Even if I tried, I was not able to get my way.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I could get my counterpart to do what I wanted.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My ideas and opinions were often ignored.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I had a great deal of influence.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I could get my counterpart to listen to what I said.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If I wanted to, I got to make the decisions.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Trust

Indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement:

	Strongly disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat agree	Strongly agree
My counterpart is honourable.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I have faith in my counterpart's organization.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My counterpart is motivated to protect the interests of me and my organization.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My counterpart is reliable.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Overall, this negotiation increased my trust in my counterpart.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My counterpart is competent.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Communication

Indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement:

	Strongly disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat agree	Strongly agree
My counterpart freely shared information that was necessary for me to make a well-informed decision.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My counterpart used language that I did not understand.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I clearly communicated my needs.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The negotiation had good communication.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The communication was to the point.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The communication was friendly.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
We developed a good rapport.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
We exchanged ideas freely.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
We struggled to communicate.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My counterpart clearly communicated their needs.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>



Engagement

Indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement:

	Strongly disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat agree	Strongly agree
I was able to learn from this process.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My values are similar to my counterpart's values.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I contributed something valuable to the negotiation.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I participated at the level that I wanted to.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The goals of my organization overlapped with those of my counterpart's organization.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Perception of counterpart's organization

Using the 5-point scale below, please indicate your level of agreement with each of the following.

	Strongly disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat agree	Strongly agree
My values are similar to my counterpart's values.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The goals of my organization overlap with those of my counterpart's organization.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I believe my counterpart's organization to be trustworthy.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Negotiation Process

Using the 5-point scale, please respond to the following questions.

	Almost never	Not often	Some of the time	Often	Almost always
To what extent did your counterpart share his or her priorities?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To what extent did your counterpart make an offer on two or more priorities at one time?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To what extent did your counterpart develop an argument for his or her position at the expense of yours?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To what extent did your counterpart state which of his or her priorities were more or less important?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To what extent did your counterpart make an offer on only one issue at a time?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To what extent did your counterpart ask about your priorities?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To what extent did your counterpart discuss issues that were off-task?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To what extent was your counterpart willing to make concessions?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To what extent did your counterpart note shared interests?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To what extent did your counterpart refer to the bottom line?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To what extent did your counterpart use threats?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To what extent did your counterpart try to weaken your arguments?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To what extent did your counterpart suggest moving on before issues had been resolved?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Satisfaction with outcome

Using the 5-point scale below, please indicate your level of satisfaction with each of the following.

	Extremely dissatisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Extremely satisfied
How satisfied do you think your counterpart is with their own outcome (i.e., extent to which the negotiated agreement benefits them)?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
How satisfied are you with the balance between your own outcome and your counterpart's outcome?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
How satisfied are you with your own outcome (i.e., the extent to which the negotiated agreement benefits you)?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Personal Performance

Using the 5-point scale below, please respond to the following questions.

	Not at all	A little bit	Somewhat	Quite a bit	Completely
To what extent did you "lose face" (i.e., damage your sense of pride) in the negotiation?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To what extent did this negotiation make you feel competent as a negotiator?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To what extent did you behave according to your own principles and values during the negotiation?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To what extent did this negotiation positively impact your impression of yourself?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Self-evaluation

During the negotiation, I think that my counterpart would say that I....

	Strongly disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat agree	Strongly agree
Gave them an opportunity to voice their issues and concerns.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Treated him or her fairly.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Valued his or her participation.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Respected his or her rights.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Valued his or her experience.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Acknowledged their expertise.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

[Back](#) [Next](#)



JIMP_POST

66%

Interpersonal relationship

Using the 5-point scale, please answer the following questions. Note the different response scale for each item.

	Extremely negative	Somewhat negative	Neither negative nor positive	Somewhat positive	Extremely positive
What kind of "overall" impression did your counterpart make on you?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

	Not very satisfied	A little satisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Satisfied	Very satisfied
How satisfied are you with your relationship with your counterpart as a result of this negotiation?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither disagree nor agree	Agree	Strongly agree
This negotiation built a good foundation for a future relationship with your counterpart.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

In the space below, please indicate 3 things that your counterpart said or did that facilitated the negotiation (point form only).

In the space below, please indicate 3 things that your counterpart said or did that hindered the negotiation (point form only).

Interest in Future Research - CF PERSONNEL ONLY

If you are interested in participating in additional online research (paid), please check the box below. We may have additional online studies you can participate in at this time.

☐ Yes, I am willing to be contacted via email regarding participating in additional research.

Your email address:

JIMP_POST

100%

Thank you. Please inform the researcher that you have completed the questionnaire.

Annex I: IMPPaCTS Questionnaire

IMPPaCTS Scale

Using the 5-point scale below, please indicate your level of agreement with each of the following:

	Strongly disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat agree	Strongly agree
I adjust my behaviour to suit the people I am working with.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I'm good at understanding how another person might see the world. *	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I'm constantly looking for new things to learn.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I like interacting with different types of people from different backgrounds.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I'm the kind of person who manages change well.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I am confident in my ability to solve most problems that come my way.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I get people to listen to me when I know what needs to be done.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If I'm in a group of people, I make sure my views are known.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I approach problems from many angles to find the best solution.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I feel more comfortable when I have a clear plan.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I tend to get along very well with others.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I have strong communication skills.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I can usually get people to do what I want them to do.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I am comfortable managing conflict.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
When a conflict arises, I am confident in my ability to find a compromise that everyone can agree on.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I understand how the economy works in other countries.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I have a strong moral compass that governs how I act. *	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I know about the cultural values and religious beliefs of other cultures.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I try to adapt my approach to the person that I'm working with.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I can deal effectively with any challenge that I encounter.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

* item removed

IMPPaCTS Scale

Using the 5-point scale below, please indicate your level of agreement with each of the following:

	Strongly disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat agree	Strongly agree
What's right for me is not necessarily right for everyone in the world.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I like to get things done quickly and efficiently.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I am generally an outgoing person.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I know how to connect with most people.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I seek opportunities to know more about other people.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I keep my emotions in check when tensions are running high.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I am aware of some of the different social norms of other cultures.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I tend to be seen as a natural leader by others.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I am aware of the different factors that influence decision making in other cultures.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I'm a "get it done" kind of person.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
It is important for me to establish cooperation and trust when working with others.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I follow international politics.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I try to see things from an angle that's slightly different from other people.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

* item removed